技術標準帶給人類生活的便利性，也統一了特定物件的規格，但相對的也造成產業阻止其他競爭對手進入市場的工具，特別在配合專利制度之下，更形成打擊對手或要求授權金的重要工具。 觸控面板是目前非常普遍的高科技設備，特別是在智慧型手機愈形普及之下，更與人群的生活結合。蘋果在觸控面板方面的技術可謂全球第一。本文即探討蘋果以觸控面板興訟之後，專利庫最強大的三星和最弱的宏達電將如何因應，藉由客觀的資料探索蘋果起訴的目的，並藉此預測三星和宏達電的因應策略。

本論文試圖檢驗中國在技術標準化中推動自主標準的政治思維，並以全球治理概念中多元主體的研究途徑作為論文的基本分析架構。本論文試圖探尋以下三個問題的解答：其一，檢驗全球治理理論在分析技術標準議題的適用性；其二，描繪出中國的政府角色在全球治理中為重要的「看不見的手」；其三，歸納出中國推行自主技術標準的舉動為闡述中國在「和諧世界」政策下中國式全球治理思維的經典案例。 　　本論文首先回顧了不同派別的全球治理理論。和既存理論最大的差異為，作者認為全球治理是一種動態的調整過程。中國藉由政府主導的模式，協助尚未成熟的第二、第三部門(企業及公民社會)參與全球治理，這種強調政府角色在全球治理中重要性的傾向，使得中國被歸類於「國家中心維持現狀派」。中國的學者將此種現象稱為「中國特色的全球治理」或是「中國模式」，然而本論文歸納出所謂中國模式的特色是以西方的價值為政策架構，本質上以政府的力量增進傳統國際關係理論中的核心國家利益項目。換言之，中國特色的全球治理為尚未成熟的全球治理。本論文的案例－中國的技術標準制定政策，闡述了中國參與全球治理的學習歷程，因此，將此稱為「過渡中的全球治理」，以彰顯中國參與全球技術標準化競爭的特殊狀態。 於知識的權力結構體系中，擁有技術標準制定的權力日趨重要，中國的技術標準戰略因而規劃於 2020 年前成為領導創新的國家之一。然而在中國 WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) 技術標準制定的經驗中，隱約可見中國在全球治理中自我調整的動態過程，這種觀察為現有主流的全球治理理論無法充分解釋的。 / The thesis tries to examine Chinese initiative in indigenization of technical standardization for the global market. The basic analytical framework is based on the theoretical concept of Global Governance with a multi-actor approach. The following chapters try to touch upon three inquiries. First, it examines the applicability of global governance on standards setting issues. Second, it depicts the ”invisible hand” of Chinese government in global governance. Finally, it concludes that Chinese initiative in indigenizing technical standardization can be a good case in point to demonstrate a Chinese version of global governance under the guidance of “harmonious world.” This thesis reviews different schools of global governance. Unlike any of the existing literature, the author considers global governance itself a dynamic adjusting process. China partakes in global governance by emphasizing guidance from the government to boost the second and third sectors which are relatively underdeveloped. Namely, China inclines to be characterized into “state-centric status quo” school, which affirms that government is the most determining actor of global governance, thus not willing to give up “controls of the government.”Chinese scholars dub this phenomenon “Chinese version of global governance” or “China model.” This paper concludes that the so called “China Model” of global governance was conducted in western culture’s framework with a realist’s state-led approach in essence. In other words, Chinese version of global governance can not be regarded as a full-fledged one. The case study standard setting policy of China has illustrated a better picture of China’s learning process of global governance. Accordingly, “global governance in process” was coined into the title of this thesis to identify the current status of China’s involvement in global competition of technical standardization. Given the growing stake of “technical standards setting” in a knowledge-based power structure, Chinese initiative of technical standardization strategy has paved the way for pursuing leading innovative state in 2020. The lesson China learned from WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) standard setting has provided us a clues about the self-adjusting role of the state in global governance as a dynamic process which could not be fully explained by conventional version of global governance prevailing nowadays.

