Univ., Diss., 2008--Marburg.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:32:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo3870_1.pdf: 936275 bytes, checksum: 329ff4e199b74a49e3754f410fee890d (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / No nascimento da tragédia, o amorpaixão foi representado como um conceito que muito bem combinava com aquele gênero literário. Por isso, a representação desse fenômeno, no espírito antigo grego, foi construída, de modo que, somente fosse possível como uma realidade intimamente relacionada com um destino inexorável. O amorpaixão era uma experiência que colocava o homem na condição de erro, portanto, era uma realidade sobre a qual não se tinha nenhum controle. A autonomia afetiva estava suplantada por um destino fatídico na expressão do próprio mundo grego a literatura, evidentemente, nunca abandonou esse modo de representar a paixão; é de se notar que é uma invenção que sempre se atualiza a concepção da paixão coroado com dimensão trágica. Eurípides, considerado o mais trágico dos trágicos, realiza em Hipólito, uma imagem desse eros como instância do trágico. Fedra, parece em vários momentos, encarnar esse fenômeno, como se o poeta ático tivesse organizado sua personagem em função de mimetizar esse conceito. Mas não se pode limitar a invenção de Eros na Literatura somente no seu sentido doloroso, é preciso reconhecer como o mesmo foi manipulado nas mãos de outra poeta. Jean Baptiste Racine aproveita do mesmo mito, antes utilizado por Eurípides, e apresenta a sua invenção dessa experiência. Agora o delito paixão vai se transfigurando em confissão . Ora, só se confessa porque subtende que há culpa, portanto culpa e confissão são duas realidades profundamente interrelacionadas. Por isso, para o classicista francês, a invenção do amoreros é deslocado para o plano da linguagem confissão . A Fedra raciniana é agora, somente ela, a culpada por inventar essa realidade os deuses foram sutilmente afastados. Assumindo uma nova perspectiva, Adélia Prado empreende o esforço estético de investir de sacralidade um objeto até então profano. O tratamento do amoreros nas mãos da poetisa vai se organizando à luz dessa orientação, que coloca paixão e Deus como experiência que se tocam. Nossos estudos vai procurar justamente compreender como esse objeto foi inventado por três autores

Yes / It appears that in September, 2011, Rome experienced much more than a dialogue on dialogic pedagogy but a gladiatorial clash of personalities and ideas. Heat, we are told, was generated (above, p.1) and in the dissipation of this heat on to the page, even the reader gets hot and flushed. We are told that arguments “fail” (above, p.16); that terms “are not clearly defined” (p.21), breakthroughs in classification (e.g. epistemological dialogical pedagogy) are tackled and dragged down to personal eccentricities “his so-called epistemological dialogical pedagogy” (p.22), politeness tries to get a grip periodically, “I agree. But maybe I agree with Kiyo only to a point” but shouting (e.g. capital letters/underlining terms – e.g. “NOT the exclusive practice” (p.26)) and assertions take over. Accusation fly - sometimes to the point of legal charges “I charge the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II with...” (p.29).

