published_or_final_version / Comparative Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 379-392). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1987. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 201-218).

The expansionist agenda of the Polk administration culminated in the War with Mexico. The capture of Mexico City in September 1847 left the United States Army with the unprecedented task of occupying an enemy capital for an extended period. After the initial theaters of operation proved unable to secure a peace, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott commenced a campaign to take central Mexico including the capital city. In March 1847, an army of 11,000 soldiers under Scott landed at Vera Cruz. In six months, Scott's army marched over 250 miles and won five major battles. In mid-September, Scott took Mexico City. Throughout the campaign, Scott attempted to implement a pacification plan in an effort to prompt Mexico to open peace negotiations. Concern for his army weighed heavily on him as he faced unprecedented challenges in occupying Mexico City after its capture. The United States simply had almost no experience in the ramifications of fighting a foreign war, other than a few brief small-scale incursions onto foreign soil at Tripoli in 1805 and in British Canada. The difficulties that arose for Scott from the situation in Mexico were frustrating. Scott pacification plan used conciliation, coercion, and force on Mexico's army and people in an effort to win the acceptance of the Mexican people. The success of his campaign depended on his army's ability to win battles while keeping Mexican civilian losses as low as possible. Scott devised a sophisticated pacification plan that was ahead of its time. This effort, together with his willingness to suspend operations after major battles to provide an opportunity for peace talks, reflected Scott's strategy. His goal was to end the war, not subjugate the Mexican people.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis seeks to demonstrate that such structural explanations as economic underdevelopment, ethnic fragmentation, and political corruption for the collapse of democracy in Nigeria in 1966, are insufficient. This study further demonstrates that the immediate cause of the collapse was the failure of the young democratic government to respond to the challenge posed by military opportunism through adequate civilian control strategies. The thesis argues that democratization is attainable in Nigeria if elected governments devise appropriate control strategies to check military opportunism while strengthening and legitimizing their own rule. It acknowledged that the first government of Nigeria's Fourth Republic, installed on May 29 1999, appears to have learned this lesson. The thesis concludes that constant vigilance on the part of successive governments will be essential as the Fourth Republic passes through the long process of democratic transition and consolidation. / http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1116 / Civilian, Ministry of Defense, Nigeria

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.) -- Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-64). Also available online.