Revision of the author's dissertation--Vanderbilt University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 367-379) and index.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie--Marburg an der Lahn--Philipps-Universität, 1993.

Thesis (M. A.), Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998. / Bibliography: leaves 187-191.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Munich. / Bibliography: p. [183]-187.

Diss.--Universität Freiburg, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 380-395. Index.

This thesis presents a study of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger on the theme of indifference. There are two main argumentative trajectories. First, I establish the coherency of indifference as a unifying theme across both of their works. Specifically, it will be shown that for both thinkers indifference emerges as a “problem” bound up with the history of western metaphysics tending towards nihilism. For Kant, this appears as a problem of reason, and for Heidegger a loss of Being. Their responses to this problem can also be seen as broadly analogous: Both are concerned to demonstrate how a certain “authentic” relation to the inner possibility of metaphysics is possible, and do so without assuming anything in advance about the being for whom metaphysics is an issue. Second, I aim to show that Heidegger’s notion of indifference, as a closure of ecstatic time and loss of Being, more sufficiently accounts for the breadth of indifference as an experiential phenomenon, as well as makes possible a “turning” (Verwindung) of this closed mode into an kind of “open indifference” that makes possible the presencing of things. From the perspective of Heidegger’s response to the problem of indifference, Kant’s response will be shown to regenerate the very problem he seeks to overcome. / Graduate

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation gathers four studies on related topics in the phenomenological tradition and Martin Heidegger's philosophy in particular. Methodologically, it addresses the question as to how a reading of a philosophical text can offer access to the phenomena relevant for philosophy. Beginning with a reading of one his latest lectures on the end of philosophy and the the potential of phenomenology (The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking), the first chapter questions Heidegger's dismissal of the notion of ground in this lecture, arguing that an innovative reading of a passage from Contributions to Philosophy can address a problem left unresolved in the lecutre. Instead of reducing it to its alleged function in metaphysics, I propose to explore the semantic and descriptive potential of `ground' and related notions outside of the ontological and metaphysical discourse. The second chapter inquires about the particular position of On the Origin of the Work of Art in the context of Heidegger's theory of truth. In contrast to an interpretation highlighting the function of art in the so-called history of Being, the artwork essay is shown to display a specific form of transcendental argument aiming to disclose the `clearing' as the condition of possibility of phenomena. Particular attention is paid to Heidegger's discussion of untruth as concealment because the distinction between a denial (Versagen) and a restraint (Verstellen) of truth elaborates an important difference in discussing phenomena of negativity. The third chapter explores the notion of `earth.' The attempt is made to distinguish four phenomenal traits specific to earth by not only relying on Heidegger's discussion and the examples he gives in On the Origin of the Work of Art but by also connecting these to discourses on earth both in one of Husserl's later manuscripts (Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature) and the philosophy of nature in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The discussion is oriented by an interpretation of two sculptures by Andy Goldsworthy; I reflect both on their methodological role for describing phenomena associated with earth and on the status of Heidegger's own examples. The chapter aims in particular to establish an explanatory priority of phenomene associated with earth over the lived body, showing that experiences featuring the phenomenal trat sof earth are irreducible to eminenty sensible experiences as experiences for my bodily being. The fourth chapter takes its departure from the German word Erklüftung that Heidegger mentions in Contributions of Philosophy. In discussing its particular position in Heidegger's discourse on both projection (Entwurf) and ground (Grund) in Being and Time, Contributions to Philosophy, The Origin of the Work of Art and Art and Space, I show why Erklüftung, although it can be established as the description of a specific phenomenon by referring to other occurrences of the word (such as in Goethe's writings on geology), I maintain that it is not apt for the purpose to which Heidegger submits the word. The failure of Erklüftung thus makes an important contributions to the understanding of Heidegger's discourse on ground. The conclusion offers a reading of the second half of Heidegger's last lecture course The Principle of Reason (Der Satz vom Grund) in order to situate the four studies vis-à-vis Heidegger's late comprehensive treatment of ground. His attempt to determine the meaning of ground and its equivalents in Latin ratio and Greek logos is distinguished from the regress to the beginning of the history of Being that the lecture develops. In contrast to this ontological way to determine ground, I defend the view that the semantic explorations and descriptions Heidegger gives offer more adequate access to the phenomena of ground. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Leung Ka-wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-211). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / INTRODUCTION --- p.3 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE REFORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY: THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY --- p.8 / Chapter §1.1 --- Philosophy and Science in Ancient Greek --- p.9 / Chapter §1.2 --- Christian Theology and the First Philosophy --- p.15 / Chapter §1.3 --- Hegel's Formulation of Philosophy --- p.18 / Chapter §1.4 --- The Estrangement of Philosophy and Science --- p.21 / Chapter §1.5 --- Reformulation of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century --- p.24 / Chapter 1.5.1 --- Positivism --- p.26 / Chapter 1.5.2 --- Neo-Kantianism --- p.31 / Chapter 1.5.3 --- Phenomenology --- p.35 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- PHILOSOPHY AS PRIMAL SCIENCE --- p.43 / Chapter §2.1 --- Remark on the Division of Heidegger's Periods of Thinking --- p.44 / Chapter §2.2 --- The Background of the Kreigsnotsemester --- p.50 / Chapter §2.3 --- Philosophy and Worldviews --- p.54 / Chapter §2.4 --- Philosophy and Particular Sciences --- p.59 / Chapter §2.5 --- "The “Knowledge of Objects"" as the Subject-matter of Philosophy" --- p.63 / Chapter §2.6 --- The Problematic of Axioms --- p.65 / Chapter §2.7 --- The Teleological´ؤcritical Method of the Southwest German School of the Neo-Kantianism --- p.68 / Chapter §2.8 --- A New Approach to the Psychical --- p.71 / Chapter §2.9 --- The Problematic of Lived´ؤexperience --- p.78 / Chapter §2.10 --- The Method for the Science of Lived´ؤexperiencein general --- p.83 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- FROM LIFE TO BEING: THE ELEVATION OF THE BEING´ؤQUESTION TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY --- p.92 / Chapter §3.1 --- Heidegger's First Confrontation with the Being- question --- p.94 / Chapter §3.2 --- Life and Philosophy --- p.98 / Chapter §3.3 --- The Incompatibility of Life and Science --- p.103 / Chapter §3.4 --- "The Venture of ""Destruction""" --- p.108 / Chapter §3.5 --- "“The Being of the Factical Life"" as the Problematic of Philosophy" --- p.114 / Chapter §3.6 --- The Problematic of Time --- p.126 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- BEING´ؤUNDERSTANDING AND TEMPORALITY: THE FORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY IN SEIN UND ZEIT --- p.133 / Chapter §4.1 --- Philosophy as Ontology --- p.133 / Chapter §4.2 --- The Priority of Human Dasein in the Being- question --- p.139 / Chapter §4.3 --- The Transformation of the Being´ؤquestion --- p.147 / Chapter §4.4 --- The Being-constitution of Dasein --- p.155 / Chapter §4. 5 --- The Problematic of Temporality --- p.165 / Chapter §4.6 --- The Structure of Understanding and the Horizonal Schema of the Ecstase of Zeitlichkeit --- p.168 / Chapter §4.7 --- The Failure of the Program of Sein und Zeit --- p.clxxxi / CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.185 / Chapter I. --- On Existence --- p.cxci / Chapter II. --- on Understanding --- p.192 / Chapter III. --- on Historicality --- p.195 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.198 / Chapter I. --- Works by Heidegger and corresponding English translations --- p.198 / Chapter II. --- Other references: --- p.202

