This project explores the impact of international and domestic institutions on the decisions of political leaders. A theory of two-level institutional incentives is developed that seeks to explain how institutional context at the domestic and international levels affects the incentives, and thus the behavior of political leaders when making decisions related to trade policy. This theory argues that the institutional context in which political leaders make policy decisions has a significant effect on their decision-making. Further, the institutional context must include both domestic and international institutions. Building on previous work on the impact of institutions at both the domestic and international levels, this project seeks to test the theory of institutional incentives in the context of trade disputes under the GATT and WTO.A series of empirical tests are conducted using a dataset of GATT disputes combined with a new dataset of disputes under the WTO. These tests demonstrate strong support for the theories set forth in this project that domestic and international institutions combine to affect the behavior of political leaders. Domestic institutions affect the impact of international institutions and vice versa. This project extends previous work in two-level institutional incentives by demonstrating that institutional change at both levels has significant effects on the behavior of political leaders.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system is facing unprecedented challenges, following the United States (US) decision to block the appointment of all Appellate Body members. The US has justified its blocking tactic, already implemented since 2017 by raising several procedural and substantive concerns with the Appellate Body's failure to follow WTO rules. On 10 December 2019, the Appellate Body was forced to suspend its activities after the second terms of two of the remaining three members expired. While the WTO dispute settlement system continues to function at the panel stage, the Appellate Body is currently unable to review appeals because it lacks the minimum number of three members required to establish a division. In addition, the collapse of the Appellate Body means that any party to a dispute can block the adoption of a panel report by filing a notice to appeal which is likely to remain in limbo for an indefinite period. Numerous studies have discussed the Appellate Body crisis and its implications for the WTO dispute settlement system. Few, however, have critically analysed the validity of the concerns that the US has raised about the Appellate Body's work over the past few years. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss and critically analyse these concerns to determine whether the Appellate Body has indeed strayed from its limited mandate. In addition, the research will provide recommendations on how to save the appellate stage and ensure that appeals are resolved while WTO members attempt to find permanent solutions to this unprecedented crisis.

No description available.

The World Trade Organization has its own binding dispute settlement system. To ensure compliance with the outcome of the dispute settlement procedures, the claimant Member is authorized to retaliate in case the respondent Member fails to comply within a certain period of time. However, the rules and procedures regarding retaliation and determination of compliance are ambiguous and have caused an interpretational problem called the sequencing problem. To address the problem, the parties to any dispute generally conclude bilateral ad hoc procedural agreements. However, by examining the procedural agreements concluded to date and by analyzing the potential problems of these agreements, this thesis concludes that due to the dependence on the will of the parties and the uncertain legal status of the agreements, the procedural agreements do not constitute a satisfactory method for addressing the sequencing problem. Alternatives such as amendments to the dispute settlement rules, an authoritative interpretation of them or ― if consensus cannot be reached soon ― clarification by means of a precedent from the Appellate Body, should be considered and attempted.

Os órgãos que compõem o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC possuem competência para analisar reclamações fundadas nos denominados acordos abrangidos e formular conclusões e recomendações sobre a conformidade das medidas impugnadas com os referidos acordos. Para interpretar as disposições destes acordos, estes órgãos podem recorrer às regras costumeiras de interpretação previstas na Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados de 1969. Estas regras de interpretação, por sua vez, permitem àqueles órgãos recorrer a espécies normativas produzidas fora do contexto da OMC como subsídios para esclarecer o sentido dos termos das disposições dos acordos abrangidos. Ao se valer destas espécies normativas, os referidos órgãos estarão também, inevitavelmente, interpretando as disposições destes. Nesse contexto, esta pesquisa teve por objetivo analisar de que forma as espécies normativas tradicionais de Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente (convenções, costumes e princípios gerais de direito) foram interpretadas pelos órgãos do OSC em três casos escolhidos para representar o problema. Os resultados da análise dos casos demonstraram que espécies normativas do Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente são efetivamente admitidas no processo interpretativo dos acordos abrangidos, o que pode se dar de forma vinculante ou não, bem como podem influenciar efetivamente na interpretação destes acordos, confirmando-lhes o significado ou lhes atribuindo um significado não explícito, embora as conclusões desta interpretação nem sempre resultem em posicionamentos totalmente favoráveis às medidas unilaterais adotadas pelos Membros da OMC a título de preocupação ambiental. / The organs that make up the dispute settlement system of the WTO have power to examine complaints founded in so-called covered agreements and formulate conclusions and recommendations on the compliance of the contested measures with the agreements. To interpret the provisions of these agreements, these organs may make use of interpretation customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. These rules of interpretation, in turn, allow those organs resort to normative species produced outside the context of WTO as subsidies to clarify the meaning of the terms of the provisions of the covered agreements. By borrowing these normative species, those bodies will also inevitably interpreting the provisions of these. In this context, this study aimed to examine how traditional normative species of International Law of the Environment (conventions, customs and general principles of law) were interpreted by the DSB organs in three cases chosen to represent the problem. The case analysis results showed that normative species of International Law of the Environment are effectively admitted in the interpretive process of the covered agreements, which can occur in binding or not, and can effectively influence the interpretation of these agreements, confirming them the meaning or assigning them a no explicit meaning, although the conclusions of this interpretation does not always result in favorable positions to fully unilateral measures adopted by WTO Members in respect of environmental concern.

