Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:13066 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Lorenz, Astrid |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | doc-type:bookPart, info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart, doc-type:Text |
| Source | Regional and federal studies, 21 (2011),4/5, S. 407 - 425 ISSN 1359-7566 |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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