Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [62]-66).

This dissertation examines John Rawls’s doctrine of public reason in light of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy. Chapter 1 introduces the topics of public reason and common sense in order to suggest that Thomas Reid’s philosophy can provide a beneficial contribution to public policy debates. Chapter 2 examines key features of Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 3 suggests that there are critical problems with Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 4 examines key features of Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy. Chapter 5 shows Reid’s common sense application in early American history as well as contemporary scholarship. It argues that common sense can provide insight into two test-cases, abortion and same-sex marriage. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation, summarizing the arguments and providing suggestions for further research.

I begin by examining Moore's notion of common sense because it is my contention that his work is not neatly separated; rather, his ethical and non-ethical philosophy have common sense as an underlying theme. For Moore, common sense was not reducible to indubitable, cracker-barrel wisdom; it is popularized science, what would be a matter of common sense if we were to take the trouble to learn. Moore's allegiance to science is the cord that connects his ethical and non-ethical work. In Principia Ethica, he attempts to introduce the spirit of scientific investigation into ethics. The 'naturalistic fallacy', to which special attention is given, is shown to be a guide to avoiding the error of essentialism, that is, of presuming that there is a unique good-making property or quality, common to all good things. Essentialism is rejected because it leads away from the open investigation characteristic of science, toward dogmatism. From this perspective, several popular criticisms of Moore's ethics are shown to be misguided. In the last chapter, an interpretation of Moore's non-naturalism based on my understanding of the naturalistic fallacy is given, that is quite different from the one most commonly accepted. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In this paper I will argue that some of the contradictions in the Problem of the Many occur since we're dealing with two different types of concepts of a cloud, one that is 'common-sense', and one that is 'scientific'. I will borrow from Noam Chomsky’s distinction between common-sense concepts, which are understood intuitively and are usually human-centric, and scientific concepts, which are carefully constructed and aspire to be objective. The common-sense concept of a cloud has certain properties (such as having a sharp boundary) which contradict some found in the scientific concept (such as having a vague boundary), and this is the source of some contradictions found within the Problem of the Many. I will propose that in the future we should approach the problem with this in mind, and not treat it as if we're dealing with only one concept of a cloud, but instead, several.

Yes / Illness representations shape responses to illness experienced by the self or by others. The illness representations held by family members of those with long-term conditions such as dementia influence their understanding of what is happening to the person and how they respond and provide support. The aim of this study is to explore components of illness representations (label, cause, control and timeline) in caregivers of people with dementia. This was an exploratory study; the data reported came from the Memory Impairment and Dementia Awareness Study (MIDAS). Data from semi-structured interviews with 50 caregivers of people with dementia were analysed using content analysis. The majority of caregivers gave accounts that appeared to endorse a medical/diagnostic label, although many used different terms interchangeably. Caregivers differentiated between direct causes and contributory factors, but the predominant explanation was that dementia had a biological cause. Other perceived causes were hereditary factors, ageing, lifestyle, life events and environmental factors. A limited number of caregivers were able to identify things that people with dementia could do to help manage the condition, while others thought nothing could be done. There were varying views about the efficacy of medication. In terms of timeline, there was considerable uncertainty about how dementia would progress over time. The extent of uncertainty about the cause, timeline and controllability of dementia indicated that caregivers need information on these areas. Tailored information and support taking account of caregivers' existing representations may be most beneficial.

Yes / Informal caregivers of people with dementia develop their own beliefs about the condition, referred to as Dementia Representations (DRs), as they try to make sense of the changes they are observing. The first aim of this study was to provide a profile of the types of DRs held by caregivers. The second aim was to examine the impact of caregivers’ DRs on their well-being, satisfaction with life (SwL) and caregiving stress. Methods: Participants were 1264 informal caregivers of people in the mild-to-moderate stages of dementia from time-point 1 of the IDEAL cohort study. Measures: DRs were measured using questionnaire items covering: Identity, Cause, Control, and Timeline. Results: Almost half (49.2%) of caregivers used a diagnostic term to describe the person’s condition, although 93.4% of caregivers stated they were aware of the diagnosis. Higher well-being, SwL, and lower caregiving stress were associated with the use of an identity term relating to specific symptoms of dementia, attributing the cause to ageing or not knowing the cause, and believing the condition would stay the same. Lower well-being, SwL, and higher caregiving stress were associated with believing there was little that could be done to control the effects of the condition. Conclusion: Healthcare professionals should assess and gain an understanding of caregivers’ DRs in order to provide more tailored information and support. / Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the National Institute for Health Research (UK) grant ES/L001853/2

