This thesis has two principal objectives: firstly, to provide a systematic account of the evolution of Brazil's international role during the twenty-one years of military rule from 1964 to 1985 and, secondly, to evaluate the extent to which developments in Brazilian foreign relations during this period have enabled the country to attain a more autonomous and independent role in world affairs. The first part of the thesis outlines the major themes of Brazilian foreign policy before 1964. It argues that in the early post-war period Brazil's international freedom of manoeuvre was limited by two principal factors: the consolidation of United States hegemony over Latin America and the absence of alternative relationships. The following five chapters then trace the evolution of foreign policy under the five military presidents that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. Each chapter charts the major foreign policy initiatives of the various governments, isolates the underlying principles on which foreign policy was based and analyses the major political and economic factors which shaped Brazilian diplomacy. In each case the analysis is organised around two crucial developments: the changing character of relations with the United States and the progress towards diversification. Part Three seeks to evaluate Brazil's changing international role. It argues that Brazil's level of autonomy has increased over the period as a result both of a decline in United States hegemony over Brazil and of the successful diversification of Brazil's foreign relations and the expansion of political and economic contacts with Western Europe, Japan, the socialist countries and the Third World. It nevertheless also argues that Brazil's freedom of manoeuvre is much more constrained than many of the accounts of the 1970s suggested and that the debt crisis has underlined both the continued centrality of relations with Washington and the fragility of many of the new ties that were so successfully builk up during the 1970s.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Chicago, 1949.

No description available.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s led to a multilateral international system no longer divided by contending forces of capitalism and communism. In the context of South Africa, the end of the Cold War occurred at a juncture where the apartheid government was being challenged by pro-democracy forces that have fought against it for decades. The developments in the international system and in the country led to South Africa adopting universal liberal values not only in its constitution, but also in its international relations. Foreign policy documents and statements by the ministry of Foreign Affairs also reflected the country's aspiration of becoming a mediator, a facilitator for democracy and a peacemaker especially in the context of Africa. International expectation mounted as South Africa was perceived as possessing the capacity to act in a manner that advances democratic values and which gives voice to the weak nations of the world. However, the aura of a post-apartheid South Africa that would act not only in its interest, but also in the interest of the world community never fully materialised. South Africa failed to act in a manner consistent with its stated commitment to democratic values when it recognised Peoples Republic of China, an undemocratic and repressive government. It also marched into Lesotho in 1998, resulting in the destabilisation of this tiny Southern African country. These events led to an increasing criticism of the South African government. Some argued that South Africa was still inexperienced given its recent emergence as a world player. Others blamed the inconsistency on a too broad and ambitious foreign policy that set itself for failure. This study seeks to contribute to the conceptual understanding of the debate regarding the ambiguous nature of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. It situates the conceptualisation of South Africa's foreign policy within the predominant debates in international relations between realism, political structuralism and pluralism. Firstly, it holds that the end of the Cold War and ascendancy of globalist conceptions of international relations did not lead to the inadequacy of political structuralism as an organising framework. Secondly, it attempts to clarify the gap between South Africa's foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour by employing the assumptions advanced by political structuralism, Thirdly, a case study of South Africa's foreign policy towards China, Lesotho, the Great Lakes and Swaziland is carried out. Here it is demonstrated that the ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy are a function of the constraints imposed by the political and economic structure of the international system, It draws its conclusion by providing methodological recommendations to South Africa's foreign policy makers and future researchers in the field of foreign policy analysis.

In March 1940, Finland had just completed another life and death struggle with the Soviet Union, the second such struggle since Bolshevik autocracy replaced Tsarist autocracy in Russia in 1917. During the following fifteen months, Soviet diplomacy endeavoured to complete the job which the Red Army had begun. By a unilateral and extremely liberal interpretation of the Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, the Soviet Union tried to isolate Finland from her other neighbours and to establish a favourable basis for a complete annexation of Finland in the manner of the three Baltic States. Surrounded by Soviet and German military might, and noticing the increasing friction in the Nazi-Soviet alliance, Finland, in order to save herself from an imminent Soviet invasion, grasped the only straw which seemed to offer some hope: a transit agreement for German troops from Finland's Bothnian coast to Kirkenes in occupied Norway. The resulting presence of German troops in the country did save Finland from becoming the seventeenth Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 or 1941, but it also involved her deeply in the Nazi-Soviet conflict which followed. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland tried in vain to have her neutrality respected, and she was attacked by Soviet forces three days after the German aggression. During the so-called Continuation War, Finland refused to take part in the general German offensive plan, restricting herself to attaining her own strategic goals only, all of them dictated by the requirements for the defence of Finnish territory. Nevertheless, when Finland was finally able to pull out of the war in 1944, she was treated by the Allied Powers as an ally of Germany and subjected to an exceedingly heavy indemnity, payable in goods to the Soviet Union. She also lost more than ten per cent of her territory and had to give the Soviet Union a fifty-years lease on Porkkala, ten miles from the capital. The retreating Germans destroyed ninety per cent of all facilities and resources in North Finland. Although Finland was not occupied, her government worked under the supervision of an Allied Control Commission installed by the Soviet Union. The government was forced to prosecute hundreds of war criminals, including eight of Finland's war-time leaders. However, as long as Finland fulfilled the conditions of the Armistice Agreement, she was allowed to handle her internal affairs in relative liberty. The Finnish Communists were unable to out-maneuvre the government and were removed from all positions of control after the Peace Treaty had been signed in 1947. Finland was also able to meet the obligations of the war indemnity, although the total cost to Finland was approximately $900,000,000. The general election of 1948 marked a turning point in that it inaugurated a period during which Finnish democracy managed to reconquer all territory lost to the Communists during the era of the Control Commission. In spite of that, Finnish-Soviet relations grew increasingly better after it had become clear to the Soviet Union that Finland intended to stay aloof from Great Power conflicts in all circumstances. By 1952, it could safely be said that Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were the best since 1917. But Finnish independence was conditional on her own policy of absolute neutrality and the future developments in the East-West conflict. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

