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Previous issue date: 2014-02-14 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Proof-theoretic Semantics provides a new approach to the semantics of logical
constants. It has compelling philosophical motivations which are rooted deeply
in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics. We investigate
this new approach of logical semantics and its perspective on logical validity in the
light of its own philosophical aspirations, especially as represented by the work
of Dummett (1991). Among our findings, we single out the validity of Peirce’s
rule with respect to a justification procedure based on the introduction rules for
the propositional logical constants. This is an undesirable outcome since Peirce’s
rule is not considered to be constructively acceptable. On the other hand, we also
establish the invalidity of the same inference rule with respect to a justification
procedure based on the elimination rules for the propositional logical constants.
We comment on the implications of this scenario to Dummett’s philosophical programme
and to proof-theoretic semantics in general. / As semânticas construtivas oferecem uma nova abordagem semântica para as
constantes lógicas. Essas semânticas gozam de fortes motivações filosóficas advindas
da filosofia da linguagem e da filosofia da matemática. Nós investigamos
essa nova abordagem semântica da lógica e sua concepção de validade lógica sob
a luz de suas próprias aspirações filosóficas, em especial aquelas representadas
pelo trabalho de Dummett (1991). Dentre nossos resultados, destacamos a validade
da Regra de Peirce em relação ao procedimento justificatório baseado nas
regras de introdução para as constantes lógicas proposicionais. Essa é uma situação
indesejável, pois a Regra de Peirce não é considerada aceitável de um ponto
de vista construtivo. Por outro lado, verificamos que o procedimento justificatório
baseado nas regras de eliminação atesta a invalidade dessa mesma regra. Tecemos
alguns comentários a respeito das consequências desse cenário para o projeto
filosófico de Dummett e para as semânticas construtivas em geral.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:repositorio.bc.ufg.br:tede/3103 |
| Date | 14 February 2014 |
| Creators | Oliveira, Hermogenes Hebert Pereira |
| Contributors | Sanz, Wagner de Campos |
| Publisher | Universidade Federal de Goiás, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL), UFG, Brasil, Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG) |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFG, instname:Universidade Federal de Goiás, instacron:UFG |
| Rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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