Os órgãos que compõem o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC possuem competência para analisar reclamações fundadas nos denominados acordos abrangidos e formular conclusões e recomendações sobre a conformidade das medidas impugnadas com os referidos acordos. Para interpretar as disposições destes acordos, estes órgãos podem recorrer às regras costumeiras de interpretação previstas na Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados de 1969. Estas regras de interpretação, por sua vez, permitem àqueles órgãos recorrer a espécies normativas produzidas fora do contexto da OMC como subsídios para esclarecer o sentido dos termos das disposições dos acordos abrangidos. Ao se valer destas espécies normativas, os referidos órgãos estarão também, inevitavelmente, interpretando as disposições destes. Nesse contexto, esta pesquisa teve por objetivo analisar de que forma as espécies normativas tradicionais de Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente (convenções, costumes e princípios gerais de direito) foram interpretadas pelos órgãos do OSC em três casos escolhidos para representar o problema. Os resultados da análise dos casos demonstraram que espécies normativas do Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente são efetivamente admitidas no processo interpretativo dos acordos abrangidos, o que pode se dar de forma vinculante ou não, bem como podem influenciar efetivamente na interpretação destes acordos, confirmando-lhes o significado ou lhes atribuindo um significado não explícito, embora as conclusões desta interpretação nem sempre resultem em posicionamentos totalmente favoráveis às medidas unilaterais adotadas pelos Membros da OMC a título de preocupação ambiental. / The organs that make up the dispute settlement system of the WTO have power to examine complaints founded in so-called covered agreements and formulate conclusions and recommendations on the compliance of the contested measures with the agreements. To interpret the provisions of these agreements, these organs may make use of interpretation customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. These rules of interpretation, in turn, allow those organs resort to normative species produced outside the context of WTO as subsidies to clarify the meaning of the terms of the provisions of the covered agreements. By borrowing these normative species, those bodies will also inevitably interpreting the provisions of these. In this context, this study aimed to examine how traditional normative species of International Law of the Environment (conventions, customs and general principles of law) were interpreted by the DSB organs in three cases chosen to represent the problem. The case analysis results showed that normative species of International Law of the Environment are effectively admitted in the interpretive process of the covered agreements, which can occur in binding or not, and can effectively influence the interpretation of these agreements, confirming them the meaning or assigning them a no explicit meaning, although the conclusions of this interpretation does not always result in favorable positions to fully unilateral measures adopted by WTO Members in respect of environmental concern.

No description available.

While international arbitration offers the prominent scheme for resolution of transnational disputes, the arbitration community must constantly examine areas of concern. Any system of justice, including the arbitration system, is not meant for abuse. Thus, it would be paradoxical to support a mischief that the arbitration system seeks to obviate. This could cast doubts as to the system's efficiency and induce distrust in a system formed to accommodate parties' interests and uphold their common intentions. In recent years, international arbitration has been plagued by different forms of procedural abuse. Abusive practices developed by parties may undermine the fair resolution of disputes and frustrate the administration of arbitral justice. There are pre-existing tools and legal rules at the disposal of arbitrators that can be utilised to prevent abuse and administer arbitral justice. However, these tools are inherently rigid in their application. The thesis introduces the principle of abuse of rights in international arbitration and argues for its application as a general principle of law to prevent the transmogrification of international arbitration into a process profoundly tainted with abuse. The virtue and efficacy of a single theory with a wide scope of application and an overarching premise, is that it can be used to address different abusive behaviours, and equally enjoys the flexibility of general principles of law.

