這篇論文的材料及其排序即是主體哲學史的文獻回顧，以笛卡兒的「我思」與精神分析的「我欲」為根系，而胡賽爾的交互主體性彷彿突破、而其實是統合了兩者為主幹，萊維納斯則依隨其上，分別地為主體哲學的邊界做出提示。為尋求不受限於封閉主體的「自我」，我們試圖追問的是：主體如何開展有別於實體的存在型態？ / This thesis is a historical retrospection on the philosophy of subjectivity. We commence our task with a review of the famous Cartesian “Cogito” – the substance of reflexive consciousness. Secondly, we refer to J. Lacan’s psychanalytical elaboration of “Desire.” Thirdly, we make an allusion to E. Husserl’s phenomenological “Intersubjectivity,” with which Husserl seems to have surmounted the aporia of solipsism, yet, de facto, rendered it to be a unitary and transcendental structure of consciousness. Sequentially, we follow the hints that E. Levinas pointed, that the relation to others is the experience that subject lose its power. By this investigation, we hope to illustrate a “Self” not confined in an enclosing subject and thus to invite ourselves to reconsider how a subject can exist differently from a substance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G1001540021 |
| Creators | 郭思妤 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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