「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。
本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。
實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。 / The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan.
This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors.
Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0090353045 |
| Creators | 馬瑜霙, Ma, Yu-ying, |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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