Some claim that when an agent does something, their action should be treated as a particular event. However, a challenge to this has it that if we understand agency through the category particular event, then we must also deploy another, process, because we act in the present but particular events can only exist in the past. In this paper, I show how this argument can be resisted, but suggest that consideration of it should nevertheless lead one to adopt a conception of events which reflects the idea that intentional action involves self-known change. We thus get into focus how understanding agency in terms of events involves attending to the interaction between the nature of events, the metaphysics of tense, and our epistemological situation as agents.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:85785 |
| Date | 05 June 2023 |
| Creators | Hinshelwood, Alec |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, doc-type:article, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | 0966-8373 |
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