「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。 本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。 實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。 / The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan. This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors. Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.

美國的租稅正義公民會社(Citizens for Tax Jusitce)在一九八五年發表一篇震撼美國政府、企業界與學術界的研究報告，文章中指出美國最大約兩百五十家大企業中，有半數以上，在一九八一年到一九八五年當中 ，至少有一年未納一毛錢的聯邦所得稅，或者甚至收到聯邦的退稅款。這篇報告引起美國財經學者與會計學者對公司租稅負擔的熱烈探討，亦對美國國會通過一九八六年租稅改革法案(the Tax Reform Act of 1986)取消投資扣抵、擴大稅基並加強最低稅負(alternative minimum tax)之稽徵有重要的影響。 　　本文之主要研究目的在於探討我國上市公司之營利事業所得稅負擔，是否受到企業規模、產業別以及稅制變化之影響。本研究使用我國教育部電子計算機中心提供之「台灣股票上市公司財務報表資料庫」，取出自民國七十三年到民國八十一年連續九年間，相同八十家上市公司所構成之縱查資料（longitudinal data或panel data），利用二元固定影響模型(two-way fixed effects model)等方法進行分析，發現上市公司之規模越大有效稅率越低（租稅負擔越低），顯示較大的上市公司可能運用較大的政治力量來減輕其租稅負擔，此結果代表用租稅來反映政治成本的政治成本假說(political cost hypothesis)不適用於我國的上市公司。在財務會計的研究上，經常以政治成本假說為基礎來解釋經理人員為何採用可降低當期盈餘的會計方法，亦即假設政治成本假說為正確，則企業規模愈大，愈容易受到政治上的監督（例如稅捐單位的嚴格審查），其政治成本愈大，為了避免這種政治成本，規模愈大約企業愈可能採用降低當期盈餘的會計方法。但是由本文的研究結果顯示，同租稅來表示政治成本的政治成本假說在我國並不成立，因此，未來有關之研究，在解釋我國公司規模對會計方法之選擇的影響時，不能直接從政治成本假說的觀點來解釋。 　　本文亦參考國外有關文獻，將我國與美國上市公司同期間(1986~1989)的租稅負擔加以比較，發現我國上市公司的有效稅率低於美國，但其主要原因為我國上市公司有虧損所引起。 　　本文另外亦使用產業的虛擬變數來分析不同產業是否有不同的租稅負擔，檢定結果顯示產業別對租稅負擔有顯著的影響。最後，本文比較民國七十五年營所稅自30%降為25%與實施加值稅前後，公司租稅負擔的變化情形，發現七十五年稅制變動後，規模愈大之上市公司須繳愈多的營利事業所得稅。 / A 1985 study by Citizens for Tax Justice examined the corpor-ate income tax burden of 250 largest U.S. corporations. They found that almost half of the largest corporations paid absolutely nothing in federal income taxes, or received tax rebates, in at least one of the four years from 1981 to 1984.This thesis intends to examine the income tax burden of public companies in Taiwan. In particular, the thesis investigates whether firm size, specific industry and tax system change will affect the income tax burden of public (listed) corporations. Financial statement data of the public corporations were obtained from the Econometric Programm- ing System (EPS) data base provided by the Ministry of Education. The main sample consists of eighty corporations that appear in all nine years over the 1984-1992 period. 　　To control for individual company and time heterogeneity and reduce omitted variable bias, fixed effects models are employed in this study. Using a two-way fixed effects model, the result shows that the larger the corporation's size the lower the effective tax rate (the lower the corporation's tax burden). It indicates that larger corporations may have more political power to reduce their tax burden. The finding suggests that political cost hypothesis is not justified in Taiwan's public corporations from the standpoint of effective tax rates. 　　This thesis also analyzes whether tax burden varies across industries. The analysis shows that a corporation's tax burden is related to the industry in which the corporation operates. Finally, this study examines the changes of corporation's tax burden pre and post 1986 when the highest statutory business income tax rate was reduced from 30 percent to 25 percent and the value-added tax was adopted in the same year. The analysis indicates that after the tax system change in 1986, large corporations paid more business income taxes.

本研究探討包括土地稅之地方租稅結構，在經濟面的最適條件，並論平均地權的理想、土地利用的經濟效率與公平，能否經由我國現行中央和地方租稅的劃分形態下之土地稅制實現，與土地稅制度之改進等問題。 從人口分派至各地的效率觀點，地方稅制之安排，應使個人不論定居於任何行政區，均可獲得相同的「財政淨效益」。如地方公共財具有敵對性，地租單一稅並不能有效內化移民對地方財政之衝擊。另一方面，此一概念也與國民之財政待遇水平公平的條件一致。從總體之經濟效率與公平角度，地方自主之稅制選擇，至少不應擴大地方間財政淨效益的差異。 本研究試以政治成本最小化的模式，分析我國地方政府對土地稅制之選擇，結果未能顯著解釋台灣省各縣（市）在公告地價與公告現值相對調整幅度差異。同時地方財政自主性不足，地方土地稅努力也與其所獲補助顯著負相關。由於土地政策及國民福利有其全國之一致性，而地方財政有其特殊性，設計地方土地稅制應考慮全國之標準及因地制宜。為消除關於土地增值稅租稅性質及稅收歸屬之爭議，本研究建議雙軌課稅制度。 / This study focuses on the economic optimum conditions of local tax structure which includes land tax.　Such issues as whether the ideal of Equalization of Land Rights and the efficiency and equity of land use could be realized through the land tax system under the current tax assignment between central and local government in Taiwan, and ways of improving land tax are studied as well. From the viewpoint of distributing total population across jurisdictions efficiently, the arrangement of local tax should make one, regardless of which jurisdiction he resides in, receive the same “net fiscal residuum”(NFC).　If local public goods are rival, single local tax to land rent can not effectively internalize the fiscal impact brought by immigrants.　On the other hand, equal NFC is consistent with conditions for the horizontal equity of fiscal treatment to citizens.　With a view to the entire economic efficiency and equity, the tax choices made by local governments at least should not widen differences of NFC between jurisdictions. In this study, the model of minimum political cost has been used to analyze how local governments in Taiwan choose between types of land taxes. But the result of multiple regression could not explain significantly the discrepancy of relative ratio of adjusting rate of Announced Land Price to adjusting rate of Announced Land Current Value between local governments in Taiwan province.　In the meantime, the local fiscal position lacks independence.　Local land tax efforts are significantly negative correlation with the received grants.　Because it’s necessary for the national consistency of land policy and social welfare, plus the particularity of local finance, the national standard and district discrepancy should be taken into consideration in designing local land tax system. In order to eliminate controversies about the characteristics of Land Value Increment Tax and where the tax revenue belongs to, a parallel tax system is suggested.