A jurisdição internacional expande-se com a criação, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, de um grande número de entes jurisdicionais internacionais. Tais entes são usualmente criados com especialização em determinado segmento do direito internacional, o que de certa forma fragmenta a unidade do direito internacional. Paralelamente, o incremento na freqüência de casos processados perante os diversos tribunais internacionais multiplica a ocorrência de hipóteses em que a atuação de uma das cortes interfere na atuação das demais. Ainda não se criaram regras capazes de minimizar esta sobreposição de atuações. No campo mais restrito das jurisdições afetas ao comércio internacional, o problema de certa forma se repete. Atuam nesta área, sobretudo, o sistema de solução de controvérsias da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), os diversos sistemas de solução de controvérsias dos diversos acordos regionais de integração (como é o caso do MERCOSUL), além dos próprios judiciários nacionais. Há vários episódios em que decisões judiciais nacionais geraram repercussões em litígios regionais e em litígios perante o sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. O mesmo ocorre na via inversa, ou seja, também há casos em que as decisões proferidas na OMC e nos sistemas regionais interferem na esfera nacional. De qualquer sorte, em função da capacidade da OMC fixar os principais parâmetros que hoje pautam o comércio internacional, o relacionamento entre os três diferentes níveis jurisdicionais OMC, regional e nacional acaba apresentando-se, concretamente, mais hierarquizado quando comparado aos demais segmentos da jurisdição internacional. Os litígios acerca do regime brasileiro de importação de pneus usados e reformados são representativos dos dilemas hoje existentes no relacionamento entre os diversos níveis de jurisdição e o desfecho dos casos, até o presente momento, aponta uma certa tentativa de adequação, por parte do judiciário brasileiro, de suas decisões aos entendimentos e recomendações advindos das esferas internacionais. / The international jurisdiction expands with the creation, from the second half of the twentieth century, of a large number of international judicial entities. Such entities are usually designed with specialization in a particular segment of international law, that somehow breaks the its unity. In parallel, the increase in the frequency of cases prosecuted before the various tribunals multiplies the occurrence in which the performance of one of the courts interferes in the actions of others. There are not yet rules to minimize this overlap. In the more restricted field of jurisdictions concerned with international trade, the problem repeats itself somehow. The adjudication in this area is especially offered by the WTO dispute settlement system, the correlates regional systems of dispute settlement (such as MERCOSUR), and the national judiciaries. There are several episodes in which national judgments echoed in regional disputes and in disputes before the dispute settlement system of WTO. The same occurs in the reverse path, ie, there are also cases in which decisions taken in the WTO and in regional systems interfered in the national sphere. Anyhow, in the capacity of the WTO to set the main parameters that guided international trade today, the relationship between the three different jurisdictional levels - WTO, regional and national - just show up more hierarchical when compared to other segments of international jurisdiction. Disputes about the Brazilian import regime for used and retreaded tires are representative of the dilemmas that exist today in the relationship between different levels of jurisdiction and the outcome of cases to date, indicates a certain attempt of adaptation, by the Brazilian judiciary, of its decisions to the understandings and recommendations of international spheres.

International environmental law is one of the most dynamic fields of public international law, and has rapidly acquired great breadth and sophistication. Yet the rate of global environmental decline has also increased and is accelerating. Halting and reversing this process is a challenge of effective governance, requiring institutions that can ensure that the now impressive body of environmental norms is faithfully implemented. This thesis explores whether and to what extent international courts and tribunals can play a useful role in international environmental regimes. Consideration is given to the threefold function of adjudication in resolving environmental disputes, in promoting compliance with environmental standards, and in developing environmental rules. The thesis is divided into three Parts. The first Part examines the spectrum of adjudicative bodies that have been involved in the resolution of environmental disputes, situates these within the evolution of institutions for compliance control, and offers a reassessment of their relevance in contemporary environmental governance. The second Part critically assesses the contribution that arbitral awards and judicial decisions have made to the development of norms and principles of environmental law, examining case law relating to transboundary pollution, shared freshwater resources and marine environmental protection. In the third Part of the thesis consideration is given to three looming challenges for international environmental litigation: accommodating greater levels of public participation in adjudicative processes, resolving practical problems stemming from the interaction among multiple jurisdictions, and ensuring that specialised courts and tribunals do not apply environmental norms in a parochial manner that privileges the policy objectives of issue-specific regimes.