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跨國企業移轉計價-動態最適化模型 / Multinational Firm Transfer Pricing Under Dynamic Optimization

臺灣現有移轉計價之規範未有明確的罰則(Penalty),因而衍生許多稅負規避的問題。本文採用動態最適化(Dynamic Optimization)的模型來觀察跨國企業移轉計價的行為,在面臨懲罰與兩國稅差時企業會如何利用移轉價格及數量來進行獲利移轉以規避稅負,進而分析政府調降稅率以降低稅差並吸引獲利移轉的稅率政策對企業移轉計價的影響,最後再探討罰則在法規制定上的必要性。結果顯示,預料到的稅率政策在長期能有效減少企業從事移轉價格操弄(Transfer Price Manipulation),但在短期﹝除了宣告那一刻之外﹞反而更助長移轉價格操弄的發生,特別是當政策宣告至執行之期間過長時更為嚴重。此外,由先前的文獻可知無罰則下的最適移轉價格為一邊界解(Boundary Solution),本文也證明了此邊界解亦可能出現於有罰則的情況下。然而,罰則的存在創造了內部解(Interior Solution)的可能性,此內部解較邊界解更趨近於常規交易價格,因此我們仍建議政府制定罰則。 / This paper employs a dynamic optimization model to determine the equilibrium price and quantity in a multinational firm (MNF) faced with a threat of a penalty. We analyze the impact on transfer pricing that arises from the unanticipated and anticipated permanent taxation policy of home country and host country. Anticipated taxation policy for reducing tax differentials can reduce transfer price manipulation in the long term. However, except for the moment of announcement, such reduction of transfer price manipulation does not occur in the short term, especially in the case of a large time lag of policy. We also show that the boundary solution is possible even though transfer price penalty exists and suggest that governments impose penalty which creates the possibility of interior solution.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0091351012
Creators謝孟釗, Hsieh,Meng-Chao
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language英文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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