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董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度關聯性之研究

自去年金融海嘯爆發,許多公司雖然經營績效不佳,其管理階層卻坐領高薪,經過媒體的大幅報導,使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓與黃金降落傘之現象。針對上述不合理的現象,投資大眾期能藉由公司所揭露的訊息,瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬之間是否具有合理的關係,並進行必要之監督。此外,股東行動主義逐漸抬頭,投資大眾可利用企業所揭露之資訊判斷公司大小情事,其中包括是否存在著公司經營不善,董監事卻溢領高薪的情況。另一方面,坐領高薪之管理階層為避免引起眾怒,可能會減少資訊之數量及降低資訊之品質,以減低其領取不合理之酬勞而引發社會譁然之機率。因此,本研究之目的在於探討公司董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性,並藉由實證資料驗證我國企業是否存在著此種規避資訊揭露之現象。
本研究實證結果顯示,董監事為了確保其本身之利益,而維持高額之董監酬勞時,可能增加董監事與管理階層合謀之機會,而共同隱藏不利之訊息,降低其資訊揭露透明度。此外,董監酬勞占公司淨利之比例增加時,董監事個人利益與公司營運成敗的關係愈密切,而影響董監事之獨立性。換言之,董監酬勞占淨利比較高之公司較會隱藏對其不利之訊息,使得該公司資訊揭露透明度降低。再者,公司董監酬勞異常高於同業平均值時,會促使董監事隱藏與董監酬勞相關之資訊,減少其資訊揭露之數量與品質,而降低其資訊揭露透明度。 / Since the global financial tsunami broke out in 2008, many corporations have performed poorly, but their top management still receives high compensations. Through the reports in news media, people become more concerned with the unreasonable phenomenon of corporate “Fat Cat” and “Golden Parachute”. Investors are paying more attention to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between corporate performance and directors’ compensations and to perform necessary monitoring. On the other hand, directors who receive high salaries may reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between directors’ compensations and corporate information transparency.
The empirical results show that for the directors and supervisors to maintain their high compensation, they may collude with the management in hiding negative information and reducing corporate information transparency. In addition, when directors’ compensations were abnormally higher than the industry average, they had a tendency to hide the compensation information or reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed. Consequently, these corporations had lower information transparency.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0096353038
Creators鄭琪融
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language中文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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