隨著全球3G行動通訊產業的快速發展，行動通訊服務市場正從傳統的單純語音走向與資料傳輸整合的趨勢，並發展出多種不同型態的通訊服務方式與系統設備，其中所牽涉到的3G技術範圍十分廣泛而複雜，其技術標準規格的發展則是由3G的技術標準組織所負責制定。本論文研究針對3G行動通訊產業進行解析，並探討3G行動通訊技術標準組織的運作及功能，並進一步瞭解在3G行動通訊技術標準的制定過程中所衍生出來的關鍵性專利問題，此外也特別針對專利聯盟公司3G Licensing Ltd.的成立與運作做一說明，以進一步瞭解3G產業中專利平台運作的情形，最後並總結對台灣行動通訊產業所可以參考的結論與建議。 / 3G technologies are being deployed to worldwide markets rapidly. The mobile services are converging with voice and data transmission. There are various companies involving in 3G system and terminal business. The relative technologies are complicated and quite broad. The 3G standard organizations are the main bodies responsible for the establishment of 3G technical specifications. This article would describe an overview of 3G industries and 3G standard organizations. It would specify how the 3G standard organizations function and discuss the issues of 3G essential patents. Regarding 3G patent platform, this article would also talk about the history and status of 3G Licensing Ltd. In the last chapter, it would try to summarize the key points as the references for Taiwan mobile industry.

電信服務日新月異，電信技術與標準推陳出新，在眾多技術與標準中，選擇一種可以獲得用戶支持，並且滿足潛在市場需求的技術標準，在世代交替與技術標準轉換之際，選擇適合的技術標準，以建構用戶基礎與技術優勢，將是投資龐大之電信公司營運成功與否的關鍵因素。 過去曾經風光的封閉型電信標準，如日本的NTT DoCoMo的PDC與其iMode標準，終究因為不能滿足新的競爭與市場需求，並且電信服務價值鏈日漸繁複的趨勢，終就還是走入歷史；近年封閉與非主流的低功率行動電話PHS標準被中國與其他國家捨棄，目前唯一經營PHS的日本Willcom電信公司與台灣的A公司也都紛紛進入財務重整，全球PHS用戶曾經達到一億之盛況，卻因為中國大陸的電信政策影響，讓曾經風光，俗稱小靈通的PHS因此消失。 PDC和PHS都是被認為是曾經領先當代的封閉型技術標準，也都是日本電信公司自主研發的先進行動通信技術，但是NTT DoCoMo只經營了三年PHS，即終止PHS服務，而Willcom電信公司(DDI Pocket前身)則選擇持續發展PHS技術；曾經封閉的PHS技術領先其他電信標準，最後卻遭到淘汰；對照蘋果公司的iOS作業系統與iTunes服務，一樣是封閉型系統，Apple卻仍是屹立不搖；未來是否可以持續保持，封閉型的標準是否可以成功，擁有廣大市場，主導整個服務鏈，頗值得深入探討。 全球各國對於電信技術與標準的管理，已逐漸採行技術中立的政策，對於技術與標準的選擇，政府政策因素的影響對企業選擇標準因素限制，已逐漸降低；本研究將以台灣A公司經營PHS為例，對照中國與日本的PHS電信業者，探討與分析電信公司選擇封閉型、非主流電信標準之成功可行性。 / Telecommunication Services have been changed rapidly recently; technologies and standards are also replaced to next generation every few years period. There are technology standards; right selection of standard is to fulfill requirements and obtain market is important. There were successful closed type telecom standards, like PDC of NTT DoCoMo in the 2G era. But finally it had been replaced by 3G, its next generation technology. The standard of telecom trend is toward an open type telecom standard. It is due to the complication of value chain of telecom services and global interfaces requirements. The closed type of technology standard is gradually abandoned. The PHS technology has been developed and adopted by leading technology telecom service provider, Willcom Japan, Telecom Company A in Taiwan announced PHS to be upgraded to XGP for a 100Mbps high speed mobile data network to compete with dominant and worldwide adopted a 4 G LTE mobile standard. But both companies went bankruptcy recently. The subscribers of PHS had been reached to his peak at 100 millions, the government policy has caused PHS in China clear away in a day. PDC and PHS are all considered as closed type technology standards. They were all invented by Japanese Telecom Operators. NTT had been operated and provided PHS service only for 3 years. The PHS leading operator, Willcom (previously DDI Pocket) is all the way providing services with PHS upgraded technology. But The Company is still facing financial difficulty and numbers of subscribers decreased dramatically. In Comparison with Apple Inc. who developed the closed type iOS and iTunes standards, are still leading mobile handset and applications markets. Apple’s service and product now become market dominant. Will Apple’s closed technologies maintenance for future successful? It is worth to be studied and look into details and referred with the PHS technology development as closed type standards. The natural to technology and standard is a trend globally from the government management policy. The governing policy has less effect on the technology and standard selection. The study is based on the case of A company using PHS technology to analyze Selection of close type standard or non dominant telecom standard will it be possible to be successful ? Willcom has announced to adopt XGP, the next generation PHS technology. Can we foresee the failure or it will arise from the dead? The study based on literature and cases analysis to analyze telecommunication, especially mobile communications operators. Successful factors of selection Telecommunication standards based on telecom service value chains, technology dependence, advantages and disadvantages of closed and open type’s standards. The thesis hopes to answer why A company’s failure and recommendation of successful factors when selection a closed type technology standard. The thesis is also to analyze the failure of A company in selection PHS technology which is closed type and reference of literature and other thesis to see the technology standard trend and hope to provide valuable reference for Telecommunication operators or related service providers in the future.

