The purpose of this study was to explore what strategy the U.S. Department of Defense should use and how its forces may/should be arrayed in future peace building and post-conflict reconstruction operations. The nature of the research for this study was analytical and qualitative. It considers U.S. Army as well as joint doctrine, and explores the recent scholarly literature on military efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. Based on this study, the author recommends the following as necessary implementations to U.S. doctrine and policy: 1) Revise NSPD-44, 2) Require a direct habitual relationship for training, planning, and operations between CRC and DOD, 3) Expand applicable training for CA personnel as well as other military officers, and 4) Revamp deployment cycle for civil-military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction operations. / Master of Arts

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor: Sepp, Kalev. Second Reader: Greenshields, Brian. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 1, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Civil Affairs, Irregular Warfare, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, stability operations, special operations, future threat environment. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-89). Also available in print.

Occupation operations are some of the most resource and planning intensive military undertakings in modern combat. The United States Army has a long tradition of conducting military government operations, stretching back to the Revolutionary War. Yet the emergence of military government operational doctrine was a relatively new development for the United States Army. During the World Wars, the Army reluctantly embraced civil administration responsibilities as a pragmatic reaction to the realities of total war. In the face of opposition from the Roosevelt administration, the United States Army established an enduring doctrine for military government in the crucible of the European Theater of Operations.

The history of the United States' occupation and administration of the Philippines is a premiere example of the evolution of the American military's civil administrative approach as it evolved from simple Army security in 1898, through an evolving ‘whole-of-government' method, to what was practically the full military administration of the country by March 1945. The second liberation and subsequent administration of the Philippines by the United States Army was unique, not simply because of the physical characteristics of the operations, but more so because of the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur used a rather self-reliant approach that rejected much of the direction from various authorities in Washington and adopted independently authored local solutions, but he took advantage of external resources when necessary. Ultimately the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under his command had to accept external direction to gain external resources. The Army's civil administrative planning and execution in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was the direct result of the social, political, economic, and military relationships between Americans and Filipinos from 1898 to 1944, much of which involved MacArthur, and the institutional changes that developed from these interactions. The result was civil administration that met the local and immediate requirements suitable for the conditions at hand. By August 1945 the Army ended civil affairs operations and transferred responsibility to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2005. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 6, 2010). "CSC 2005" "Subject Area Topical Issues" Includes bibliographical references.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

[pt] O Exército Brasileiro publicou em maio de 2021 o Manual de Campanha de Assuntos Civis, em substituição ao Manual de Campanha de Cooperação Civil Militar (2017) e ao Manual de Assuntos de Governo (1981). Baseado na recente modificação doutrinária ocorrida através da publicação do manual em questão, este estudo tem o objetivo de analisar como se deu o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis do Exército Brasileiro e como ela se traduz e se desenvolve a partir de um conjunto de práticas e experiências que visa a melhor coordenação entre civis e militares em operações militares. O estudo utiliza a revisão de bibliografia especializada e a condução de entrevistas como métodos de análise qualitativa. Argumenta-se que o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis se baseia largamente na experiência dos militares do Exército na condução de atividades de assuntos civis em operações de paz, operações humanitárias e operações de apoio aos órgãos governamentais, na realização de experimentações doutrinárias e no contato de militares brasileiros com doutrinas estrangeiras através de cursos realizados no exterior, resultando na utilização de conhecimentos doutrinários de países parceiros e organizações internacionais. Dessa maneira, constata-se que a produção doutrinária atravessa campos de experiências que conjugam o engajamento militar externo e interno. Adicionalmente, conclui-se que o Manual de Assuntos Civis visa consolidar uma doutrina que informe mais objetivamente a missão do Exército Brasileiro na sua relação com atores civis. / [en] The Brazilian Army published the Civil Affairs Field Manual in May 2021, replacing the Civil Military Cooperation Field Manual (2017) and the Government Affairs Manual (1981). Based on the recent doctrinal modification that occurred through the publication of the referenced manual, this study aims to analyze how the process of producing the Brazilian Army s Civil Affairs doctrine took place and how it translates and develops from a set of practices and experiences aimed at improving coordination between civilians and the military in military operations. The study uses a review of specialized literature and the conduct of interviews as methods of qualitative analysis. It is argued that the process of producing civil affairs doctrine is largely based on the experience of the Army military personnel in conducting civil affairs activities in peace operations, humanitarian operations, operations supporting government agencies, in conducting doctrinal experimentation and in the contact of Brazilian military personnel with foreign doctrines through courses conducted abroad, resulting in the use of doctrinal knowledge from partner countries and international organizations. In this way, it can be argued that doctrinal production crosses fields of experiences that combine external and internal military engagement. Additionally, one can conclude that the Manual of Civil Affairs aims to consolidate a doctrine that more objectively informs the Brazilian Army s mission in its relationship with civilian actors.

The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand’s COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand’s current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok’s most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.