Adipositas gilt seit einigen Jahren als eine der häufigsten chronischen Erkrankungen des Kindes- und Jugendalters. Welche Faktoren zu einer erfolgreichen Behandlung der Adipositas im Kindes- und Jugendalter führen, sind jedoch noch immer nicht ausreichend geklärt. Ein wichtiger – bisher jedoch weitgehend unbeachteter – Faktor, welcher möglicherweise wegweisend für den Therapieverlauf sein kann, ist das subjektive Krankheitskonzept der betroffenen Kinder. Das bedeutsamste theoretische Modell, welches den Einfluss der individuellen Krankheitsvorstellungen auf den Regulationsprozess eines Menschen im Umgang mit Erkrankungen beschreibt, ist das Common Sense Model of Illness Representation (CSM) von Howard Leventhal. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es die subjektiven Krankheitskonzepte adipöser Kinder zu erfassen und ihren Einfluss auf den Regulationsprozess zu analysieren. In einer ersten Untersuchung wurde mittels Daten von 168 adipösen Kindern im Alter von 8 bis 12 Jahren zunächst ein Fragebogen zur Erfassung der subjektiven Krankheitskonzepte entwickelt. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass der Fragebogen als reliabel und valide eingeschätzt werden kann. Mit Hilfe dieses Fragebogens konnte nachgewiesen werden, dass adipöse Kinder Konstrukte über ihre Erkrankung haben, welche in eigenständigen Dimensionen gespeichert werden. Die gefundenen initialen Krankheitskonzepte adipöser Kinder ergeben ein homogenes erwartungskonformes Bild. In einer zweiten Untersuchung wurden anschließend die subjektiven Krankheitskonzepte adipöser Kinder, die Bewältigungsstrategien sowie gesundheits- und krankheitsrelevante Kriteriumsvariablen untersucht. Die Befragungen erfolgten vor Beginn einer stationären Reha (T1), am Ende der Reha (T2) sowie sechs Monate nach Reha-Ende (T3). Von 107 Kindern liegen Daten zu allen drei Messzeitpunkten vor. Es konnte ein Zusammenhang zwischen Krankheitskonzepten, Bewältigungsstrategien und spezifischen Kriteriumsvariablen bei adipösen Kindern nachgewiesen werden. Die Analyse der Wirkzusammenhänge konnte zeigen, dass die kindlichen Krankheitskonzepte – neben den indirekten Einflüssen über die Bewältigungsstrategien – die Kriteriumsvariablen vor allem auch direkt beeinflussen können. Der Einfluss der initialen Krankheitskonzepte adipöser Kinder konnte hierbei sowohl im querschnittlichen als auch im längsschnittlichen Design bestätigt werden. Zudem konnten vielfältige Einflüsse der Veränderung der subjektiven Krankheitskonzepte während der Therapie gefunden werden. Die Veränderungen der Krankheitskonzepte wirken sowohl mittelfristig auf die individuellen Bewältigungsstrategien am Ende der Reha als auch längerfristig auf die adipositasspezifischen Kriteriumsvariablen Gewicht, Ernährung, Bewegung und Lebensqualität. Die Befunde stärken die Relevanz und das Potential der zielgerichteten Modifikation adaptiver bzw. maladaptiver Krankheitskonzepte innerhalb der stationären Therapie der kindlichen Adipositas. Zudem konnte bestätigt werden, dass subjektive Krankheitskonzepte und ihre Veränderung innerhalb der Therapie einen relevanten Beitrag zur Vorhersage des kindlichen Therapieerfolgs über einen längerfristigen Zeitraum leisten können. / Obesity has been considered one of the most common chronic illnesses in children and adolescents for some years. The factors that contribute to a successful treatment of obesity in children and adolescents have however yet to be adequately identified. One important – but so far largely neglected – factor which could be crucial to the therapeutic process is the subjective concept of illness in the children affected. The most significant theoretical model to describe the influence of the individual notions of illness on a person’s regulatory process in dealing with illnesses is the Common Sense Model of Illness Representation (CSM) developed by Howard Leventhal. The aim of this thesis was to record the subjective concepts of illness in obese children and to analyse their influence on the regulatory process. In a first study, a survey was developed to collect data on the subjective concepts of illness in 168 obese children between the ages of 8 and 12 years. The results indicate that the survey can be considered reliable and valid. With the aid of this survey, it could be proven that obese children have constructs of their illness that are stored in independent dimensions. The initial concepts of illness found in obese children give a homogeneous picture that conforms to expectations. A second study analysed the subjective concepts of illness in obese children, as well as coping strategies and health and illness-relevant criterion variables. Surveys were carried out before the start of in-patient rehab (T1), at the end of rehab (T2) and six months after the end of rehab (T3). The data of 107 children is available from all three instances of measurement. It was possible to prove a connection between concepts of illness, coping strategies and specific criterion variables in obese children. An analysis of cause-and-effect relationships was able to demonstrate that – as well as indirectly influencing the coping strategies – the children’s concepts of illness had above all a direct influence on the criterion variables. The influence of the initial concepts of illness in obese children could thus be confirmed both in a cross-sectional and in a longitudinal design. In addition, multiple influences were found of changes to the subjective concepts of illness in the course of therapy. Changes to concepts of illness have both a medium-term effect on individual coping strategies at the end of rehab and a longer-term effect on the obesity-specific criterion variables weight, diet, movement and quality of life. The findings reinforce the relevance and potential of the goal-orientated modification of adaptive or maladaptive concepts of illness within the in-patient treatment of childhood obesity. In addition, it was confirmed that subjective concepts of illness and the changes they undergo during therapy can provide a relevant contribution to predicting the success of a child’s therapy over a longer period of time.

