The UN and NATO have implemented separate approaches to civilian-military cooperation. Central in both approaches is a need for information sharing between civilian and military actors. Without shared information, cooperative planning becomes impossible. For military actors secret information makes sharing difficult and for civilian actors, principles hinder close cooperation. Scholars in the field of intelligence study have identified that states and organizations share information if the benefits of such, outweigh costs and risks. This thesis examines institutional differences between the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali and NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan, in order to better understand how institutional factors, affect sharing of information. With an outset in Rational Choice Institutionalism and by use of Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Development and Analysis Framework, an analytical instrument is designed. Through inductive review of interviews, first-hand accounts and reports; factors that drive, enable and hinder civilian-military sharing are indicated. The thesis indicates that the institutional framework of MINUSMA forms interdependency between civilian and military actors, while sharing in ISAF was enabled only when common goals were agreed upon. Military and civilian actors, in both MINUSMA and ISAF point to unclear mandates and vague goals as primary barriers to civilian-military sharing.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-6223 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Waller, Adam |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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