The study describes the labour conditions for migrants in Sweden and aims at examining who is to benefit from increased labour migration. The qualitative method with a literature review is complemented with an interview in order to incorporate undocumented migrants’ perspective. Labour migration is discussed with the possible progress towards circular migration and thereafter incorporated in analyse with the dual labour market theory. The results show that it is foremost Swedes and migrants from inside the EU/EEA region that benefit from labour migration while migrants from outside the region will have to follow employers’ needs. This has lead to labour permits in low wage sectors were migrants supplement to structural inflation. The demand for cheap labour has also led to the exploitation of undocumented migrants who are paid starvation salaries. If these services are increasingly requested, serious employers might find it difficult to stand against decreasing minimum salaries and the welfare will decrease for more groups of employers. Meanwhile, changing demography is predicted to necessitate increased migration to sustain an economical growth in Sweden. This would also suggest that Sweden receives the main benefit from increased labour migration.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Vita. Advisor : Amy Remensnyder. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-238).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Western Seminary, Portland, OR, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-185).

This thesis will attempt to gauge the accuracy of Tertullian's Adversus Marcionem, particularly in the area of theology. Sources other than Tertullian, mostly his fellow heresiologists, will be used to form a picture of Marcionite thought, against which I will compare Tertullian's representation in the Adversus Marcionem. From this comparison I hope to be able to shed some light on how accurate Tertullian is in his discussion of Marcionite theology. The thesis will focus mainly on books 1-3 of the Adversus Marcionem.

The following thesis is concerned with the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind surrounding the nature of phenomenal consciousness (viz. subjective experience, or qualia). My primary aim is to adjudicate the ongoing dialectic between dualists and physicalists regarding the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness — physical or nonphysical — by examining the two major arguments most commonly deployed against physicalism: namely, the zombie argument (Chalmers), and the knowledge argument (Jackson). I conclude by showing that once physicalism has been shorn of the various doctrines that it need not and ought not accept — that is, once we are clear about what, precisely, the fundamental doctrine of physicalism actually is — it becomes clear that these arguments do not go through, and that the case for dualism has not been made. I also argue that the task of actually disarming these arguments (in the right way) is potentially critically instructive to contemporary physicalists, as this helps to nourish a clearer overall understanding of what physicalism (properly understood) is, and is not, committed to. In Chapter One I lay the groundwork for the aforementioned anti-physicalist arguments by explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase “phenomenal consciousness” and its various synonyms. I then briefly summarize the mind-body problem and articulate the so-called “explanatory gap” therein. Chapter Two looks at the zombie argument (as articulated by David Chalmers, 1996) and finds that the argument itself, as stated, actually has very little to do with defending dualism against physicalism, but rather is ultimately an argument for epiphenomenalism — which, I argue, is untenable. Chapter Three examines Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism (1982). Here I show why the argument itself fails to support property dualism, but also why the standard physicalist objections to it fail. I argue that Mary does indeed learn facts about the world upon her release, and that physicalists must face up to this squarely. I then suggest that physicalism (properly understood) is entirely compatible with this admission. Chapter Four examines a kind of rehabilitated version of the zombie argument in the context of a larger discussion about the relation between conceivability and possibility. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-18 13:18:41.928

My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior (such as the waving of my hand) is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states (event dualism), then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should guide our ontological commitment. If we can offer true explanations that appeal to more than one event (or property), then we are committed to overdetermination for the event explained. I argue that accepting overdetermination is not absurd and that we can give an adequate account of causal relevance for psychological and other supervenient properties. The result is a partial defense of both property and event pluralism. Recent work by Davidson, Fodor, Jackson, Kim, Pettit and Yablo receives explicit and critical discussion.

