移轉訂價係指關係企業間進行交易時，價格之訂定過程。由於各國稅制、稅率均存在差異，使跨國集團常透過移轉訂價之方式，不當安排其利潤以規避稅負。各國稅捐主管機關本其財政收入考量，並捍衛其課稅主權，紛紛建立移轉訂價稅制，要求關係企業間移轉訂價必須符合常規交易原則。 　　近年來，智慧財產已逐漸取代有形財產，成為企業價值之主要項目。由於智慧財產並無公開交易市場，且其通常具有一定之獨特性，致使涉及智慧財產之受控交易，於運用常規交易原則時產生諸多困難。 　　本論文為智慧財產移轉訂價之探索性研究，從稅制面進行分析與探討。研究結果發現，我國現行稅制與經濟暨合作發展組織、美國移轉訂價規範相較之下，未臻完備之處有： 1. 欠缺成本貢獻協議之具體規範； 2. 欠缺相互協議程序之具體適用規範。 　　此外，智慧財產受控交易於運用我國現行移轉訂價規範時，容易產生爭議及困難點之處在於： 1. 缺乏可比較未受控交易； 2. 智慧財產所有權之認定； 3. 共同研發之課稅問題； 4. 相互協議程序和預先訂價協議機制難以適用。 / Transfer pricing refers to a process of pricing arrangement in a controlled transactions between affiliated enterprises. Due to differences in tax legislations and tax rates among countries, multinational corporations may deliberately allocate their profits into different countries by leveraging off those differences, so its overall tax liabilities may be minimized. In view of the foregoing, tax authorities of various countries have began to formed transfer pricing related rules and regulations in order to preserve their tax bases and have requested full conformity of transfer pricing rules from resident enterprises when conducting related party transactions. In recent years, intellectual property (“IP”) has overtaken the importance of tangible assets and became a predominant operating item in many of the enterprises. However, given the inherent uniqueness in each IP and the lack of open market for the IP, difficulties often arise when applying the arm’s length principal on IP related controlled transactions. This exploratory research discusses transfer pricing of IP. Through this research, it is identified that there may be room for improvements for Taiwan transfer pricing rules in the following two areas in comparison with the OECD and U.S. transfer pricing rules: 1. Rules of cost contribution arrangement；and 2. Application rules of mutual agreement procedure. Moreover, controversies and difficulties may likely to occur in the following areas when applying transfer pricing rules on IP related controlled transactions in Taiwan: 1. Lack of comparable uncontrolled transactions； 2. The ownership of intellectual property rights； 3. Tax on cooperative R&D；and 4. Difficulties to apply with MAP and APA.

本研究針對移轉訂價制度在電子商務環境中是否產生適用上的問題、以及是否產生新型態的交易模式來進行探討，以了解現行之移轉訂價規範是否仍適用於電子商務環境。本研究首先透過文獻分析法與比較分析法，將電子商務移轉訂價相關之文獻加以整理與分析，了解移轉訂價在電子商務環境中所可能產生的適用問題，並比較各國對電子商務移轉訂價之態度與作法；接著根據電子商務的特性，提出跨國企業可能的電子商務移轉訂價交易模式。而後採用深入訪談法，針對可能的適用問題與可能的交易模式作為訪談主題，邀請五位產、官、學界之代表進行訪談，以了解實務面的觀點與處理方式，並改善本研究所提出之交易模式。 / 依據文獻彙整及訪談結果顯示，移轉訂價制度在電子商務環境下，仍應適用與傳統商務一致之常規交易原則。針對受控交易進行功能與風險分析，以找出合適之可比較對象並選定最適之移轉訂價方法，來判斷受控交易是否符合常規交易原則。此外，對於電子商務移轉訂價所可能產生的問題，包含可比較對象之找尋、移轉訂價方法之選擇、價值創造中心之決定、租稅天堂的運用、電子商務特性之影響、以及交易軌跡消失之疑慮等方面，皆不至於重大影響移轉訂價制度的運作；電子商務僅係提供另一道交易媒介，使得交易變得更有效率，並未改變受控交易之經濟實質與交易本質。因此，移轉訂價規範不論在傳統商務或電子商務的環境中，皆可一體適用，不因電子商務的加入而須加以改善或修正。 / To know if the existing transfer pricing guideline could still apply to the environment of electronic commerce or not, this study aims to inquire into related issues of the transfer pricing under e-commerce activities, including whether it will bring any possible problems or result in new transaction models or not. First of all, documentary analysis and comparative analysis are applied to compile and analyze the literature related to transfer pricing in e-commerce. It helps to understand possible problems that will occur when applying it in e-commerce and to compare the different ideas and manners of practicing transfer pricing in e-commerce between certain