This thesis examines how the use of combined arms according to Robert Leonhards theory can explain the military success on the tactical level of war in two historical cases. Previous studies focus mainly on how combined arms shall be understood and how it shall be used and not how combined arms has contributed to military success. This thesis uses a theory testing case study to examine how combined arms contributed to the military success of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur-war and to that of American forces in Operation Desert Storm. The analysis is based on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the analysis shows that both the Israeli forces and the American forces used the different principles of combined arms. The analysis also showed that the use of combined arms created military success at the tactical level of the different wars, but combined arms cannot by itself explain the military success as the technical advantages, moral and educational level also had a significant impact on the outcome.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-8656 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Areskoug, Max |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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