As Cloud services become more commonplace, recent works have uncovered vulnerabilities unique to such systems. Specifi cally, the paradigm promotes a risk of information leakage across virtual machine isolation via side-channels. Unlike conventional computing, the infrastructure supporting a Cloud environment allows mutually dis- trusting clients simultaneous access to the underlying hardware, a seldom met requirement for a side-channel attack. This thesis investigates the current state of side-channel vulnerabilities involving the CPU cache, and identifi es the shortcomings of traditional defenses in a Cloud environment. It explores why solutions to non-Cloud cache-based side-channels cease to work in Cloud environments, and describes new mitigation techniques applicable for Cloud security. Speci cally, it separates canonical cache-based side-channel attacks into two categories, Sequential and Parallel attacks, based on their implementation and devises a unique mitigation technique for each. Applying these solutions to a canonical Cloud environment, this thesis demonstrates the validity of these Cloud-specifi c, cache-based side-channel mitigation techniques. Furthermore, it shows that they can be implemented, together, as a server-side approach to improve security without inconveniencing the client. Finally, it conducts a comparison of our solutions to the current state-of-the-art. / Thesis (Master, Computing) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-25 18:03:47.737

Mokslinė problema: kokie yra Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinės gynybos ir puolimo veiklos ypatumai. Tyrimo objektas: Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinės žaidimo gynybos ir puolimo ypatumai. Tyrimo tikslas: nustatyti Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinės žaidimo ypatumus XXX olimpinėse žaidynėse. Tyrimo uždaviniai: 1. Nustatyti Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinės žaidimo ypatumus puolime. 2. Nustatyti Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinės žaidimo ypatumus gynyboje. Rezultatai. Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinė Londono olimpinėse žaidynėse vidutiniškai per rungtynes pelnė po 78,2 ± 8,1 taško, atšokusį kamuolį atkovojo 38,2 ± 5,3 kartų, puolime kamuolį atkovojo 9 ± 2,4 karto, atliko 18,2 ± 3,9 rezultatyvaus perdavimo, prasižengė 24,7 ± 3,9 karto, padarė 16,3 ± 4,0 technikos klaidų, perėmė 4,3 ± 3,1 kamuolio, blokavo 2,0 ± 1,1 varžovo metimo. Lietuvos rinktinės pozicinių atakų veiksmingumas – 48%, greitųjų atakų – 60,3%. Lietuvos rinktinės atakų, trukusių iki 5 s veiksmingumas – 60,3%, 6–9 s atakų veiksmingumas – 51,6%, 10–15 s atakų veiksmingumas – 50,7%, 16–20 s atakų veiksmingumas – 43,2%, 21–24 s atakų veiksmingumas – 33,3%. Lietuvos krepšinio rinktinės gynybos veiksmingumas taikant asmeninę gynybą buvo 50,1%, aikštės gynybą – 68%, asmeninį spaudimą visoje aikštėje – 60,6%, asmeninį spaudimą pusėje aikštės – 44,4%, asmeninį spaudimą aktyviai dengiant žaidėją su kamuoliu – 45%, zoninį spaudimą visoje aikštėje – 14,3%. Išvados: 1. Lietuvos vyrų krepšinio rinktinė XXX-ųjų olimpinių... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Research problem: what are lithuanian national basketball men team‘s indicators on defence and offence. Research object: Lithuanian national basketball men team‘s performance. Research aim: to identify performance of Lithuanian national basketball men team in the XXX olympic games. Research objectives: 1. To identify Lithuanian national basketball men team‘s defensive performance. 2. To identify Lithuanian national basketball men team‘s offensive performance. Results. The average number of points per game by Lithuanian national basketball men‘s team in London olympic games was 78.2 ± 8.1. The other statistical averages are following: 38.2 ± 5.3 rebounds per game; 9 ± 2.4 offensive rebounds per game; 18.2 ± 3.9 assists per game; 24.7 ± 3.9 committed fouls; 16.3 ± 4.0 turnovers; 4.3 ± 3 stolen balls; 2.0 ± 1.1 blocked shots. The efficiency of the atacks were 48% of the positionals and 60.3% of the fastbreaks. The efficiency of the attacks depending on their duration were following: fastbreaks (up to 5 sec) – 60.3%; hasty attacks (6¬¬¬¬¬–9 sec) – 51.6%; positional attacks (10–15 sec) – 50.7%; positional attacks (16–20 sec) – 43.2%; positional attacks (21–24 sec) – 33.3 %. The most effective defensive structure that Lithuanian national basketball men‘s team used was zone defense – efficiency of 68%. Other defensive structures were: man to man – 50.1%; full court man to man preassure – 60.6%; half court man to man preassure – 44.4%; man to man preassure on a player... [to full text]