在知識經濟時代，智慧財產權在企業發展與競爭力提升上具有相當影響力，其重要性已不言可喻。近年來越來越多的關注焦點落在技術標準的發展上，蓋技術標準是技術成果的規範化、規則化，對企業而言，唯有引領標準，掌握制定規則的權力，才能形成真正的競爭優勢，否則就可能永遠受制於人。而對產業整體而言，技術標準對經濟及科技之發展有相當貢獻，蓋一旦標準形成，產品與零組件間相容性問題就可被解決，製造商之生產成本也可降低。一般認為技術標準的形成是大勢所趨且有利多於弊的效果，然在技術標準的制定與後續相關專利的實施過程，卻可能衍生出許多與反托拉斯法相關之爭議。美國司法部與聯邦交易委員會曾在1995年共同發表「智慧財產授權之反托拉斯準則」，表達對智慧財產權授權行為可能引發競爭法問題之看法，在相隔十二年後，於2007年4月間，又共同發表了「反托拉斯法執行與智慧財產權報告」，當中對技術標準與專利聯盟所牽涉的競爭法議題做了深入探討。 技術標準制定過程中引貣競爭法上疑義的行為態樣有專利劫持及抵制技術標準制定之情形。美國聯邦交易委員會已於2006年8月Rambus一案中，確立專利劫持行為違反聯邦交易委員會法第五條與休曼法第二條規定，聯邦上訴巡迴法院也於2007年6月Qualcomm v. Broadcom一案中，表示專利權人違反FRAND授權原則將形同從事專利劫持之效果，構成休曼法第二條規定之違反。至於抵制技術標準制定情形，法院已於2006年2月在Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia一案中表示確有違反休曼法第一條規定之見解。 目前各技術標準組織紛紛藉由:1.制定揭露政策，亦即要求成員揭露與欲採定為標準之技術相關之專利權，或2.訂定FRAND政策，要求成員同意未來將在符合公平、合理且無歧視原則下進行授權等方式，以避免專利劫持情形發生。惟由 於技術標準組織除在了解相關技術是否存在專利權之外，需進一步知悉未來專利授權條件，以做為是否將特定專利技術採為技術標準之參考，再加上FRAND字義上不易做成精確解釋，易生文義操弄之空間，仍無法解決專利劫持之問題，因此近期部分技術標準組織漸發展出事先授權條件揭露之政策，例如VITA及IEEE組織，要求欲參與技術標準制定之成員，必須事先揭露將來擬授權金額之上限或授權條件的最嚴苛限度。此外也有論者提出事先多方進行授權條件協商之可行性。 關於事先單方揭露授權條件政策之適法性，美國反托拉斯主管機關已表明不予質疑之立場，並肯定事先單方揭露授權條件有促進技術標準制定效率之優點。至於在事先多方協商授權條件政策方面，反托拉斯主管機關雖強調其對於技術標準組織是否應進行事先協商授權條件並未設立立場，但基本上仍肯定事先授權條件協商具減少專利劫持並達到促進競爭效果之優點，故傾向適用合理原則作為判斷是否違反反托拉斯法規定的依據。惟若專利權人以事先協商授權條件作為掩護，實際上共同約定以標準技術製造生產之下游產品的銷售價格(naked price fixing)，此時仍難逃被認定構成當然違法行為。 在藉由專利聯盟實施技術標準之過程，亦可能有構成競爭法上聯合行為與獨占行為之情形發生。相關引發違法疑慮之行為態樣包括:專利聯盟中包含替代性專利、競爭性敏感資訊之流通、排除他人加入專利聯盟、專屬授權、回饋授權、權利金約定、拒絕部分授權等。惟應注意的是，美國法院及反托拉斯主管機關認為，有鑑於專利聯盟具促進授權活動進行效率之特性，有助於技術提升及產業發展，因此傾向以合理原則判斷專利聯盟限制條款約定之合法性，而不當然認為此等行為態樣違反反托拉斯法相關規定。 在台灣喧騰一時的飛利浦光碟案主要亦是涉及技術標準實施過程產生是否違反公平交易法之疑義，九十六年四月間最高行政法院作出最終判決，纏訟已久的紛爭於是落幕。對於本案衍生問題思考，首先，本文認為公平會或許應審慎思考是否進一步制定有關技術標準與專利聯盟之特別處理準則。公平會似可參酌美國等先進國家之例，詳細規範技術標準的制定與發展，及專利聯盟的形成、對參與者的限制、關鍵性專利的決定、授權管理、授權條件的審查等各項問題。其次，在技術市場的界定與聯合行為的認定上，應回歸專利技術內容與專利技術間的關係加以分析；存在互補關係之技術，彼此間沒有制衡或牽制力量，不應被劃定在同一技術市場，也就不會成立聯合行為。而在獨占地位的認定上，應認為只要擁有製造某一產品之部分關鍵性專利技術，足以專利法所賦予之權利牽制他人對該產品之製造、銷售等行為，而該產品在相關產品市場可被認為具獨占地位，即應可認定專利技術擁有者之獨占地位成立。最後，在獨占地位濫用之救濟措施方面，公平會應依公平法第41條規定，妥善運用法律所賦予之裁量權限，縝密思索對於該當具體事案最為合理、適當的救濟措施，給予當事人最直接有效的救濟，而非僅消極地命令其不得繼續從事違法行為或處以罰鍰，對於事態之解決，並無法有效發揮回復市場競爭應有狀態之公平法規範目的。美國聯邦交易委員會於Rambus案及其他相關案例中極富創意地提出消極、積極的更正措施交錯運用模式，當可作為我國公平會未來對類似案件處理之參考。 為了成功地制定技術標準以引領產業發展，本文認為，有志於參與技術標準活動業者，在這個主要由歐美大廠主導技術標準制定的產業環境中，應注意歐美等國法規範內容與法院、相關主管機關之實務見解，才能知悉特定行為之法律風險以避免誤觸法網，並適當主張自己的權利。其次，可善用技術標準組織政策訂定方式解決專利劫持問題。再者，在技術標準制定之高度角力競爭下，必須培育跨領域人才參與技術授權談判才能增加脫穎而出之機會。而若欲藉由成立專利聯盟方式進行專利交互授權或對外授權，專利聯盟的組成與授權進行至少應符合本 文第七章所歸納的幾個基本要件，始不易產生違反競爭法之疑慮。至於在被控專利侵權業者方面，在面對專利侵權訴訟而進行訴訟攻防時，可朝專利權人參與技術標準或專利聯盟活動的行為是否違反反托拉斯法規定之方向加以思考，以冀增加勝訴之機會。 / In this era of knowledge-economy, intellectual property plays an important role in business developments. The significance of standard setting is thus much emphasized in recent years. It is generally recognized that standard setting brings many benefits to industries, such as costdown of manufacturing process and improvement of product compatibility, and patent pools can help to decrease transaction costs of licensing negotiations and to mitigate royalty stacking problems. However, disputes regarding the violation of antitrust law can be caused in the process of setting standards and the formation and the operation of patent pools. The U.S. DOJ and the U.S. FTC has discussed about antitrust issues related to standard setting and patent pools in “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” in April 1995 and “Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Right：Promoting Innovation and Competition” in April 2007. Patent