在知識經濟時代，智慧財產權在企業發展與競爭力提升上具有相當影響力，其重要性已不言可喻。近年來越來越多的關注焦點落在技術標準的發展上，蓋技術標準是技術成果的規範化、規則化，對企業而言，唯有引領標準，掌握制定規則的權力，才能形成真正的競爭優勢，否則就可能永遠受制於人。而對產業整體而言，技術標準對經濟及科技之發展有相當貢獻，蓋一旦標準形成，產品與零組件間相容性問題就可被解決，製造商之生產成本也可降低。一般認為技術標準的形成是大勢所趨且有利多於弊的效果，然在技術標準的制定與後續相關專利的實施過程，卻可能衍生出許多與反托拉斯法相關之爭議。美國司法部與聯邦交易委員會曾在1995年共同發表「智慧財產授權之反托拉斯準則」，表達對智慧財產權授權行為可能引發競爭法問題之看法，在相隔十二年後，於2007年4月間，又共同發表了「反托拉斯法執行與智慧財產權報告」，當中對技術標準與專利聯盟所牽涉的競爭法議題做了深入探討。
技術標準制定過程中引貣競爭法上疑義的行為態樣有專利劫持及抵制技術標準制定之情形。美國聯邦交易委員會已於2006年8月Rambus一案中，確立專利劫持行為違反聯邦交易委員會法第五條與休曼法第二條規定，聯邦上訴巡迴法院也於2007年6月Qualcomm v. Broadcom一案中，表示專利權人違反FRAND授權原則將形同從事專利劫持之效果，構成休曼法第二條規定之違反。至於抵制技術標準制定情形，法院已於2006年2月在Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia一案中表示確有違反休曼法第一條規定之見解。
目前各技術標準組織紛紛藉由:1.制定揭露政策，亦即要求成員揭露與欲採定為標準之技術相關之專利權，或2.訂定FRAND政策，要求成員同意未來將在符合公平、合理且無歧視原則下進行授權等方式，以避免專利劫持情形發生。惟由
於技術標準組織除在了解相關技術是否存在專利權之外，需進一步知悉未來專利授權條件，以做為是否將特定專利技術採為技術標準之參考，再加上FRAND字義上不易做成精確解釋，易生文義操弄之空間，仍無法解決專利劫持之問題，因此近期部分技術標準組織漸發展出事先授權條件揭露之政策，例如VITA及IEEE組織，要求欲參與技術標準制定之成員，必須事先揭露將來擬授權金額之上限或授權條件的最嚴苛限度。此外也有論者提出事先多方進行授權條件協商之可行性。
關於事先單方揭露授權條件政策之適法性，美國反托拉斯主管機關已表明不予質疑之立場，並肯定事先單方揭露授權條件有促進技術標準制定效率之優點。至於在事先多方協商授權條件政策方面，反托拉斯主管機關雖強調其對於技術標準組織是否應進行事先協商授權條件並未設立立場，但基本上仍肯定事先授權條件協商具減少專利劫持並達到促進競爭效果之優點，故傾向適用合理原則作為判斷是否違反反托拉斯法規定的依據。惟若專利權人以事先協商授權條件作為掩護，實際上共同約定以標準技術製造生產之下游產品的銷售價格(naked price fixing)，此時仍難逃被認定構成當然違法行為。
在藉由專利聯盟實施技術標準之過程，亦可能有構成競爭法上聯合行為與獨占行為之情形發生。相關引發違法疑慮之行為態樣包括:專利聯盟中包含替代性專利、競爭性敏感資訊之流通、排除他人加入專利聯盟、專屬授權、回饋授權、權利金約定、拒絕部分授權等。惟應注意的是，美國法院及反托拉斯主管機關認為，有鑑於專利聯盟具促進授權活動進行效率之特性，有助於技術提升及產業發展，因此傾向以合理原則判斷專利聯盟限制條款約定之合法性，而不當然認為此等行為態樣違反反托拉斯法相關規定。
在台灣喧騰一時的飛利浦光碟案主要亦是涉及技術標準實施過程產生是否違反公平交易法之疑義，九十六年四月間最高行政法院作出最終判決，纏訟已久的紛爭於是落幕。對於本案衍生問題思考，首先，本文認為公平會或許應審慎思考是否進一步制定有關技術標準與專利聯盟之特別處理準則。公平會似可參酌美國等先進國家之例，詳細規範技術標準的制定與發展，及專利聯盟的形成、對參與者的限制、關鍵性專利的決定、授權管理、授權條件的審查等各項問題。其次，在技術市場的界定與聯合行為的認定上，應回歸專利技術內容與專利技術間的關係加以分析；存在互補關係之技術，彼此間沒有制衡或牽制力量，不應被劃定在同一技術市場，也就不會成立聯合行為。而在獨占地位的認定上，應認為只要擁有製造某一產品之部分關鍵性專利技術，足以專利法所賦予之權利牽制他人對該產品之製造、銷售等行為，而該產品在相關產品市場可被認為具獨占地位，即應可認定專利技術擁有者之獨占地位成立。最後，在獨占地位濫用之救濟措施方面，公平會應依公平法第41條規定，妥善運用法律所賦予之裁量權限，縝密思索對於該當具體事案最為合理、適當的救濟措施，給予當事人最直接有效的救濟，而非僅消極地命令其不得繼續從事違法行為或處以罰鍰，對於事態之解決，並無法有效發揮回復市場競爭應有狀態之公平法規範目的。美國聯邦交易委員會於Rambus案及其他相關案例中極富創意地提出消極、積極的更正措施交錯運用模式，當可作為我國公平會未來對類似案件處理之參考。
為了成功地制定技術標準以引領產業發展，本文認為，有志於參與技術標準活動業者，在這個主要由歐美大廠主導技術標準制定的產業環境中，應注意歐美等國法規範內容與法院、相關主管機關之實務見解，才能知悉特定行為之法律風險以避免誤觸法網，並適當主張自己的權利。其次，可善用技術標準組織政策訂定方式解決專利劫持問題。再者，在技術標準制定之高度角力競爭下，必須培育跨領域人才參與技術授權談判才能增加脫穎而出之機會。而若欲藉由成立專利聯盟方式進行專利交互授權或對外授權，專利聯盟的組成與授權進行至少應符合本
文第七章所歸納的幾個基本要件，始不易產生違反競爭法之疑慮。至於在被控專利侵權業者方面，在面對專利侵權訴訟而進行訴訟攻防時，可朝專利權人參與技術標準或專利聯盟活動的行為是否違反反托拉斯法規定之方向加以思考，以冀增加勝訴之機會。 / In this era of knowledge-economy, intellectual property plays an important role in business developments. The significance of standard setting is thus much emphasized in recent years. It is generally recognized that standard setting brings many benefits to industries, such as costdown of manufacturing process and improvement of product compatibility, and patent pools can help to decrease transaction costs of licensing negotiations and to mitigate royalty stacking problems. However, disputes regarding the violation of antitrust law can be caused in the process of setting standards and the formation and the operation of patent pools. The U.S. DOJ and the U.S. FTC has discussed about antitrust issues related to standard setting and patent pools in “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” in April 1995 and “Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Right：Promoting Innovation and Competition” in April 2007.
Patent holdup and group boycott are controversial in standard setting. In August 2006, the U.S. FTC ruled in In re Rambus that patent holdup would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. In June 2007, the Federal Circuit also ruled in Qualcomm v. Broadcom that patent owner who has broken one’s previous commitment on FRAND licensing would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. As to group boycott, the court opinioned in Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia that group boycott in the process of setting standard could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) have tried to avoid patent holdup by making patent disclosure and FRAND licensing policies. Recently some SSOs have
