In mid-April 1945, US and UK forces swept through Germany. The Western Allies had spent years preparing for the moment, cultivating a civil affairs capacity since the Interwar Period and devoting thousands of hours to planning for the occupation. However, the rapid pace of the advance stretched the new capability beyond its limits as frontline forces seized large swaths of Germany and encountered exponentially increasing numbers of displaced persons. The accidental discoveries of Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen and the tens of thousands of survivors suffering appalling levels of starvation and disease overwhelmed the forces dispatched to address the sites, resulting in a sluggish response. Significant flaws in Allied planning assumptions caused the breakdown that potentially cost hundreds of unnecessary deaths. Yet, operational staff officers from the Supreme Headquarters down to the division level recognized the poor response and, in two short weeks, adapted the plan to address the conditions on the front. Policy adjustments and messages from General Eisenhower removed ambiguity in existing guidance and provided clear direction to frontline forces. More importantly, the Western Allies formally merged the campaign plan guiding combat operations, OVERLORD, with the plan for occupation, ECLIPSE. The changes produced a marked improvement in the US liberation of Dachau on 29 April 1945, thereby demonstrating adaptation and innovation at the operational level of war.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc2356210 |
Date | 07 1900 |
Creators | Reeves, Jeremy Ray |
Contributors | Wawro, Geoffrey, Leggiere, Michael, Chet, Guy, Majstorovic, Vojin, Hunt, Jonathan |
Publisher | University of North Texas |
Source Sets | University of North Texas |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
Format | Text |
Rights | Public, Reeves, Jeremy Ray, Copyright, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved. |
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