On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against the Egyptian Air Force and started what was to be known as the Six Day War. The Six Day War is a good example of when a small nation manages to singlehandedly defeat a superior adversary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the success of the Israeli Air Force and their contribution to the victory. The use of air power in the Six Day War will be analyzed, using John Warden’s Five Ring Model and Shaun Clarke’s theories about risk-based coercion and SPOT-bombing. Research findings indicate that Shaun Clarke’s theories about coercion may to some extent explain the success of the Israeli Air Force. Attacking the armed forces created the threat of further violence against more valuable and vulnerable targets causing the Arabic leaders to choose peaceful solutions instead of continued fighting. Furthermore, the SPOT-bombing analyzes show that the psychological effect that the Israeli Air Force had on their adversary played a significant role in the campaign against Egypt. However, Warden’s model could not explain the reasons behind the outcome of the war.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-6796 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Nilsson, Tim |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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