implemented policies of ex ante unilateral announcement of licensing terms by patent holders or ex ante multilateral licensing negotiation between patent holders and SSO members to deal with patent holdup problems. These ex ante approaches facilitate competition between patent holders on licensing terms and allow SSOs to gain more information on patents. In light of the competitive effects these ex ante approaches generate, FTC and DOJ declared that they will review related policies and conduct under the rule of reason. But any efforts to reduce competition by using ex ante disclosure or negotiation process as a cover to fix downstream prices of products would be reviewed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The standard patent licensing by patent pools could also give rise to cautions of violating antitrust law. Certain behavior in patent pools can be deemed controversial, such as including substitute patents, exchanges of competitively sensitive information, exclusive membership, exclusive license, grantback license, package license, and so on. The DOJ and the FTC expressed that they will examine similar behavior in patent pools under the rule of reason, since patent pools provide a more efficient way for patent licensing, which help to improve technology qualities and industry developments.
The case, Philips v. Fair Trade Commission, R.O.C., also involved some disputes of violating Fair Trade Act. From the case, the thesis claims that first, there is a need for FTC to enact a guideline regarding standard setting and patent pools for the industries to follow. Second, while defining technology markets and concerted actions, one should analyze the relationship between patents. Complementary patents belong to different technology markets, so it would be impossible for complementary patent owners to collude with each other. Third, to identify
monopolization, the thesis asserts that the patent owner of technology essential for certain product will acquire monopoly positions in certain product market, and thus will be deemed as monopolists in the related technology market. Last but not the least, the thesis proposes that the FTC should not only passively prohibit the abuse of monopoly position and issue punishments, but also come up with some proper solutions, such as compulsory license, to actively maintain fair competition in the market. Some measures delineated by the U.S. FTC in In re Rambus can be referred for future cases in Taiwan.
To successfully participate in standard setting and patent pool activities, the thesis proposes certain suggestions. First, because most SSOs are led by U.S. and European enterprises and most SSOs are subject to U.S. and European legal jurisdiction, it is important to follow up to U.S. and European law and legal developments to avoid legal risks. Second, properly structuring SSO patent policies might enable SSOs to mitigate patent holdup problems. Third, the cultivation of inter-disciplinary professionals of technology, law, finance, and business management can be significant for industries in the standard setting competition. The thesis as well indicates several principles that might help to avoid the risks of violation of antitrust law during the formation and operation of patent pools. On the other hand, those who are accused of patent infringement might gain a better chance to win the lawsuit, if the violations of antitrust of patent owners in standard setting and patent pools are taken into consideration.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0094361006 |
| Creators | 陳貞妤, Chen,Chen-Yu |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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