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Previous issue date: 2013-03-25 / This essay is about the neoclassical account of foundational justification. According to Internalist Foundationalism, in epistemology, if our ordinary beliefs about the world around us are to be rationally justified, the chain of inferential justification must terminate in beliefs that are justified noninferentially, and the subject must be aware of the justifying features of the experiential states, that are the most plausible candidates for ending the regress of justification. There is no agreement among Foundationalists at to the right sort of justification the foundational beliefs have to possess. The Neoclassical Foundationalist claims that only a foundation that is certain can provide the basis for empirical knowledge. A defense of this view requires an account of justification that can face both Sellars and Bergmann s dilemmas, showing how foundational beliefs can be noninferentially and infallibly justified, satisfying the internalist conditions. In this essay we consider in detail the most representative internalist infallibilist theories of foundational justification in order to introduce our thesis that they share a common basis and can respond in a common way to the challenges against their views / O presente ensaio tem por objeto a explica??o neocl?ssica de justifica??o fundacional. Conforme o fundacionalismo internalista, em epistemologia, as cren?as sobre o mundo ? nossa volta s? podem ser racionalmente justificadas se a cadeia constitu?da pelas rela??es inferenciais de justifica??o terminar em cren?as que s?o justificadas de modo n?o inferencial, e se o sujeito estiver consciente das caracter?sticas justificadoras presentes nas experi?ncias sensoriais, que s?o as candidatas mais plaus?veis para dar t?rmino ao regresso da justifica??o. N?o h? consenso entre os fundacionalistas quanto ao tipo de justifica??o que as cren?as b?sicas devem ostentar, para o fundacionalista neocl?ssico apenas uma funda??o que seja certa pode fornecer base adequada para o conhecimento emp?rico. A defesa dessa concep??o requer uma explica??o de justifica??o internalista que possa enfrentar tanto o dilema de Sellars quanto o dilema de Bergmann, mostrando que cren?as fundacionais podem ser n?o inferencial e infalivelmente justificadas e satisfazer as condi??es do internalismo. Neste ensaio consideramos detalhadamente as teorias da justifica??o fundacional mais representativas do internalismo infalibilista, a fim de apresentar nossa tese de que elas compartilham uma base comum e podem enfrentar de maneira conjunta os desafios colocados ?s suas concep??es
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:tede2.pucrs.br:tede/2918 |
| Date | 25 March 2013 |
| Creators | Etcheverry, K?tia Martins |
| Contributors | Almeida, Cl?udio Gon?alves de |
| Publisher | Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, Programa de P?s-Gradua??o em Filosofia, PUCRS, BR, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ci?ncias Humanas |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RS, instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, instacron:PUC_RS |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | -8305327606432166393, 500, 600, 1531447313960029988 |
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