holdup and group boycott are controversial in standard setting. In August 2006, the U.S. FTC ruled in In re Rambus that patent holdup would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. In June 2007, the Federal Circuit also ruled in Qualcomm v. Broadcom that patent owner who has broken one’s previous commitment on FRAND licensing would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. As to group boycott, the court opinioned in Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia that group boycott in the process of setting standard could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) have tried to avoid patent holdup by making patent disclosure and FRAND licensing policies. Recently some SSOs have implemented policies of ex ante unilateral announcement of licensing terms by patent holders or ex ante multilateral licensing negotiation between patent holders and SSO members to deal with patent holdup problems. These ex ante approaches facilitate competition between patent holders on licensing terms and allow SSOs to gain more information on patents. In light of the competitive effects these ex ante approaches generate, FTC and DOJ declared that they will review related policies and conduct under the rule of reason. But any efforts to reduce competition by using ex ante disclosure or negotiation process as a cover to fix downstream prices of products would be reviewed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The standard patent licensing by patent pools could also give rise to cautions of violating antitrust law. Certain behavior in patent pools can be deemed controversial, such as including substitute patents, exchanges of competitively sensitive information, exclusive membership, exclusive license, grantback license, package license, and so on. The DOJ and the FTC expressed that they will examine similar behavior in patent pools under the rule of reason, since patent pools provide a more efficient way for patent licensing, which help to improve technology qualities and industry developments. The case, Philips v. Fair Trade Commission, R.O.C., also involved some disputes of violating Fair Trade Act. From the case, the thesis claims that first, there is a need for FTC to enact a guideline regarding standard setting and patent pools for the industries to follow. Second, while defining technology markets and concerted actions, one should analyze the relationship between patents. Complementary patents belong to different technology markets, so it would be impossible for complementary patent owners to collude with each other. Third, to identify monopolization, the thesis asserts that the patent owner of technology essential for certain product will acquire monopoly positions in certain product market, and thus will be deemed as monopolists in the related technology market. Last but not the least, the thesis proposes that the FTC should not only passively prohibit the abuse of monopoly position and issue punishments, but also come up with some proper solutions, such as compulsory license, to actively maintain fair competition in the market. Some measures delineated by the U.S. FTC in In re Rambus can be referred for future cases in Taiwan. To successfully participate in standard setting and patent pool activities, the thesis proposes certain suggestions. First, because most SSOs are led by U.S. and European enterprises and most SSOs are subject