This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers’ R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (long-term) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility.

In essay one, my primary objective is to see the sensitivity of foreign exchange rate risk on firm performance in US manufacturing industry and examine if the hedging help reduce the foreign exchange rate risk. I am particularly interested in manufacturing industry because of the nature of business operation of manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms in US are not only exposed to foreign exchange fluctuation from sales and revenue but also are exposed to foreign exchange rate risk for procurement, placement and investment. I find that the firms with extreme foreign exchange rate risk exposure exhibit lower daily return and firms with very low foreign exchange rate risk exhibit higher daily return using the portfolio approach. I also find that the firms that hedge has lower foreign exchange rate exposure compared to firms that don’t hedge. The coefficient for hedge is negative and statistically significant. In essay two, I investigate the effect of executive compensation on exchange rate risk in US manufacturing industry. There is a large theoretical and empirical interest on executive compensation using agency framework that investigates the conflict of interest between shareholders and corporate executives. That interest has been largely aligned with the use of managerial performance dependent on observable measures of firm performance. Since US manufacturing firm is largely exposed to foreign exchange transactions by design, I investigate if the value of in-the-money unexercised vested executive stock option has any impact on foreign exchange rate exposure. I investigate if the value of in-the-money unexercised unvested executive stock option has any impact on executive stock option. Using pooled OLS, fixed effect panel data and random effect panel data, I find that in all 3 model value of in-the-money unexercised vested executive stock option has negative coefficient and is statistically significant. At the same time in all 3 models the value of in-the-money unexercised unvested executive stock option is positive and is statistically significant.

The focus on sustainability has become more noticeable during recent years. This is especially evident in the Nordics, were Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland tops the sustainability rankings. Moreover, several studies have been conducted surrounding the topic of the sustainability measuring ESG-scores and their relation to financial performance. Simultaneously, researchers have come up with controversial findings regarding the relationship between financial performance and executive compensation. This study aims to find out the relationship between sustainability and senior executive compensation in the Nordics, as well as how they are both connected to financial performance. In order to fulfill this, eight multiple regression models were created on a sample of 101 Nordic companies. The chosen dependent and independent variables comprised various ESG-scores, as well as a ratio of senior executive compensation divided by total revenue. This resulted in 895 different observations during the years 2008 to 2017. This is a quantitative study following the positivist paradigm. Moreover, a deductive approach is taken in regard to how theory is used. Theories used to make conclusions include the stakeholder theory, the shareholder theory, the legitimacy theory, the agency theory and the stewardship theory. The regression models of choice were the OLS model and the OLS robust model, depending whether the models fulfilled the assumption regarding heteroscedasticity. The findings showed no significant relationship between the ESG combined score and the senior executive compensation ratio in the Nordics. However, a significant negative relationship between the compensation and the social and environmental scores could be found. Moreover, the governance-score was the only ESG-score to indicate a positive relationship with senior executive compensation. Conclusions could be made that there is a negative relationship between senior executive compensation and sustainability factors such as emission reduction and employment quality. This finding is in favor for the shareholders, but not the stakeholders. Additionally, there is a positive relationship between senior executive compensation and good governance. This includes factors such as a high score regarding board structure, shareholder rights and CSR strategy. It could also be concluded that good governance has an indirect positive impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the findings question previous arguments that executive compensation is an agency cost, rather than a solution of the agency problem.

This dissertation contains five research projects within the context of two distinctive issues that concern the effectiveness of executive compensation in aligning executive interests with shareholders and how institutional investors play a role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms. The objective of this dissertation is to first determine how institutions should exert their influence if they are serious about alleviating agency problems and improving firm performance. Second, the thesis seeks to determine whether institutional investors use their influence to shape executive compensation and corporate governance mechanisms in a manner consistent with aligning managerial interests with shareholders and increasing shareholder wealth. The thesis finds that CEOs with option incentives increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. Moreover, CEO option grants are positively related to measures of firm valuation and operating performance suggesting option incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. This is robust to alternative measures of firm valuation and operating performance, also various estimation techniques. Using these findings to motivate the direction of institutional influence on executive compensation, it is found that institutional investors, particularly smaller activist traders, significantly increase option grant incentives received by executives. Institutional influence also raises CEO pay which is consistent with preservation of reservation CEO utility levels. Addressing the role of institutional investors in the context of other corporate governance mechanisms, it is found that institutional investor influence is also negatively related to board size and positively related to board independence, which is achieved by removal of inside directors. Such actions are consistent with empirical studies that show smaller boards and increased levels of independent directors improve firm performance and board decision making. The main conclusion from this dissertation is that option incentives are an effective mechanism to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. Institutional investors appear to recognise this importance, and effectively use their influence to increase options received by executives. Combined with institutional investors putting in place corporate boards that provide better oversight of management, institutional investors appear to be effective monitors of the firms in which they invest.