countries. Also, probable transaction models will be proposed according to the characteristics of e-commerce. Secondly, in-depth interviews are used to probe into transfer pricing in e-commerce activities more thoroughly. Possible problems and transaction models of application are the main theme of interviews, and five representatives from the industrial circle, the government, and the academia are the major interviewees of the study. The purpose of in-depth interview is to figure out perspectives and actions of the practical aspect and to improve the transaction models proposed by the study. / According to the results of literature review and interviews, even in e-commerce conditions, the transfer pricing guideline can also apply to the arm’s length principle, the same as the traditional commerce does. As for the function and risk analysis of controlled transaction, which helps to figure out comparable uncontrolled transaction and to decide on the proper transfer pricing methodologies, it is applied to judge if controlled transaction could comply with the arm’s length principle. As for the function and risk analysis of controlled transaction, which helps to figure out comparable uncontrolled subjects and to decide on the proper transfer pricing methodologies, it is applied to judge if controlled transaction could comply with the arm’s length principle. Furthermore, possible problems that would arise in the course of e-commerce transfer pricing, including a search for the comparable uncontrolled transaction, the adoption of transfer pricing methodologies, the decision of value creation center, the utilization of tax heavens, the effects of e-commerce characteristics, and doubts about disappearance of the transaction track, all have no great influences upon the operation of transfer pricing guideline. E-commerce provides another medium of exchange to make transactions more efficient without changing the financial essence and transaction quality. In a word, the transfer pricing guideline can both apply to traditional commerce and e-commerce conditions. It is not necessary to improve or adjust the transfer pricing guideline even when involving in the issue of e-commerce.

臺灣現有移轉計價之規範未有明確的罰則(Penalty)，因而衍生許多稅負規避的問題。本文採用動態最適化(Dynamic Optimization)的模型來觀察跨國企業移轉計價的行為，在面臨懲罰與兩國稅差時企業會如何利用移轉價格及數量來進行獲利移轉以規避稅負，進而分析政府調降稅率以降低稅差並吸引獲利移轉的稅率政策對企業移轉計價的影響，最後再探討罰則在法規制定上的必要性。結果顯示，預料到的稅率政策在長期能有效減少企業從事移轉價格操弄(Transfer Price Manipulation)，但在短期﹝除了宣告那一刻之外﹞反而更助長移轉價格操弄的發生，特別是當政策宣告至執行之期間過長時更為嚴重。此外，由先前的文獻可知無罰則下的最適移轉價格為一邊界解(Boundary Solution)，本文也證明了此邊界解亦可能出現於有罰則的情況下。然而，罰則的存在創造了內部解(Interior Solution)的可能性，此內部解較邊界解更趨近於常規交易價格，因此我們仍建議政府制定罰則。 / This paper employs a dynamic optimization model to determine the equilibrium price and quantity in a multinational firm (MNF) faced with a threat of a penalty. We analyze the impact on transfer pricing that arises from the unanticipated and anticipated permanent taxation policy of home country and host country. Anticipated taxation policy for reducing tax differentials can reduce transfer price manipulation in the long term. However, except for the moment of announcement, such reduction of transfer price manipulation does not occur in the short term, especially in the case of a large time lag of policy. We also show that the boundary solution is possible even though transfer price penalty exists and suggest that governments impose penalty which creates the possibility of interior solution.