The aim of this thesis is to develop theories and formal methods to endow a computing machinery with capabilities to identify, represent, reason and evaluate complex activities that are directed by an individual’s needs, goals, motives, preferences and environment, information which can be inconsistent and incomplete. Current methods for formalising and reasoning about human activity are typically limited to basic actions, e.g., walking, sitting, sleeping, etc., excluding elements of an activity. This research proposes a new formal activity-centric model that captures complex human activity based on a systemic activity structure that is understood as a purposeful, social, mediated, hierarchically organized and continuously developing interaction between people and word. This research has also resulted in a common-sense reasoning method based on argumentation, in order to provide defeasible explanations of the activity that an individual performs based on the activity-centric model of human activity. Reasoning about an activity is based on the novel notion of an argument under semantics-based inferences that is developed in this research, which allows the building of structured arguments and inferring consistent conclusions. Structured arguments are used for explaining complex activities in a bottom-up manner, by introducing the notion of fragments of activity. Based on these fragments, consistent argumentation based interpretations of activity can be generated, which adhere to the activity-centric model of complex human activity. For resembling the kind of deductive analysis that a clinician performs in the assessment of activities, two quantitative measurements for evaluating performance and capacity are introduced and formalized. By analysing these qualifiers using different argumentation semantics, information useful for different purposes can be generated. e.g., such as detecting risk in older adults for falling down, or more specific information about activity performance and activity completion. Both types of information can form the base for an intelligent machinery to provide tailored recommendation to an individual. The contributions were implemented in different proof-of-concept systems, designed for evaluating complex activities and improving individual’s health in daily life. These systems were empirically evaluated with the purpose of evaluating theories and methodologies with potential users. The results have the potential to be utilized in domains such as ambient assisted living, assistive technology, activity assessment and self-management systems for improving health.