Finns det ett samband mellan belöningssystem och finansiell aktieägartillväxt i publika svenska företag? En intressant och högaktuell fråga, som det visade sig, och som kommer att försöka besvaras i denna uppsats. Inledningsvis undersöktes om det fanns någon relevant svensk statistik som kunde belysa de exekutiva ledarnas förtjänstutveckling under senare år. Statistiska Centralbyråns inkomststatistik gav inte svar på frågan. LO-ekonomernas statistik visade sig vara relevant och bekräftade mitt antagande att inkomstutveckling för denna grupp varit osedvanligt god. Med antagandet bekräftad och således stärkt i tron ställdes tre frågor som uppsatsens syfte var att besvara: Fråga 1 Hur ser de belöningsmodeller ut som tillämpas av svenska företag avseende ersättningar till medlemmar i företagens exekutiva ledningsgrupper? Fråga 2 Hur förhåller sig de tillämpade belöningsmodellerna till relevant belöningsoch motivationsteori? Fråga 3 Finns det ett samband mellan aktieägarnas finansiella utveckling i dessa företag och företagens belöningar till den studerade yrkesgruppen? Lämpliga teorier att applicera på de undersökta företagens belöningsmodeller visade sig vara agentteorin och förväntansteorin. Dessa två teorier jämfördes med de fyra undersökta företagens, Ericsson, Handelsbanken, IKEA och Skandia belöningssystem genom studier av dessa bolags årsredovisningar för åren 2000-2004. Det visade sig härvid att de företag (två st.) som hade de högsta belöningsnivåerna redovisade sämst resultatutveckling och negativ avkastning till aktieägarna, medan det företag (en st.) med den lägsta belöningsnivån, hade en god resultatutveckling och en fördelaktig avkastning till aktieägarna. För IKEA var studiematerialet för knapphändigt för att kunna uttala sig om hur belöningsnivån utvecklats även om aktieägarens avkastning var den mest fördelaktiga bland de undersökta företagen. Samtliga företag, IKEA undantagen, har konstaterats ersätta sina exekutiva ledare med grundlön, rörlig lön, anställningsförmåner och pensionslösningar även om Handelsbanken uppger att man inte tillämpar rörlig bonus eller rörligt tantiem. Slutledningsvis konstaterades att det inte i något fall förelåg något samband mellan hur företagen ersätter sina exekutiva ledare och aktieägarnas finansiella tillväxt.

This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.

ABSTRACT MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND TAKEOVER WEALTH GAINS By EBRU REIS DECEMBER 5, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale Major Department: Finance This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers’ incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers’ incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their firms’ stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target managers’ incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments.

I investigate the relation between firm risk and firm transparency over the period 1992-2006 and find that the level of firm transparency and the level of firm risk are negatively related. I also find that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) works to mitigate this inverse relationship. This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who suggest that managers reduce risk to protect their pay and performance evaluations under higher levels of firm transparency. I further find that firms in high technology industries are more likely to increase risk relative to firms in other industries when transparency is high. Finally, I develop an additional proxy for transparency based on the Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Score. Results using this proxy are generally consistent with my findings that there is an inverse relationship between risk and transparency and that CEO pay-performance sensitivity lessens this relationship.

This dissertation contains five research projects within the context of two distinctive issues that concern the effectiveness of executive compensation in aligning executive interests with shareholders and how institutional investors play a role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms. The objective of this dissertation is to first determine how institutions should exert their influence if they are serious about alleviating agency problems and improving firm performance. Second, the thesis seeks to determine whether institutional investors use their influence to shape executive compensation and corporate governance mechanisms in a manner consistent with aligning managerial interests with shareholders and increasing shareholder wealth. The thesis finds that CEOs with option incentives increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. Moreover, CEO option grants are positively related to measures of firm valuation and operating performance suggesting option incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. This is robust to alternative measures of firm valuation and operating performance, also various estimation techniques. Using these findings to motivate the direction of institutional influence on executive compensation, it is found that institutional investors, particularly smaller activist traders, significantly increase option grant incentives received by executives. Institutional influence also raises CEO pay which is consistent with preservation of reservation CEO utility levels. Addressing the role of institutional investors in the context of other corporate governance mechanisms, it is found that institutional investor influence is also negatively related to board size and positively related to board independence, which is achieved by removal of inside directors. Such actions are consistent with empirical studies that show smaller boards and increased levels of independent directors improve firm performance and board decision making. The main conclusion from this dissertation is that option incentives are an effective mechanism to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. Institutional investors appear to recognise this importance, and effectively use their influence to increase options received by executives. Combined with institutional investors putting in place corporate boards that provide better oversight of management, institutional investors appear to be effective monitors of the firms in which they invest.

This dissertation contains five research projects within the context of two distinctive issues that concern the effectiveness of executive compensation in aligning executive interests with shareholders and how institutional investors play a role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms. The objective of this dissertation is to first determine how institutions should exert their influence if they are serious about alleviating agency problems and improving firm performance. Second, the thesis seeks to determine whether institutional investors use their influence to shape executive compensation and corporate governance mechanisms in a manner consistent with aligning managerial interests with shareholders and increasing shareholder wealth. The thesis finds that CEOs with option incentives increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. Moreover, CEO option grants are positively related to measures of firm valuation and operating performance suggesting option incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. This is robust to alternative measures of firm valuation and operating performance, also various estimation techniques. Using these findings to motivate the direction of institutional influence on executive compensation, it is found that institutional investors, particularly smaller activist traders, significantly increase option grant incentives received by executives. Institutional influence also raises CEO pay which is consistent with preservation of reservation CEO utility levels. Addressing the role of institutional investors in the context of other corporate governance mechanisms, it is found that institutional investor influence is also negatively related to board size and positively related to board independence, which is achieved by removal of inside directors. Such actions are consistent with empirical studies that show smaller boards and increased levels of independent directors improve firm performance and board decision making. The main conclusion from this dissertation is that option incentives are an effective mechanism to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. Institutional investors appear to recognise this importance, and effectively use their influence to increase options received by executives. Combined with institutional investors putting in place corporate boards that provide better oversight of management, institutional investors appear to be effective monitors of the firms in which they invest.