The thesis consists of three chapters:
Chapter 2 investigates, in the context of a two-country model with monopolistic
competition and price stickiness, the implications for macroeconomic stability
and the welfare properties of three distinct kinds of monetary policy arrangements:
(a)cooperative, (b) noncooperative and (c) monetary union. The cooperative first
best can be achieved if domestic inflation is set equal to zero in both countries at
all times. In the non cooperative equilibrium welfare is not maximized due to the
presence of beggar-thy-neighbor policies with the costs of non-cooperation increasing
with the degree of openness of the economy. A monetary unión is welfare-improving
relative to non cooperation only for countries that have strong trading links.
In chapter 3 (co-authored with Katharine Neiss), we investigate the propagation
mechanism of monetary shocks in an otherwise standard sticky price model, modified
to incorporate factor hoarding in the form of variable capital utilisation rates and
labour effort. In contrast, to previous studies, we find that real effects of monetary
shocks can be generated at relatively low degrees of nominal rigidities. Factor hoarding
enriches the propagation mechanism, by flattening the marginal cost responses
to monetary shocks. The assumption of labour hoarding is crucial for generating
persistence, while the assumption of variable capital utihsation allows us to generate
reahstic investment volatility without having to introduce capital adjustment costs.
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates whether monetary pohcy in a currency area should
stabilize an aggregate of inflation and output or whether it should take into account
the dispersion of these variables across regions when the currency area is characterized
by asymmetric shocks across regions and when participation constraints define
the set of feasible policies. We find that even if the two regions are identical, asymmetric
shocks might create asymmetric responses of regional variables. Participation
constraints introduce a trade-oíf between eíficiency and incentives in settings with
lack of a strong enforcement technology. In order to deal with incentive problems the
central bank has to manipulate the future consunption paths by adopting a more
expansionary policy with respect to regional productivity shocks.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TDX_UPF/oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/7597 |
| Date | 22 November 2001 |
| Creators | Pappa, Evi |
| Contributors | Galí, Jordi, 1961-, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
| Publisher | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Source Sets | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa) |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess, ADVERTIMENT. L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi doctoral i la seva utilització ha de respectar els drets de la persona autora. Pot ser utilitzada per a consulta o estudi personal, així com en activitats o materials d'investigació i docència en els termes establerts a l'art. 32 del Text Refós de la Llei de Propietat Intel·lectual (RDL 1/1996). Per altres utilitzacions es requereix l'autorització prèvia i expressa de la persona autora. En qualsevol cas, en la utilització dels seus continguts caldrà indicar de forma clara el nom i cognoms de la persona autora i el títol de la tesi doctoral. No s'autoritza la seva reproducció o altres formes d'explotació efectuades amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva comunicació pública des d'un lloc aliè al servei TDX. Tampoc s'autoritza la presentació del seu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de drets afecta tant als continguts de la tesi com als seus resums i índexs. |
Page generated in 0.0022 seconds