Thesis (MA (Sociology and Social Anthropology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The thesis examines the lives of four families in Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal and what the situation in which these families find themselves tells us about race, poverty and social change in contemporary South Africa by using ethnographic participant observation techniques. Central to the thesis is a concern with contradiction expressed in the entanglement of these four families with a particular moral order. This moral order is the basis of continued material survival, but at the same time, it is not adequate to transform conditions of poverty nor to change feelings of entitlement, making it impossible for these families to imagine their condition as shared with other races. The problem appears to be just about individuals not thinking correctly about their position and about them not seeing how many South Africans are struggling to survive and therefore share similar difficulties. The thesis shows that the difficulties experienced have rather more to do with changing the families' common sense notions. Their common sense is grounded in material realities, in realties of institutions that provide for them but also dictate a particular way of seeing the world, a moral order. Common sense is embedded in the material practices of people, in how they inhabit space and make place for themselves, in how they interact with family, in how they work with the institutions that are the very condition of their survival, and in how they come to understand and judge the past. At the moments when the limits of the moral order become clear, it is then not the moral order that comes into question but rather it is reasserted through explanations based on particular structural changes as contingencies that reinforce the moral order rather than challenge it. It is at these moments that people reassert race since their common sense explanations seem limited. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die alledaagse lewens van vier families in Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal en wat hul situasie ons kan vertel van ras, armoede en sosiale verandering in 'n kontemporêre Suid-Afrika gebasseer op deelnemende waarneming en etnografiese tegnieke. Sentraal tot die proefskrif is 'n fokus op die teenstrydigheid wat voorkom in die verstrengeling van hierdie vier families met 'n bepaalde morele orde. Hierdie morele orde is die grondslag vir voortgesette materiële oorlewing, maar terselfde tyd is dit nie voldoende om die kondisies van armoede te transformeer of om hul gevoelens van geregtigheid te verander nie en maak dit amper onmoonltik vir die families om hulle kondisie as gedeel en gemeenskaplik met ander rasse te sien. Die probleem blyk om meer te wees as net individue wat nie korrek nadink oor hul posisie nie of nie sien hoeveel ander Suid Afrikaners sukkel om 'n bestaan te maak nie en dus soortgelyke probleme ervaar. Die tesis wys dat dit het eerder te doen met 'n verandering in wat die families „weet‟ gebaseer op hulle gesonde verstand (common sense). Hulle gesonde verstand is gegrond in materiële realiteite, die realiteite van instellings wat vir hulle voorsiening maak en gevolglik die spesifieke wyse waarop hulle die wêreld sien dikteer; 'n morele orde. Hulle gesonde verstand is gegrond in die materiële praktyke van mense, in hoe hulle in ruimtes leef en plek maak vir hulself, in hoe hulle omgaan met familie, in hoe hulle te werk gaan met instellings wat die basis is vir hulle oorlewing en in hoe hulle sin maak van die verlede asook dit oordeel. In die oomblike wanneer die grense van die morele orde bereik word, is dit nie die morele orde wat bevraagteken word nie. Die morele orde word eerder gehandhaaf deur regverdigings gebasseer op spesifieke strukturele veranderings wat dit verder versterk, eerder as uitdaag. Dit is in hierdie oomblikke wat mense fokus op ras omdat hulle gesonde verstand se rationalisasies of regverdigings beperk is.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-15T13:33:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 André Vinícius Seleghini Franzin.pdf: 1557469 bytes, checksum: e477e83ba22bbec7731c88e610492af7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-15T13:33:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 André Vinícius Seleghini Franzin.pdf: 1557469 bytes, checksum: e477e83ba22bbec7731c88e610492af7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-21 / The aim of this work is to present common sense as a fundamental category of knowledge and as an epistemological criterion of legal thinking. We start by presenting some of the key meanings that the expression "common sense" has assumed in the history of philosophy, and then delineates the fundamental notes of a concept that recognizes the alethic value of common sense, in accordance with the investigation of the Italian philosopher Antonio Livi. We analyse, then, from the same philosophical context, the structure of legal knowledge, seeking to discern its formal object and its own purpose. Finally, we examine how – and to what extent – the common sense thus conceived can offer an adequate epistemic foundation to legal knowledge / O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar o senso comum como categoria fundamental do saber e como critério epistemológico do conhecimento jurídico. Partiremos da apresentação de alguns dos principais sentidos que a expressão “senso comum” assumiu na história da filosofia, delineando, em seguida, as notas fundamentais de um conceito que reconheça o valor alético do senso comum, inserindo-o em um contexto metafísico e gnosiológico realista, com esteio nas investigações do filósofo italiano Antonio Livi. Analisaremos, em seguida, a partir desse mesmo contexto filosófico, a estrutura do conhecimento jurídico, buscando discernir o seu objeto formal e a sua finalidade própria. Finalmente, ponderaremos de que maneira – e em que extensão – o senso comum assim concebido pode oferecer uma adequada fundação epistêmica ao conhecimento jurídico.