在世界及地區性貿易組織的努力下, 近來關稅等貿易障礙已經普遍降低。但與此同時, 環境品質向下沉淪的疑慮也隨之而來。儘管相關的討論不在少數, 但大部分著重於外生貿易障礙調降下的策略性環境政策, 以及其對應之福利變動; 或是在合作與非合作環境政策下, 同時決定環境與貿易政策, 然而也相對較少將環境階段的扭曲納入貿易政策制定的考量中。因此, 本文旨在探討若將生態傾銷的誘因納入考量,並改採序列賽局分別決定最適環境稅與關稅時, 貿易政策合作下所制定之最適關稅協定為何?
另一方面, 我們也觀察生產性跨國污染的大小對最適關稅的影響, 並發現當污染不具跨國外溢效果時, 此時不論環境政策合作與否, 最適關稅應對該污染性財貨提供進口補貼。相對地, 若跨國污染超過一定程度時, 除非環境政策能夠合作, 否則此時應對其課徵關稅, 以避免過度生產減損社會福利。 / By constructing a reciprocal-dumping model, we investigate a second-best tariff agreement when considering the linkage between the trade and the environmental policy. Though there has been much discussion about the linkage, most existing literature rarely considers the distortion when setting a trade agreement. We also take the transboundary strength of production pollution into account.
Our results show that: (1) in the absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal tariff should be an import subsidy. Thus, whether both countries coordinate on their environmental policies or not, a bilateral reduction in tariffs will enhance the global welfare. (2) On the contrary, if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, then the second-best tariff should be positive,
while the first-best level is negative. In this situation, trade liberalization might decrease global welfare.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0096255003 |
| Creators | 吳吟咨 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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