Emotionsreglering är ett närmast transdiagnostiskt fenomen med relevans för såväl individ- som parrelaterade problembilder. Kopplingar till relationsnöjdhet har tidigare gjorts via observationsstudier på parnivå eller självskattningsstudier på individnivå. Studiens huvudsyfte var att undersöka om mellanmänskliga skattningsskalor för emotionsreglering kan förklara varians i pars relationsnöjdhet utöver den varians som förklaras av en intrapersonell skattningsskala för emotionell dysreglering. Som ett andra syfte översattes och undersöktes två skattningsskalor med potentiell relevans för mellanmänsklig emotionsreglering. I studien fyllde ett urval av vuxna par (n = 110) i självskattningsformulär över internet. För att kunna undersöka både egen (aktörens) och partnerns emotionsreglerings inverkan på aktörens relationsnöjdhet användes en actor-partner interdependence model (APIM). En första modell bestående av intrapersonell emotionsreglering visades förklara 19.7% av variansen i relationsnöjdhet, en andra modell som också inkluderade mellanmänskliga mått visade signifikant bättre model-fit och större variansförklaring (64.6%). Effekter på relationsnöjdhet i den andra modellen kom ifrån tre aktörskattade mått och ett partnerskattat mått. Adekvat intern konsistens fanns för delskalorna för inre affektförbättrande, yttre affektförbättrande, inre affektförsämrande, yttre affektförsämrande, stoppbeteenden och negativ eskalering, men inte för undfallenhet. Affektförbättrande delskalor och stoppbeteenden visade inga samband med intrapersonell dysreglering. Fortsatta undersökningar krävs för att uttala sig om eventuell kausal inverkan på relationsnöjdhet och för att kunna etablera de översatta skalornas validitet och reliabilitet.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation addresses and then attempts to further what could be called the “French” Phenomenological tradition and its developments of a phenomenology of eros in dialogue with—and often as a response to—older Platonic conceptions of eros. Eros, I show, had a foundational role in Plato’s ethics; becoming ethical was dependent on first having an erotic encounter with beauty. However, this connection between love and ethics has been frequently abandoned in 20th-century philosophy. I argue that this move, a side-effect of the development of a philosophy of alterity, was ultimately founded on faulty assumptions about the nature of love, as well as its connection to the good and the beautiful. For that reason, after first elucidating the concerns raised regarding an ethical eros and the reasons for the denial of love’s foundational role, I establish a definition of eros that can once again play the same role as Plato saw for it while simultaneously addressing the 20th century’s concerns about alterity and the recognition of the Other. Re-establishing this role requires arguing for three key theses: 1. Recognition of the Other is based on recognizing his or her beauty and goodness 2. Love of the Other is love of the Other as individual, not in light of some attribute 3. Love of the Other forms the basis of our entering into the ethical attitude. Combined, these theses build toward an ethical eros in two senses. First, they show that eros itself is an ethical relationship, which will be defined as an encounter with the Other structured by signification (the reasons for this definition will be made clear when I examine Levinas’ ethics). Second, the erotic encounter with one beautiful Other (which may or may not lead to a response of love) leads to the development of an ethical disposition toward all Others. In the dissertation, these theses are developed against the background of existing views about eros, in order to show their necessity, as well as to explore the reasons why they have so far been denied. Part I, “Platonic Eros,” therefore, is an in-depth reading of eros from the Platonic point of view, as seen primarily in the Symposium and Phaedrus. Part II, “Impossible Eros,” picks up on Plato’s failing to recognize the alterity of the Other and begins a critique of Plato from that point, carried out by a variety of early philosophers in the French philosophical tradition, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Lacan, and Shulamith Firestone. Part III, “Unspeakable Eros,” is a direct response to Part II, dealing primarily with Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion. Part IV, “Ethical Eros” is the conclusion of the dissertation, in which I argue that love can once again take on its role, assigned to it already in Plato, as the basis of ethics. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

I argue that virginity is a distinct phenomenon with essential structures that can be apprehended and described using a phenomenological method, and thus offer the first robust phenomenology of virginity. A more complex passage than the physical transaction of first sexual intercourse, virginity manifests the event of a coming to love through the conduit of the sexual-erotic body. Calling on Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, I argue that virginity qualifies as a saturated phenomenon, exceeding or overflowing intuition and signification in its paradoxical phenomenality. As a study in saturated phenomena my work pushes the limits of phenomenology by endorsing the exigency of a phenomenology of the evanescent and enigmatic to engage denigrated domains of human experience such as sex and love. Our access to virginity is possible because of our ontological constitution as sexuate beings, but also because of our essential potential to cultivate our sexuate existence through the lens of a primordial erotic attunement. Conscious development of our erotic potential is a form of ascesis that can elevate the sexual-erotic encounter to the ethical height of love. Still, virginity can never be forced, taken, or lost, since the phenomenon is ultimately only gifted through an act of erotic generosity and the intervention of grace. Virginity is not a one-time threshold crossing. It has the essential possibility of being perpetually renewed with each singular sexual-erotic encounter. I seek to sever sex from its legacy as mere animal instinct and from its functional and reproductive teleology in order to open a new way of thinking about our sexual-erotic being that focuses on its ethical potential and its usefulness as a model for being with others outside of the sexual-erotic relation. I take seriously the Irigarayan possibility that we can craft an ethics of Eros. My work draws broadly from twentieth-century literature on phenomenology, poststructuralism, and psychoanalysis, including that of Marion, Beauvoir, Irigaray, Derrida, Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler.

I argue that virginity is a distinct phenomenon with essential structures that can be apprehended and described using a phenomenological method, and thus offer the first robust phenomenology of virginity. A more complex passage than the physical transaction of first sexual intercourse, virginity manifests the event of a coming to love through the conduit of the sexual-erotic body. Calling on Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, I argue that virginity qualifies as a saturated phenomenon, exceeding or overflowing intuition and signification in its paradoxical phenomenality. As a study in saturated phenomena my work pushes the limits of phenomenology by endorsing the exigency of a phenomenology of the evanescent and enigmatic to engage denigrated domains of human experience such as sex and love. Our access to virginity is possible because of our ontological constitution as sexuate beings, but also because of our essential potential to cultivate our sexuate existence through the lens of a primordial erotic attunement. Conscious development of our erotic potential is a form of ascesis that can elevate the sexual-erotic encounter to the ethical height of love. Still, virginity can never be forced, taken, or lost, since the phenomenon is ultimately only gifted through an act of erotic generosity and the intervention of grace. Virginity is not a one-time threshold crossing. It has the essential possibility of being perpetually renewed with each singular sexual-erotic encounter. I seek to sever sex from its legacy as mere animal instinct and from its functional and reproductive teleology in order to open a new way of thinking about our sexual-erotic being that focuses on its ethical potential and its usefulness as a model for being with others outside of the sexual-erotic relation. I take seriously the Irigarayan possibility that we can craft an ethics of Eros. My work draws broadly from twentieth-century literature on phenomenology, poststructuralism, and psychoanalysis, including that of Marion, Beauvoir, Irigaray, Derrida, Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler.