The extant management accounting literature shows that there is little consensus on why and how change in management accounting systems (MAS) evolves within organisations over time (Burns and Vaivio, 2001) and especially how the change process can be conceptualised into a theoretical model (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Although Amat et al. (1994) have provided a better understanding of MAS change over time and successfully conceptualised the process into a model using the notion of dualism, they noted that the evidence of a single case study is not enough. However, there has been no further study to extend Amat et al.'s (1994) findings. This thesis resembles Amat et al.'s (1994) study, analysing the progressive formalisation of MAS in a Chinese company: Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Stock Company Limited, during periods of change at both the social and organisational levels. It was found that three outer, social factors (socio-economic condition, competition and socio-culture) and three inner, organisational ones (autonomy, profitability and authority) have greatly impacted on the progressive formalisation of the MAS in the Chinese company during the period studied. Also, the internal effects on the MAS change differ from the external ones, mostly reflecting the increasingly specialised managers in the company having exercised a set of proactive or intentional changes in the MAS within the corporate boundary.

The overall aim of this thesis is to critically assess the concept of the person in Macmurray's philosophy. This exploration requires a general examination of Macmurray's published and unpublished writings owing to the lack of any full length study of his ideas. In particular, this thesis is broadly sympathetic to Macmurray's thought and seeks to reveal the relevance of its for today. Whilst certain details of his theory are contentious and inadequate, they are not beyond redemption. Religion is important for Macmurray, but he is primarily a philosopher, and the content of this thesis reflects this. In the first chapter, Macmurray's antagonism towards traditional mind-body dualism is discussed in connection with his definition of the Self as an embodied agent. It is in this sense that his concept of the person represents an holistic account of the individual. Whilst speculation surrounds Macmurray's influences, some comparisons are drawn and the ensuing criticisms are examined. As a direct result of the postulation of the Self as agent, the existence of the Other is both confirmed and deemed necessary. Chapter two explores the interaction between the Self and the Other from the perspective of the human infant. It asserts the importance of relationships for the growth of the individual. Then, with reference to the ethical implications of the related agent, chapter three examine the composition of societies, paying particular attention to Marxist analysis, and seeking to extricate Macmurray's transferable ideas from those conditioned by his era. Finally, chapter four claims that communities are necessary for the full expression of the person, whilst criticising Macmurray's dubious employment of religious terminology in this respect. In essence, this thesis argues that the insights of Macmurray's theory have been needlessly neglected, and that the person must be understood from the perspective of agency and relationships.

No description available.

What happens when feminist body theory and reductionist theories of biological sex difference are brought together? In this work I take as my starting point the increasing ubiquity of appeals to biology as an explanation for ‘human’ and ‘woman’s’ nature on the one hand, and the reactive and reflexive distancing of biology within feminist body theory on the other, to begin to question the middle ground. I aim to constructively dissent from taking up either of these positions in order to confront the question: what if the reductionists prove to be, even partially, right? In acknowledging that possibility, I am interested in whether/where there is potential for feminist theory to be more relaxed about biologically sex differentiated attributes. I position myself as a women’s studies scholar taking a walk across the campus to see what evidence is being produced by ‘the opposition’. To place my walk in context, I first briefly explore various feminist approaches to the problem of biological sex differences, and the continuing difficulties surrounding binaries and binary thinking. Next, in the main part of the thesis, I review the historical and contemporary reasoning and claims made within three areas of reductionist science that are aligning at this time, and which have been reproached for promoting a return to a more biologically determinist social environment. I then take a brief excursion off campus to demonstrate the dangerous aspects of these scientific enterprises when their interpretation into popular culture is not carefully monitored. Finally, I return again to my own side of the campus to look at some of the ways feminists have already begun the work of overturning outworn and contested conventional theories about biology and human nature in conversation with reductionist theory. Having done this, was it worth the walk? My assessment is that while, in some cases, feminism’s defensive antiessentialism is warranted, there is work being undertaken within these reductionist sciences that is less rigid and reactionary than some critical interpretation would suggest. I conclude that there is a certain futility in feminist body theory’s oppositional stance to biology, and that its utility is put at risk by a continued investment in one side of a binary. Further, my walk across the campus leads me to believe that, while perhaps not imminent, there is every reason to expect that the scientific pursuit of an unequivocal genetic basis for specific sex differentiated behaviours will succeed. That being so, there are spaces where the insights of both sides might be productively brought together so as to avoid the worst excesses of biological determinism and, at the same time, loosen the grip of binary thinking on approaches to biology and the body.