本篇論文旨在探討具有明顯外溢效果之地方公共財政的最適供給量。行文中將假設公 共財價格固定，人口在各社區的分佈既定，以及同一社區的人民偏好一致。文分五章 ，約三萬字。第一章為公共財的分類，界定與本文分析有關的公共財。第二章為文獻 回顧，將與本文有關的文獻做簡要敘述。第三章為 佔模型分析，將公共財座落的區 位變數而導致的各社區利益消長加進傳統的 佔模型中，以決定均衡的供給量。第四 章，以遊戲理論的觀念，探討在失衡時，如何經由各社區的偏好顯示，而將公有財（ 因而私有財）供給量導向均衡。第五章為結論與未來發展方向。檢討前面各章分析結 論，指出尚存的問題，及將來繼續研究方向。

本篇論文旨在探討具有明顯外溢效果之地方公共財政的最適供給量。行文中將假設公 共財價格固定，人口在各社區的分佈既定，以及同一社區的人民偏好一致。文分五章 ，約三萬字。第一章為公共財的分類，界定與本文分析有關的公共財。第二章為文獻 回顧，將與本文有關的文獻做簡要敘述。第三章為 佔模型分析，將公共財座落的區 位變數而導致的各社區利益消長加進傳統的 佔模型中，以決定均衡的供給量。第四 章，以遊戲理論的觀念，探討在失衡時，如何經由各社區的偏好顯示，而將公有財（ 因而私有財）供給量導向均衡。第五章為結論與未來發展方向。檢討前面各章分析結 論，指出尚存的問題，及將來繼續研究方向。

本研究探討包括土地稅之地方租稅結構，在經濟面的最適條件，並論平均地權的理想、土地利用的經濟效率與公平，能否經由我國現行中央和地方租稅的劃分形態下之土地稅制實現，與土地稅制度之改進等問題。 從人口分派至各地的效率觀點，地方稅制之安排，應使個人不論定居於任何行政區，均可獲得相同的「財政淨效益」。如地方公共財具有敵對性，地租單一稅並不能有效內化移民對地方財政之衝擊。另一方面，此一概念也與國民之財政待遇水平公平的條件一致。從總體之經濟效率與公平角度，地方自主之稅制選擇，至少不應擴大地方間財政淨效益的差異。 本研究試以政治成本最小化的模式，分析我國地方政府對土地稅制之選擇，結果未能顯著解釋台灣省各縣（市）在公告地價與公告現值相對調整幅度差異。同時地方財政自主性不足，地方土地稅努力也與其所獲補助顯著負相關。由於土地政策及國民福利有其全國之一致性，而地方財政有其特殊性，設計地方土地稅制應考慮全國之標準及因地制宜。為消除關於土地增值稅租稅性質及稅收歸屬之爭議，本研究建議雙軌課稅制度。 / This study focuses on the economic optimum conditions of local tax structure which includes land tax.　Such issues as whether the ideal of Equalization of Land Rights and the efficiency and equity of land use could be realized through the land tax system under the current tax assignment between central and local government in Taiwan, and ways of improving land tax are studied as well. From the viewpoint of distributing total population across jurisdictions efficiently, the arrangement of local tax should make one, regardless of which jurisdiction he resides in, receive the same “net fiscal residuum”(NFC).　If local public goods are rival, single local tax to land rent can not effectively internalize the fiscal impact brought by immigrants.　On the other hand, equal NFC is consistent with conditions for the horizontal equity of fiscal treatment to citizens.　With a view to the entire economic efficiency and equity, the tax choices made by local governments at least should not widen differences of NFC between jurisdictions. In this study, the model of minimum political cost has been used to analyze how local governments in Taiwan choose between types of land taxes. But the result of multiple regression could not explain significantly the discrepancy of relative ratio of adjusting rate of Announced Land Price to adjusting rate of Announced Land Current Value between local governments in Taiwan province.　In the meantime, the local fiscal position lacks independence.　Local land tax efforts are significantly negative correlation with the received grants.　Because it’s necessary for the national consistency of land policy and social welfare, plus the particularity of local finance, the national standard and district discrepancy should be taken into consideration in designing local land tax system. In order to eliminate controversies about the characteristics of Land Value Increment Tax and where the tax revenue belongs to, a parallel tax system is suggested.