CHDS State/Local / This thesis reviews various readiness assessment tools used by military units and the civilian First Responder community. Most civilian readiness assessment tools have fallen short of adequately predicting a response team's probability of mission success or failure. This thesis will explore the use of model-based vulnerability analysis techniques and FT++ software as potential tools that could be adopted by first response organizations to predict a unit's operational performance. / National Disaster Medical System Emergency Coordinator, DHS / FEMA

CHDS State/Local / This thesis examines the structure and intelligence process of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group to assess its effectiveness as measured through the application of a Program Logic Model. This model verifies the links between the assumptions on which the program is based and actual program activities. It further assesses its status as a â smart practiceâ based on measurable criteria that are beyond perception or peer approval alone. The TEW is a regional, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary network that functions as a focal point for analyzing the strategic and operational information needed to prevent, mitigate, disrupt and respond to threats and acts of terrorism. Although efforts toward prevention are difficult to measure in any program, input and outcome are assessable. This method provides an effective means to evaluate a program while documenting what works and why. Effectiveness should not be based solely on outputs; a structure that produces them is also an indicator. The objective of this thesis is to establish a benchmark of practical standards for collaborative intelligence sharing operations that can be replicated by other regions and that will establish a common nationwide homeland security intelligence network. Based on these criteria, it is reasonable to conclude that the TEW is in fact a â smart practice.â It meets its intended goals and objectives when measured according to the parameters of the Program Logic Model, and has a structured process and system that leads to preferred outcomes. / Commander, Los Angeles County (California) Sheriff's Department

CHDS State/Local / In the final report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) found that the attacks were successful in part because information was not shared and analysis not pooled among the different agencies across all levels of government. Since that time, there have been significant strides to improve cooperation and close the intelligence gaps among the different intelligence and law enforcement services. Effective terrorism prevention, however, requires information and intelligence fusion as a cooperative process at all levels of government so that the flow of intelligence can be managed to support the identification of emerging threats to the homeland. This thesis explains the value of a state/regional fusion center by examining three successful fusion centers in Arizona, Georgia, and Los Angeles. Recommendations from each agency on lessons learned, as well as independent research, have been provided to help state and local agencies develop their own fusion centers. / Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

This thesis will focus on the area of 802.20 wireless networking as a feasible "last mile" solution to wireless access in a tactical coalition environment and will be implemented into a series of experiments. Implementation will primarily utilize Flarion's FLASH OFDM (Fast, Low-Latency Access with Seamless Handoff Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing). Current and future military and homeland security forces, conducting operations in a tactical environment, require instant access to data. Wireless data requires a reliable air-link resource anchored to a viable service platform. Flarion's FLASH-OFDM wireless air-link mimics the performance of a high-speed wireline environment. Through Flarion's Radio Router base station and mobile data terminal, a Radio Access Network is created. It connects directly to a standard IP Packet Data Network forming a wireless data network. Utilizing this network environment, this thesis intends to document the implementation of a limited objective experiment (LOE) in support of homeland security and the War on Terrorism (WOT), specifically, the testing of an IEEE 802.20 network enabling US and key foreign partners to integrate mobile wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies into a surveillance and target acquisition network program.

Understanding the roles played by the constituents to the Northern Ireland conflict is important and relevant for three reasons. First, an analysis of the factors contributing to a cessation of hostilities in Northern Ireland provides vital insights into the manner in which armed insurrections can be brought to an end. Secondly, as the US finds itself increasingly involved in the quagmire of sectarian conflict and attempts to put together governments representative of all major elements of indigenous proportions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a study of past attempts by a liberal democratic government to create a representative power-sharing government which crossed the sectarian divide is particularly apt. Finally, the success of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) seems predicated on the acceptance of democratic principles by the IRA via its political wing, Sinn Fein and the acquiescence of the Unionist population to a power-sharing arrangement which includes representation from the Republican constituency. Neither position appears to have been sufficiently present in previous attempts at power-sharing. While the long-term viability of power-sharing in the province remains in question, a return to violence has not occurred. Such factors may be critical elements in bridging the sectarian divide not only within the context of Northern Ireland, but when resolving terrorist/insurgent campaigns throughout the world.

Although anti-terror financing efforts have yielded positive results, national and international guidelines that are in place to stem the flow of funds can have unintended consequences on legitimate business, charitable organizations, and communities in general. Specifically for Islamic charitable organizations, the negative effects are particularly bad because charities many times are created and operate in areas that support communities both affected by and interconnected with conflict. Islamic charities have drawn scrutiny after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and their ability to operate in the United States and elsewhere have run into roadblocks associated with anti-terror financing regulations. Several countries including the United States have started to regulate and monitor these organizations in an effort to stem the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. Yet, the policies can have an overall negative effect on the capability of these organizations to operate in the perceived constrained environment because of donor fear of being associated with Islamic charities, fear that donations will be misused, and/or fear from government retribution. This thesis will explore the trade-offs involved for shutting off the funding to Islamic charities and determine if a balance can be struck between the policies and charities.

