Empirical studies of managers have shown that managerial work is characterized by a high level of social interaction (Carlson, 1951; Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1973). Managerial work is often conducted face-to-face, and managers often perceive a need to react to the situations, problems and requirements of others. Thus, managers often feel constrained and experience a severe lack of control. Accordingly, studies of managers have demonstrated the social character of managerial work, and have proposed that this aspect affects managers’ scope for action. Few attempts, however, have been made to focus on the social aspect of managerial work and explain how it affects the managers’ scope for action. This study aims to close that gap. In this study the manager is regarded as a social actor. The content and accomplishments of the manager’s work are hence regarded mainly as results of his or her social interaction (Willmott, 1987; Whittington, 1992; Hales, 1999). Drawn from structuration theory (Giddens, 1979; 1984), the notions of rules and resources are central to this study for it is when social actors draw upon rules and resources that they construct scope for action. Empirically the study is limited to one managerial task, namely the task of pay setting. The company, in which the empirical data was collected, has implemented individual and performance-related pay, a form of payment that places a considerable responsibility on the first-line manager. One objective with this study is therefore to describe pay setting in a Swedish company and thereby increase the knowledge base on the use of performance-related pay in this context. The empirical data in the study consists of interviews with 24 first-line managers in a medium-sized Swedish company producing electronic equipment. The results of the study show that pay setting is a complex and time-consuming managerial activity and that the managers face difficulties handling the pay-setting process. The collective agreements and the limited amounts of money to be distributed are perceived as constraints that make it difficult to reward high-performing employees. The study however shows that the manager’s scope for action during the pay setting process is negotiable, and that a limited scope for action sometimes is desirable.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-6930 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Creators | Neu, Elizabeth |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala : Företagsekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral thesis, monograph, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | Doctoral thesis / Företagsekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, 1103-8454 ; 116 |
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