Through several wars, Israel has proven itself capable of standing up against superior foes, and the Israeli Air Force has always played a significant role in these successes. During the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli forces faced a new threat in the form of superior anti-aircraft weaponry when Egypt and Syria launched an attack on October 6, 1973. The Israeli Air Force was forced to stray from its established doctrine, yet they still managed to once again achieve victory. The purpose of this case study was to gain an understanding of the factors that contributed to Israel achieving victory during the Yom Kippur War and how a small state can defeat a superior foe. The actions of the Israeli Air Force during the Yom Kippur War were analyzed through the theoretical perspectives of John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape. The analysis shows that neither theory can provide a clear-cut answer to why Israel ended up victorious, but several aspects of them are prominent enough to help explain how Israel managed to get into an advantageous situation. A more extensive study that looks into factors such as the combined effort of the Israeli Air Force and the Israeli Army would be required to reach a more definitive conclusion.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-11070 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Kristiansson, Martin |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0023 seconds