根據過去文獻公司經常以管理階層之薪酬契約來解決代理問題，激勵經理人做出股東財富極大化之決策。而過去企業衡量經理人績效時，大多使用財務性指標，然而知識時代來臨，傳統財務性指標已不足衡量獎酬制度，尤其當公司策略重視創新及品質導向時，若獎酬只與傳統財務績效指標做連結，可能會導致經理人做出不當的決策，故亦應加入非財務性指標來決定獎酬。本文主要探討專利權對高階經理人超額薪酬之影響，由於專利權對於獲利存在遞延效果，本文推論董事會可能依據外部人無法觀察到的當期非財務性績效指標，給予相對應之超額薪酬。
由於專利權對於高科技業更為重要，因此本研究以高科技產業公司為樣本，進行實證研究，結果顯示公司專利權申請數、核准數及被引證次數愈多，高階經理人超額薪酬愈高。 / Traditionally, firms use financial performance measures to reward managers and thus align managerial incentives with the interest of shareholders. However, recent evidence shows that firms are increasing using non-financial performance measures to evaluate CEO performance, especially when firms emphasize on innovation and quality. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between patents information and CEO excess compensation for high-tech firms. The empirical results show that CEO excess compensation is positively associated with patent counts and patent citations after controlling for financial performance measures. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-financial performance measures provide incremental information about CEO efforts over financial measures and thus compensation committees adjust CEO compensation for non-financial performance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G1013530072 |
| Creators | 黃榆芳 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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