What relationship exists between working conditions and teacher turnover in child-care (early care and education) programs? Research has shown high staff turnover is a major factor affecting the quality of care. Using a new survey and data set I designed of union and randomly selected non-union programs in Massachusetts, I examine factors other than compensation that might be related to lower teacher turnover. Focusing on different institutional settings, including unionization and regional unemployment, I use economist Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty to see if “voice” alternatives to quitting are an effective method of reducing exits. “Voice” alternatives studied include working relationships and practices between management and labor; identified paths for promotion and compensation; and processes for making decisions and addressing grievances. I discuss three research questions: What working conditions or practices affect teacher turnover in child-care programs in the private market? Results indicate the presence and type of worker voice affects teacher turnover. Programs with collective bargaining agreements have lower rates of turnover than those without. Unionized programs also employ more staff per child, pay higher wages, and serve a higher percentage of state-subsidized children. How does “voice” differ in nature and quantity across different types of workplaces? I find there is more voice in unionized programs. Also different voice practices are used in programs operating in a high-unemployment compared to a lowunemployment environment. What, if any, is the statistical relationship (correlation) between teacher turnover and voice, and how does this relationship vary across workplaces? My results show a consistently negative relationship between teacher turnover and voice in these workplaces even when controlling for wages. Programs with more voice aspects have less teacher turnover.

In the face of high population growth and declining natural resource base, tackling rural poverty necessitates an increase in overall factor productivity or a rise in the market rate of return of assets possessed by the poor. Towards achieving these objectives, the role of spatial integration of markets and the efficiency with which these markets operate are considerably important, as these factors shape the structure of incentives and the level of opportunities open to the rural poor. As a result, factors that hinder the spatial integration of markets and their efficient operation will have significant impact on rural poverty. In Ethiopia markets are often segmented mainly due to high transport cost associated with poor road infrastructure. The existing poor quality and low road density are expected to contribute to rural poverty through limiting the size of the market, increasing market risk (price volatility), widening the spatial prices gaps, reducing the market return to land and labour, inflating the profitability of new technologies and reducing the incentive to produce for market. This research endeavours to empirically substantiate if there is a robust link between farm income and the quality of road infrastructure farm households have access to as well as the pathways through which the effects of road on rural income are felt. The empirical result consistently showed that improving rural road access will have significant impact on rural income in general and the income of the poor in particular. The mechanisms by which road boosts rural income and reduce poverty are also found to work through narrowing down spatial price gaps, promoting technology adoption, boosting resource allocation efficiency and raising the market return to land and labour. The result also showed that the rural poor benefits from road induced income growth.

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京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23666号 / 経博第649号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 准教授 遊喜 一洋, 教授 佐々木 啓明 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

This thesis explores lobbying as an important political economy dimension of policymaking. It exploits theoretical, empirical, and numerical approaches and methods to investigate the possibilities of engaging in costly lobbying and how lobbying by special interests affects the setting of minimum wage and small business tax rates. The theoretical modeling relies on the common agency framework - a situation with multiple principals who are simultaneously and non-cooperatively interacting with a single agent - of public policy lobbying and a simpler principal agent model. Empirical analysis employs panel data regression methods in the context of Canadian provinces to identify causal relationship. Both minimum wage and small business taxation invite a considerable amount of activity from various special interest groups in Canada, which engage in lobbying for a policy stance more favorable to their members. After providing a brief overview of lobbying issues and literature in the first chapter, in the second one I show that initial lobbying cost can be a clear entry barrier, that lobbying competition can have properties of a high-stakes game and that lobbying can take place simply to preserve the status quo and not lose ground. In the pure rivalry sense, to not allow the opponent to gain ground in the policy arena. In the third chapter, I formulate a model of minimum wage determination based on the common agency lobbying framework to evaluate how the competition for political influence between unionized workers and firm owners affects the minimum wage determination. A binding minimum wage is a function of the policymaker's political ideology, the labor demand elasticity and the skill composition of union members. Specifically, when the elasticity of labor demand is large, the benefit of lobbying against (for) an increase in the minimum wage is greater since a potential minimum wage increase has a larger negative (positive) effect on firms' (unionized workers') income. Lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political preference; a more business (labor) friendly policymaker reduces (increases) the minimum wage. However, lobbying can also induce the policymaker to go against its ideological preference. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces over the 1965-2013 period gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. Preferred panel data regression specifications, controlling for unobserved province and year effects, and various province specific, time varying factors, indicate that real minimum wage decreases in skill-adjusted union density and a measure of political ideology, and increases with technological progress. Greater labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. In the fourth chapter, I focus on the issue of small business tax determination and the effect of lowering its rate on income inequality. In Canada, where the small business income tax rate is considerably lower than the top individual rate, higher income individuals are able to reduce their personal taxes by retaining and shifting income via privately owned small businesses. Therefore, because the small business owners benefit from an increasing difference between the small business and top individual tax rates, I show using a principal-agent model that by lobbying as a special interest group they can always `buy' a lower corporate tax rate from the government. However, a lower business income tax, relative to a given personal income tax rate, is not income inequality neutral and unambiguously increases the income share of the highest earning individuals in the economy, specifically those who own small corporations. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis describes the introduction into Canada, from the United States, of the Cooperative Wage Study (CWS) - a scheme of joint union-management job evaluation for the removal of wage rate inequities in the steel industry. it is especially concerned with the impact of the CWS programme upon the structure of industrial relations in this industry, and with the aims and objectives of both the union and management regarding it. A comparison of the origins of the plan in both the U.S.A. and Canada is made and a survey of the development of the programme carried out in two basic steel plants in Ontario. An evaluation of the results is attempted in the light of the original objectives, together with an assessment of the importance of CWS as an industrial relations technique. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Yes / The government increased the funding for regional development agencies to £2.3 billion in 2007/8, yet hard evidence on the effectiveness of the spending is difficult to find. Techniques for valuing benefits in difficult areas have existed for many years. They range from the hedonic methods and contingent valuation studies of environmental economists to the estimates of shadow wage rates used by development economists to take account of the economic value of additional employment. The latter have been used for years in some of the poorest developing countries in the world, as well as some countries in the European Union. Meanwhile some attempts to capture the indirect benefits of regeneration spending have surfaced through the United States with the ‘Social Return on Investment’ and Local Multiplier 3, yet the proponents of these approaches do not seem to have come across the abundant literature on the use of shadow pricing in the context of developing countries. This article attempts to explore the extent to which practices used and lessons learned in the economic analysis of environmental impacts and of investments in developing countries can inform the evaluation and appraisal of regeneration projects in the United Kingdom.