This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti-psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:85757 |
| Date | 05 June 2023 |
| Creators | Rödl, Sebastian |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, doc-type:article, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | 0966-8373 |
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