In the always connected and fast-paced modern world we live in, questions about who we are, what our values are, and how to act are more pertinent than ever. What better way to reconcile these questions than turning to a seemingly out of touch 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche? Interestingly enough, Nietzsche lamented that his contemporaries would never understand his work; similarly, he thought of his own work as directed towards ‘philosophers of the future.’ As any present moment passes and as history progresses, we, in a sense, run away from ourselves. This projecting of oneself into the future is unavoidable. Could one ever strictly pin down oneself in such a way to eliminate this problem of time? Of course not! This is an absurd question. What we should really be asking is can we at least exist in a way that is at one with the movement of time and the immediacy of modern technology? The purpose of this paper is to illuminate what would be involved in the task of figuring out how to authentically be-alongside-oneself in this way, qua Nietzsche. However, once we, if successful, are able to achieve a mode of being-alongside- ourselves, it is fruitless, in a sense; we are always being thrown into the future and are therefore no longer alongside-ourselves as such. This is why we shall pivot at the end of this paper in order to suggest how it is possible to orient our being- thrown-into-the-future in the most useful and timely way.

In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I argue it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-conditional badness. Finally, I present a Nietzschean argument for the irreducible complexity of badness. I suggest we may be willing to concede pain's badness so readily only because it has not been specified what kind of badness it actually has.

The thought of Friedrich Nietzsche is often taught, but seldom sufficiently understood, and thus what ought to be most challenging to us about Nietzsche – that is, the rationalistic basis of his rejection of liberal democracy – is not squarely confronted. I propose to lay the ground for such a confrontation. / text

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2009

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Bonn, 1968.

Thèse--Faculté des lettres de l'Université de Neuchâtel. / "Ouvrages consultés": p. 427-434. Bibliographical foot-notes.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía. / En este trabajo se presenta el nihilismo de Nietzsche como estructura que se devela en la obra el Ulises de James Joyce. Nietzsche acusó la posición fundamental del hombre con respecto a la vida: su negación. Denunció el nihilismo como la historia del hombre como historia universal. Se trata de una sola y misma historia jalonada principalmente por Hegel, Feuerbach y Stirner. Dios ha muerto, pero Nietzsche desconfía de esta muerte. El Dios trascendente ha muerto para volverse cosmopolita; el Dios-Hombre ha muerto para volverse Hombre-Dios; el Hombre-Dios ha muerto para volverse cada uno por sí mismo Dios. De Dios al Hombre y de éste al Yo.

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Embora a questão do esclarecimento não fosse novidade na História das Ciências, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) impôs-lhe várias mudanças ao demonstrar a historicidade da razão movendo-se para muito além das categorias a priori e negar uma continuidade necessária entre teorias e conceitos científicos. Por acreditar que a ciência é o local de onde emergem nossas verdades, Bachelard atribuiu à História das Ciências a tarefa de descrever as rupturas que marcaram os momentos em que o irracionalismo foi abandonado. A revolução metodológica imposta por seu trabalho e pelo etos responsável por ela deu dignidade filosófica à História das Ciências e fez com que os historiadores assumissem a postura de juízes, função que exige uma avaliação epistemológica do nosso passado científico através da sua persistência na ciência atual, razão pela qual podemos falar de uma História epistemológica. Por todas essas razões, ao escrevermos a história intelectual dessa nova disciplina pretendemos demonstrar que, não apenas a epistemologia bachelardiana se inscreve na tradição filosófica nietzschiana, como inaugurou a via de aproximação entre a história das ciências e a história social. / Although the question of enlightenment was no novelty in the History of Science, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) imposed several changes on it demonstrating the historicity of reason moving itself away from the idea of a priori categories and denying a necessary continuity among scientific concepts and theories. Because he believed that Science is the place where our truths emerge from, Bachelard argued that the task of History of Science was to describe the ruptures that marked the moments when irrationalism was abandoned. The methodological revolution imposed by his work and the ethos responsible for it gave philosophical dignity to the History of Science and made the historians assume the obligation of judgment, an assignment which they need to evaluate epistemologically our scientific past questioning its persistence through the actual science, reason why we can say that Bachelard inaugurated an epistemological History. For all this reasons, we think that the intellectual history of this new discipline allow us to understand the bachelardian epistemology in relation with the nietzschean tradition of critical philosophy and to demonstrate how it sets the basis for an approximation between history of science and social history.

Embora a questão do esclarecimento não fosse novidade na História das Ciências, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) impôs-lhe várias mudanças ao demonstrar a historicidade da razão movendo-se para muito além das categorias a priori e negar uma continuidade necessária entre teorias e conceitos científicos. Por acreditar que a ciência é o local de onde emergem nossas verdades, Bachelard atribuiu à História das Ciências a tarefa de descrever as rupturas que marcaram os momentos em que o irracionalismo foi abandonado. A revolução metodológica imposta por seu trabalho e pelo etos responsável por ela deu dignidade filosófica à História das Ciências e fez com que os historiadores assumissem a postura de juízes, função que exige uma avaliação epistemológica do nosso passado científico através da sua persistência na ciência atual, razão pela qual podemos falar de uma História epistemológica. Por todas essas razões, ao escrevermos a história intelectual dessa nova disciplina pretendemos demonstrar que, não apenas a epistemologia bachelardiana se inscreve na tradição filosófica nietzschiana, como inaugurou a via de aproximação entre a história das ciências e a história social. / Although the question of enlightenment was no novelty in the History of Science, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) imposed several changes on it demonstrating the historicity of reason moving itself away from the idea of a priori categories and denying a necessary continuity among scientific concepts and theories. Because he believed that Science is the place where our truths emerge from, Bachelard argued that the task of History of Science was to describe the ruptures that marked the moments when irrationalism was abandoned. The methodological revolution imposed by his work and the ethos responsible for it gave philosophical dignity to the History of Science and made the historians assume the obligation of judgment, an assignment which they need to evaluate epistemologically our scientific past questioning its persistence through the actual science, reason why we can say that Bachelard inaugurated an epistemological History. For all this reasons, we think that the intellectual history of this new discipline allow us to understand the bachelardian epistemology in relation with the nietzschean tradition of critical philosophy and to demonstrate how it sets the basis for an approximation between history of science and social history.