The purpose of the current study is to present an interpretation of Eros and its demonical aspect as it is described in Plato’s dialogues Phaedrus and The Symposium as well as to attempt to throw some light over the question in which way the erotic as such influences Plato’s notion of how to pursue philosophy. In the first part of the essay an account is given of the Platonic Eros as a unifying element and as striving for being. I defend the position that in the context of the interpreted dialogues philosophy is thought of as an erotic enterprise which takes place as a coming closer to the object of love. This coming closer takes place as remembering in Phaedrus and as creating in beauty in The Symposium. Further I suggest that the creative activity in which the philosophical lover is involved lets a certain demonic time arise. In the second part of the study I change perspective and look at the erotic desire as a twofold process. In order to clarify the underlying dynamics in this process I introduce the concept of demonic appeal. The erotic desire takes place according to this twofold structure as a demonic appeal on the side of the beloved which gives rise to an erotic striving on the side of the lover. The lover is pulled towards the beloved which is perceived by the lover as something demonic, as the effect of a foreign commanding power over him. What pulls the lover towards itself is the beautiful and I argue that the beautiful is the way in which being appears to the philosophic lover. In the last part of this section I discuss the consequences of this way of appearing of being for Plato’s thinking. In the third and last part of this study I focus on mindfulness of one’s erotic desires as the necessary condition for initiation of philosophic life. I maintain that the purpose of mindfulness according to the dialogues is the attainment of freedom and a reflective stance in respect to one’s desires.

El Seminario se proponía ser un estudio pormenorizado de los diálogos de Platón El Banquete y el Fedro, destinado a establecer la naturaleza, funciones y alcances de la filosofía a partir del Eros y de lo que él permite explicar sobre lo que se podría llamar la estructura de la pregunta (Erótesis).

Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell / It is only in "erotic matters" that Plato's Socrates is wise, or so he claims at least on several occasions, and since his Socrates makes this claim, it is necessary for Plato's readers to investigate the content of Socrates' wisdom about eros. This dissertation undertakes such an investigation. Plato does not, however, make Socrates' view of eros easy to grasp. So diverse are Socrates' treatments of eros in different dialogues and even within the same dialogue that doubt may arise as to whether he has a consistent view of eros; Socrates subjects eros to relentless criticism throughout the Republic and his first speech in the Phaedrus, and then offers eros his highest praise in his second speech in the Phaedrus and a somewhat lesser praise in the Symposium. This dissertation takes the question of why Socrates treats eros in such divergent ways as its guiding thread and offers an account of the ambiguity in eros' character that renders it both blameworthy and praiseworthy in Socrates' estimation. The investigation is primarily of eros in its ordinary sense of romantic love for another human being, for Socrates' most extensive discussions of eros, those of the Phaedrus and Symposium, are primarily about romantic love. Furthermore, as this investigation makes clear, despite his references to other kinds of eros, Socrates distinguishes a precise meaning of eros, according to which eros is always love of another human being. Socrates' view of romantic love is then assessed through studies of the Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium. These studies present a unified Socratic understanding of eros; despite their apparent differences, Socrates' treatment of eros in each dialogue confirms and supplements that of the others, each providing further insight into Socrates' complete view. In the Republic, Socrates' opposition to eros, as displayed in both his discussion of the communism of the family in book five and his account of the tyrannic soul in book nine, is traced to irrational religious beliefs to which he suggests eros is connected. Socrates then explains this connection by presenting romantic love as a source of such beliefs in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Because eros is such a source, this dissertation argues that philosophy is incompatible with eros in its precise sense, as Socrates subtly indicates even within his laudatory treatments of eros in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Thus, as a source of irrational beliefs, eros is blameworthy. Yet eros is also praiseworthy. Despite his indication that the philosopher would be free of eros in the precise sense, Socrates also argues that the experience of eros can be of great benefit in the education of a potential philosopher. Precisely as a source of irrational religious belief, the erotic experience includes a greater awareness of the longing for immortality and hence the concern with mortality that Socrates believes is characteristic of human beings, and by bringing lovers to a greater awareness of this concern, eros provides a first step towards the self-knowledge characteristic of the philosophic life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.