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / As the United States continues to develop plans and policies to counter the threat of terrorism, it becomes increasingly more vital to understand the entire spectrum of the threat. Realistically assessing the capability of possible and probable terrorist groups helps federal and state agencies to establish potential methods and procedures for defense and maritime domain awareness. Yet, the avenues of attack and the varieties of terrorists far outnumber the available resources of most agencies concerned. Moreover, there have been no attacks on homeland U.S. targets since September 11. The red team concept provides an innovative method to examine these vulnerabilities from the terrorist perspective. The effectiveness of a red team can be measured in various ways and is dependent on key organizational and situational elements. In the end, the determination of effectiveness is based on the original intentions of the host enterprise, whether it is training, research, strategy, or analysis or a combination. We conducted a case study to utilize the red team concept as a tool for bringing a fresh awareness to a critical issue within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The red teams identified vulnerabilities of possible targets, raised the awareness on the nature of terrorists, researched potential tactics and tools, and examined existing assumptions about maritime security. In applying the red team concept, the case study used military officers as surrogate terrorists planning a campaign to attack port cities. The case study effectively demonstrated the anticipated functions, while the follow-on actions ensured that the results were distributed to the appropriate agencies. Furthermore, civilian officials and the agencies concerned valued the red team reports as positive insights into the current situation. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / It has been thirty-three months since the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11th 2001. Yet, in distributing grants to States and localities to build their capacity for homeland security, the Nation continues to rely on funding formulae that are deeply flawed. Many grants are distributed in ways that ignore need-driven criteria, such as where terrorists are most likely to strike and which targets are most critical. This thesis develops an alternative formula that takes need into account (and therefore is much more likely to send funds where they are required). After reviewing need-driven formulae from a range of fields that might be applied to homeland security, I use the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to break the objectives of homeland security capacity-building into discreet, measurable components. Then, I analyze the criteria that should be used to build a grant allocation process to accomplish those objectives, including population density, criticality of infrastructure, the threat to a municipality, vulnerability to that threat, and terrorism prevention. The resulting formula is far better structured than the current system to put homeland security grant funds where the Nation most needs them. / Civilian, Assistant Chief Fire Department City of New York

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Since 11 September 2001, a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most often asked question posed to professionals in the field is "what is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission." What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, "who's in charge of the operation?" "When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation"? Many have argued that the command structure between the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another, when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization. / Commander, United States Navy

CHDS State/Local / In March of 2002, through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was developed. The original intent of the HSAS was to provide a warning mechanism for the federal government; other state and local agency responses were voluntary. However, the intent expanded to include a warning system for local, state, federal agencies, the private sector and the general public. Five orange alerts later, the confusion continues with a mix of complacency and misunderstanding. State and local officials complain about the general nature of the intelligence and the lack of specificity directed at regions or targets. The cost of orange protective measures is adding up into the billions of dollars. Warnings specific to New York City have a different value in Utah. Solutions require a new federal intelligence culture with a new name and location under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security distributing specific intelligence. We need highly trained intelligence analysts working with multi-agency state or metropolitan fusion centers. The media should help in educating the public on the HSAS and promoting volunteer organizations, encouraging participation to assist in Homeland Security and to reduce the fear of a catastrophic event. Customized HSAS should be developed for each community, state and private sector business to better utilize protective resources. Protective measures should be implemented with specific intelligence to support the elevation of the HSAS. / Civilian-Utah Department of Public Safety