The traditional role of the active-duty military force at home is one of support to a civilian Lead Federal Agency (LFA) that primarily falls under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). During emergencies, military domestic assistance is historically provided when local, state, and federal resources have been overwhelmed. During and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, however, the slow and perceived inept response to the massive disaster prompted a national debate on the appropriate role of the military in response to major domestic disasters. Many concerned with the federal response to Katrina believed that America's homeland security system could not aptly respond to a large-scale natural or man-made catastrophe without the military in a lead role. Defining the roles and understanding the responsibilities outlined for the Department of Defense (DOD) within the National Response Plan (NRP) is an important first step towards an effectively coordinated incident response. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of the active-duty military in domestic disaster response, using Hurricane Katrina, to determine if DOD and DHS response to the disaster was implemented according to the NRP. This research will help explain the role that the military plays in supporting the civilian LFA in disaster response.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the influence of public opinion on presidential decision-making has been debated. Because the United States is a democracy, one would expect that public opinion and the ideas and concerns of the people should weigh on the decisions of the policy makers. In theory, at least, presidential decision-makers should not solely determine policy. Yet most presidential administrations would have the public believe that they are leading, not following, public opinion based on their inherent charge as elected officials to advocate what they perceive to be in the best interest of the country. It is important to understand the relationship between public opinion and executive decision-makers. Comparing U.S. policies implemented in response to terrorist attacks against U.S. sovereignty and Iraq's persistent pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by presidents from two different political parties offers an opportunity to analyze how public opinion is viewed by presidents, what actions the administrations took to influence public opinion, and whether public opinion ultimately affected the foreign policy decision-making of the executive. How and when public opinion constrains policymakers and their options is essential to understanding why certain policy decisions for the use of force are made and what decisions can be predicted in the future.

As the United States Air Force air base defense doctrine evolved over the years, implementation and execution errors were occasionally exploited by insurgent forces operating in the areas adjacent to U.S. occupied air bases. Executing unconventional attack methodologies, primarily via stand-off weapons, these insurgents were able to wreak havoc on U.S. and allied air bases, causing massive destruction and the loss of American lives. An examination of the literature from air base (ground) attacks in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar Towers indicated several problematic areas resonating in all three cases. These common areas include: inadequate intelligence (both organic and external), lack of proper focus on critical infrastructure and insufficient or absent force protection technologies. Many of today[alpha]s security experts are predicting future attacks on military infrastructure to include stateside and forwarddeployed air bases. Today[alpha]s slightly diverse, yet consistent insurgent enemy, with attack methodologies mirroring those of Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, remains a constant and formidable threat. As the Air Force moves forward with its newly implemented Integrated Base Defense doctrine, specific attention must be paid to improving upon the problem areas from the past. This thesis focuses on the specific problematic areas, and provides policy recommendations for force protection planners.

The Air Base has long been a potential target of attack for enemy planners. An effective way to attack the United States Air Force (USAF) is to avoid its usual dominance in the air and use an asymmetrical approach, attacking air bases with ground forces inserted into the Joint Rear Area. The history of airbase ground attacks from 1942 to 1994, documented in the book Snakes in the Eagles' Nest, shows that the dominant strategy employed by air base attackers has been the standoff attack. Roughly, 75 percent of all airbase attacks have been through the use of rockets or mortar fire from outside the airbase's perimeter defenses. In Vietnam, where the defenses against penetrating ground attacks were emphasized, this percentage rose to 96 percent. Historically, robust main operating bases, with passive defensive measures such as hardened facilities and redundant systems, have been able to withstand standoff attacks. The relative inaccuracy of the attacker's standoff systems and their limited ability to sustain fire on the air base minimized damage. Times have changed and the USAF finds itself operating in an expeditionary mode across the globe. Expeditionary Air Forces cannot depend on the luxury of operating off airfields with the robust infrastructure of main operating bases. In addition, the emergence of man portable, guided munitions for mortars and guided anti-tank missiles has increased the accuracy of potential standoff weapons. Finally, the sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq and of modern radio-controlled model aircraft suggests the potential for attackers to build their own guided standoff weapons. The potential for a "one shot, one kill" standoff weapon is here today, negating the effectiveness of passive hardening measures. Disrupting these attacks will take new strategies. Understanding current Joint and USAF doctrine is the first step. Areas for further study include disrupting the enemy forces before they launch a standoff attack, intercepting the standoff round in flight and mitigating the damage on impact are discussed.