Recent aggressions and geopolitical insecurities in the Baltic region have made it necessary for the Swedish armed forces to change their focus from an international defense policy to a territorial defense strategy. This change focuses mainly on strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Swedish armed Forces by reshaping the brigade structures with a focus on combined arms warfare in conjunction to maneuver warfare. Current doctrine and manuals show a lack in combined arms concerning its contribution to tactical success as well as its origin. As such a question whether tactical success can be explained with combined arms has been raised. This thesis aims to examine if Robert R Leonhard’s theory on combined arms can explain success at a tactical level during Operation Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur war and the analysis focuses on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the study shows that the theory can partly explain success at a tactical level in both cases. But further studies must be conducted on the subject in order to increase the theories explanatory power.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-9995 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Ribberström, Carl-Johan |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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