As soon as India attained freedom in 1947, the fundamental problem facing her was internal and not external. Naturally, the Indian leaders were concerned more about her domestic problems than foreign. The communal disturbances which immediately followed the partition of the country, made it difficult for the Government to maintain law and order in certain parts. Moreover, the economic situation went from bad to worse after independence. Free India had to tackle the tremendous problem of providing her vast population with the necessities of life, like food, clothing and housing. The Government of India was fully aware of these difficulties and the economic weakness of the country. It was under these circumstances that the leaders of free India had to determine the objectives of India's foreign policy. The difficult situation at home and the desirability of obtaining economic and technical assistance from abroad, made the pursuit of peace one of the great objectives of India's foreign policy. Other objectives were to work for the ending of colonialism and Imperialism throughout the world and the elimination of racial discrimination. In order to carry out these objectives successfully, the statesmen of India felt that they must give full support to the United Nations and follow an independent foreign policy. But India decided to continue her historical connections with the Commonwealth of Nations because she owed common allegiance to a particular way of life and ideal of State and Government. With regard to her policies in the Far East, India developed friendly relations with Communist China. She was one of the first countries who recognised the People's Republic of China. Although these friendly relations were disturbed in 1950 over Tibet, India continued to press for the representation of Communist China in the U.N. Nevertheless, she seems to be aware of the principal potential threat of this large neighbour to her security. For this reason, and others, India wishes to see Japan a strong sovereign state in Asia. In the case of Korean problem, India supported the U.N. action branding the North Koreans as aggressors, but she could not send any economic and military support. However an ambulance and surgical unit was sent to join the U.N. forces. As soon as the United Nations forces pushed the aggressor back across the 38th Parallel, the issue, according to Indian leaders, was no more an issue of resistance to aggression. From this time on India was reluctant to support any such action of U.N. which might prolong and extend the conflict. At the same time she began to work for some kind of peaceful solution of the Korean situation. Although she could not succeed in obtaining her objective completely, negotiations between the parties in dispute did begin which brightened the prospects for peace. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

In 1949 the newly created Federal Republic of Germany lacked freedom of action. The country was under Western Allied occupation, its new Government under supervision by the Allied High Commission. After coming to office in September 1949, chancellor Konrad Adenauer was determined to achieve West Germany's firm anchoring in the Western community, sovereignty, political, economic, and military security, and Western European integration. However, his later success should not obscure the fact that his policy was risky. In 1949-50 his course was complicated by the Saar issue, sparse Allied granting of sovereign rights, the rearmament question, and the problem of German unity. Meanwhile, the Opposition social Democrats under Kurt Schumacher criticized the concessions to the Allies and, as western integration assumed a quicker pace, stressed the primacy of German unity. Even members of the Bonn Cabinet started to doubt a policy that seemed likely to solidify German division. The West German press mirrored and judged the domestic fight over foreign policy. Four of the five leading publicists examined in this study tended to support economic and political integration in Western Europe, while not prepared to cede to French interests and to renounce German claims on the Saar, they did support the Petersberg Agreement on dismantling, accession to the Council of Europe, and involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations. The issue of German unity played a limited role in their editorials. Two pundits, Paul Sethe and Hans Baumgarten, never mentioned it, while two others, Richard Tungel and Ernst Friedlaender, believed that western integration offered perspectives to regain East Germany in the future. Moreover, Schumacher's opposition found little positive echo. Only Rudolf Augstein and Sethe at times backed similar policies to that of the SPD. Although the broad tenets of Adenauer's course were accepted, there was consistent criticism of his diplomatic methods, in fact, in the spring of 1950 three commentators called on the Chancellor to surrender diplomatic affairs to someone else. Amongst the editorialists examined, only Augstein advocated a neutralist policy, hoping it would facilitate German unification. However, he did not sufficiently discuss the great risks associated with German neutrality. Augstein was also the only commentator to oppose West German rearmament categorically. Although none of the commentators supported outright rearmament, the pundits backed a para-military federal police against the perceived East German threat. The question of direct remilitarization was ignored or made dependent on Allied concessions. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

Note: