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West Virginia University

Evolving Secure Authentication from 5G to 6G: Advancing Privacy and Resilience in Next-Generation Networks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The fifth generation (5G) of mobile networks introduced groundbreaking improvements in connectivity, latency, and reliability. As 5G continues to expand across commercial and de- fense sectors, ensuring the privacy and integrity of its authentication mechanisms remains paramount. The foundation of 5G security lies in the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, which enhances user identity protection and establishes mutual authenti- cation between the user equipment (UE) and the network. Despite these advances, several weaknesses persist, including replay-based desynchronization, linkability, and correlation at- tacks under realistic adversary models. This thesis provides a unified analysis of these vulnerabilities and introduces a lightweight mitigation designed to strengthen the AKA protocol. Its core contribution is a reciprocal chal- lenge, in which the UE generates a cryptographic nonce and embeds it into the authentication exchange to provide explicit, verifiable freshness. While industrial prior art has explored UE- initiated challenges, these solutions retain the 5G sequence-number (SQN) mechanism and do not address the privacy leakage produced by mac-failure and synch-failure signal- ing. In contrast, the enhancement proposed in this thesis replaces SQN-based freshness entirely, removes AUTS-driven behavioral linkability, and collapses failure causes into a uni- form rejection. The result is stronger mutual authentication and improved protection against replay and tracking attacks, achieved with minimal computational and signaling overhead and without altering existing trust boundaries. Building upon these findings, the thesis transitions to sixth-generation (6G) security considerations, which are expected to demand heightened robustness due to exponentially greater device density, ultra-reliable low-latency communication (URLLC), and widespread non-terrestrial network (NTN) deployments. Potential backward compatibility between 6G and legacy 5G procedures is examined to identify vulnerabilities in access, handover, and integrity protection that may carry forward if unaddressed. This work concludes by outlining a set of security recommendations and design principles for 6G authentication and mobility management. The overarching goal is to establish a more resilient, privacy-preserving framework that bridges the security gaps identified in 5G and anticipates emerging threats in next-generation networks. Together, these insights provide a roadmap for securing 5G and beyond.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
MS
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Lane Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lutz, Isabella Deanne
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Matthew Valenti
  • Thomas Devine
  • David Krovich

Subjects

dc:subject × 12

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
West Virginia University
Base URL
researchrepository.wvu.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lutz, Isabella Deanne. Evolving Secure Authentication from 5G to 6G: Advancing Privacy and Resilience in Next-Generation Networks. Thesis thesis, https://doi.org/10.33915/etd.13147