This thesis provides an analysis of the co-production of the defense function as provided by the legislative branch, Department of Defense (DoD) and the defense industry at large. The aim of the study will be to examine the evolution of the procurement and contracting process since World War II with a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the increasingly symbiotic relationship between DoD and corporate America. This relationship has evolved significantly over the last halfcentury. It is no longer merely transactional as each side has leveraged the wartime and peacetime interaction to yield upgrades in weapon systems and capabilities that may have been otherwise unattainable in the same time frame. The benefits of this research include the identification and assessment of the intricacies of the DoD-defense industry relationship, particularly with regard to financial management, to elucidate significant trends, and characteristics that pose potential risk and warrant further study.

CHDS State/Local / Responders at the Federal, state, and local level are critical to Homeland Defense and Security (HLDS). Building from the recently published RAND and National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report on responder safety, this thesis explores the issues associated with creating a safety risk management capability that will enable HLDS responders to better protect themselves from harm and enhance their readiness. Risk management experiences within the military were benchmarked with emphasis upon lessons learned from the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. This revealed that Operational Risk Management (ORM), a risk-based decision-making tool that systematically balances risk and mission completion, and Crew Resource Management (CRM), a human factors-based team coordination training, should be the primary components focused upon to build the safety risk management capability. Development of ORM and CRM capabilities for HLDS responders will require strong national and local leadership, innovative measurement tools, clear accountability, and should be implemented via the national preparedness model outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD- 5) and HSPD-8. ORM and CRM, if successfully established, can provide HLDS responders with the safety risk management capability that enables them to safely and effectively provide their vital services to the Nation. / Chief - Afloat & Marine Safety, US Coast Guard (USCG)

CHDS State/Local / As the Department of Homeland Security continues to develop plans and strategies to guide our government agencies towards a safer environment, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are struggling to define their role in the Homeland Security Mission. This paper proposes the creation of a National Law Enforcement Network made up of the state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The network design will allow local agencies to reach beyond the traditional law enforcement approach by establishing formal networks that facilitate local, regional, national and eventually global coordination of an effective strategy aimed at preventing future terror attacks in the homeland. The creation of this network will ensure that every police officer in the United States understands their role in preventing future terror attacks. Drilling down to the lowest local level to include businesses, industry and the private sector, the formation of the network expands our detection and prevention capabilities well beyond our current level. / Commander - Special Operations Division, Metropolitan Police Department

CHDS State/Local / The events of 9/11 and subsequent examination of the intelligence community in the United States have clearly identified several areas that require immediate repair. While we have, on the federal, state and local levels, a complex system of collecting, developing, and analyzing intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, we do not have an accompanying system that shares intelligence information throughout the law enforcement community. The purpose of this thesis is to review information sharing between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and to suggest methods to improve that capability. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, authorities uncovered patterns of suspicious activity occurring in places such as Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey. These activities included individuals paying cash for plane tickets, taking flight lessons, inquiring about crop duster planes, and frequenting drug stores. Taken individually, these incidents were not overly suspicious; nor were they seen as serious when reported to authorities. Yet, all together they illustrate at best highly suspicious behavior, and at worst a picture of a master plan of prospective criminal activity. When collecting data on terrorist potential, one isolated incident in a local jurisdiction may not have obvious significance, but the ability to view all incidents together across cities or states might paint a more complete picture. Agencies are now recognizing the benefits of data sharing across institutions and jurisdictions. / Assistant Police Chief, Ventura Police Department