This thesis argues that there is a philosophical attempt directed at combating the fragmentation of the sciences that starts with Heidegger and continues today through Trish Glazebrook's interpretations of the former's concept of "reflection," and Carl Mitcham and Robert Frodeman's concept of "critical interdisciplinarity" (CID). This is important as the sciences are both more implicated in our lives and more fragmented than ever. While scientific knowledge is pursued for its own sake, the pertinent facts, meaning, and application of the science is ignored. By linking Heidegger's views on the fragmentation of the sciences to Glazebrook's interpretations of reflection and Mitcham and Frodeman's CID, I show that CID is a concrete realization of Heidegger's reflection.

Men are increasingly underrepresented in counselor education and in the counseling profession, with only 27% of members of the American Counseling Association reporting as men. Men in counseling often feel marginalized and isolated. Additionally, they are socialized to be independent, emotionally and physically strong, and to focus on success, while being discouraged from seeking help. Continual exposure to the trauma material of others can cause secondary trauma, with cumulative deleterious effects identified in this study using the Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. The purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to explore the lived experiences of male counselors who primarily work with children who have experienced trauma. Using purposive sampling 6 licensed male counselor participants were identified, and semistructured interviews were conducted. A hermeneutic interpretation made through the lens of constructivist self-development theory was used to further elucidate participants' experiences. The 13 themes generated from this data included: (a) counselors' use of an eclectic theoretical approach, (b) majority of the clients had experienced trauma, (c) experiences of vicarious trauma, (d) increased empathy and growth; (e) negative impact of vicarious trauma, (f) help-seeking behavior, (g) denial of help-seeking behavior, (h) additional training, (i) coping skills, (j) supportive supervisors, (k) peer consultation, (l) supervisor role, (m) world is unsafe/people are bad, and (o) increasing knowledge. Implications for social change include empowering current and future male counselors to effectively understand and mitigate negative consequences of vicarious trauma from working with children who have experienced trauma.