to U.S. and European legal jurisdiction, it is important to follow up to U.S. and European law and legal developments to avoid legal risks. Second, properly structuring SSO patent policies might enable SSOs to mitigate patent holdup problems. Third, the cultivation of inter-disciplinary professionals of technology, law, finance, and business management can be significant for industries in the standard setting competition. The thesis as well indicates several principles that might help to avoid the risks of violation of antitrust law during the formation and operation of patent pools. On the other hand, those who are accused of patent infringement might gain a better chance to win the lawsuit, if the violations of antitrust of patent owners in standard setting and patent pools are taken into consideration.

技術標準化與相關智慧財產權保護，一直以來為智慧財產權法與競爭法的交集與爭議的話題。其中又以標準必要專利侵權糾紛為主。基於標準必要專利權人與前在被授權人雙方的立場，其中目前最具爭議的問題應該涉及禁制令救濟的適用性或以F/RAND授權原則為基礎的抗辯來排除侵權。 標準制訂組織（Standard Setting Organization, SSO）訂定F/RAND授權原則承諾（Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory）於其智慧財產權政策，要求標準專利權人應以公平、合理且無歧視的授權條件，向所有標準實施者提供授權。F/RAND授權原則承諾之發展，目前趨向於強調專利權人的契約義務，以第三方受益人的立場來平衡授權當事人的談判地位；如何「符合F/RAND授權原則之授權」，目前各國尚未有明文法律解釋，對於F/RAND授權原則承諾之清楚定義與規範，目前僅有法院及競爭法主管機關之見解。 在標準必要專利訴訟中，台灣廠商處於被告之身分的狀況居多。面對禁制令的威脅，如何更清楚地了解目前各管轄法院的看法以決定訴訟或談判策略更是重要。本文整理美國、歐洲及亞洲國家之管轄法院案例，加上對競爭法架構下的標準專利授權規範的分析，最後整理如何讓F/RAND授權原則承諾成為對抗禁制令有效抗辯。希望本文能為涉及標準專利訴訟之台灣廠商提供有價值的參考意見。 / Technology standardization and intellectual property protection has been an overlapping and controversial issue between Intellectual Property laws and Competition Law, particularly when it comes to infringement on F/RAND encumbered Standard Essential Patent, SEP. From both standard essential patent owner and potential licensee’ perspectives, the most questionable issue is whether injunctive relief should be available to the holder of F/RAND encumbered SEP who committed to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (F/RAND) terms, in order to prevent a third-party implementer from practicing a standard reading on that SEP, when such implementer is willing to take a license but the parties disagree on the terms of the license. Furthermore, the definition of F/RAND has never been clearly defined by statutes or interpreted by any judiciary; interested parties could only refer to decisions or guidelines made by the judiciaries or competition authorities in different countries. It is rather common for Taiwanese companies to face F/RAND encumbered SEP law suits as the defendants. Given the even severer threat of injunctive relief, it becomes more important to understand the position each judiciary takes on this issue to have appropriate strategies on law suits and negotiation. This thesis is accordingly written on the following perspectives: firstly, starting with discussion about F/RAND-encumbered SEP law suits in the United States, Europe and Asia; secondly, bringing in SEP encumbered disputes or investigations into framework of Competition Law from competition authorities among different countries and lastly trying to present possibilities that F/RAND commitment as a cause of action under Contract Law can be applied as defense to overcome injunctive relief sought by F/RAND-encumbered SEP licensors. Meanwhile, this thesis is expected to provide Taiwanese companies valuable strategies to law suits or disputes involving F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.