While it is clear that section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be read as prohibiting only of those violations of equality that amount to discrimination, it remains unclear how to determine what it means for a state to treat its citizens as equals, and more specifically, what constitutes discrimination. Thus, the idea of human dignity in section 15 the Charter has been, in many ways, groundbreaking in its recognition of the far-reaching impact of unequal treatment. There remains, however much scholarly dissension surrounding the concept’s meaning and use within section 15 equality jurisprudence. As a result, many have argued that the concept suffers from ambiguity and indeterminacy, thus creating an additional burden on equality claimants. This work advances the thesis that the concept of human dignity, understood in the objective sense as autonomy and self-determination, explains the nature and scope of the government’s obligation to show equal concern and respect, and offers us valuable guidance as to why certain types of unequal treatment are unfair and illegitimate. The concept can, I believe, help to delineate how equality is to be conceived, specified and realised under section 15 of the Charter. To make my case, I reject and show as flawed the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation and use of dignity in section 15(1) jurisprudence. Finally, in an attempt to demonstrate that the concept of dignity is relevant and necessary to an analysis of discrimination, I show that such a concept is in fact grounded in Sophia Moreau’s own illuminating account of the wrongs of unequal treatment. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-02 11:09:56.411

The objective of this study was to investigate educators’ understanding of the right to human dignity within a school context. A sample of principals, deputy principals, senior teachers, HODs and educators from four different schools in one Education District in Mpumalanga Province, South Africa participated in this study. The study was motivated by the increasing number of cases that have been reported on the infringement of the learners’ right to human dignity which includes rape, sexual abuse, harassment, bullying and assault of learners in South African schools. A qualitative case study was conducted using interviews and document analysis to gather data. The conceptual framework was based on the interpretation and implementation of the right to human dignity. The study provided insight into what educators think of the the concept of human dignity and what they do or fail do regarding the promotion and protection of the right. Most participants perceived the right to human dignity as a basic right and related it to integrity and respect. However, there were also misconceptions about the concept. Some educators lacked an understanding of the right to dignity which had negative consequences on their classroom practice. This gave rise to infringements and violations of the right to human dignity of the learners as reported in this study. Name-calling, ridiculing and degrading of learners and character assassination were common experiences. The findings of this study also revealed a lack of clear guideline for educators to use in the promotion and protection of the right to human dignity. The findings indicate the necessity to conduct more school-based research on human rights that will open dialogue on how to integrate rights in teaching and learning activities. Educators do not seem to know how to interact with the learners in positive and constructive ways in their schools within the confines of the Constitution. This study supports the findings of Serame and others which call for a culture of humanity and accountability in South African schools. / Dissertation (MEd)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Education Management and Policy Studies / MEd / Unrestricted

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The transhumanist movement propounds the view that the evolution of humanity must be extricated from the contingencies of blind natural selection and actively directed by human beings themselves, utilising existing as well as nascent technologies, in order to radically enhance and thus transform individual human capabilities to levels which far surpass current capacities. Transhumanism has elicited vehement critique, however, due to the claim that the transformations it proposes will result in a new posthuman species; and thus, that its aims represent a violation of human dignity. In order to assess this claim it is necessary to firstly investigate the aims and values of the transhumanist movement, as well as the technological means through which it proposes these aims will be fulfilled. This task is the focus of the first half of this thesis. Secondly, the concept of dignity itself must be examined in order to ascertain its status as a means of critiquing transhumanism. The second half of this thesis therefore explicates the notion of dignity by tracing its historical interpretations and uses, as well as the way in which it has been employed to uphold human rights and to adjudicate bioethical dilemmas in the contemporary milieu. This investigation enables the assessment of the two most renowned dignity arguments, namely, the arguments of the bioconservative thinkers Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama which have been lodged against transhumanism, as well as the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. In light of this discussion, the conclusion is that the notion of dignity is plagued by irrevocable ambiguity, vagueness and inconsistencies, due to the presence of conflicting interpretations. These findings have implications for the concept’s efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die transhumanistiese beweging verteenwoordig die standpunt dat die evolusie van die mensdom losgemaak moet word van die toevallighede van blinde, natuurlike seleksie en aktief gerig moet word deur die mens self, deur van bestaande sowel as ontwikkelende tegnologieë gebruik te maak ten einde individuele menslike vermoëns radikaal te verbeter en dus te transformeer tot op vlakke wat huidige vermoëns ver oorskry. Transhumanisme het egter hewige kritiek ontlok weens die aanspraak dat die transformasies wat dit voorstel ‘n nuwe post-menslike spesie tot gevolg sal hê en dus dat die oogmerke daarvan ‘n skending van menswaardigheid verteenwoordig. Ten einde hierdie aanspraak te beoordeel, was dit eerstens nodig om die oogmerke en waardes van die transhumanistiese beweging te ondersoek, sowel as die tegnologiese middele wat voorgestel word as dit waardeur hierdie oogmerke verwesenlik sal word. Hierdie taak is onderneem in die eerste helfte van die tesis. Tweedens is die konsep van waardigheid self krities onder die loep geneem ten einde die status daarvan as ‘n middel om transhumanisme te kritiseer, te beoordeel. Die tweede helfte van hierdie tesis verhelder dus die idee van waardigheid deur die historiese interpretasies en gebruike daarvan na te gaan, sowel as die manier waarop dit aangewend is om menseregte te ondersteun en om dilemmas in die bioetiek in die hedendaagse milieu te bereg. Hierdie ondersoek maak die beoordeling van die drie mees bekende waardigheidsargumente wat teen transhumanisme gebring is, naamlik die argumente van die biokonserwatiewe denkers Leon Kass en Francis Fukuyama, sowel as die teenargument van die transhumanis Nick Bostrom, moontlik. Na aanleiding van hierdie bespreking is die gevolgtrekking van die skrywer dat die idee van menswaardigheid deurspek is met onvermydelike dubbelsinnigheid, vaagheid en teenstrydighede as gevolg van teenstrydige interpretasies. Hierdie bevindinge het implikasies vir die doeltreffendheid van die konsep om die komplekse etiese probleme wat gestel word, nie net deur transhumanisme nie, maar deur die bioetiek arena oor die algemeen, te beoordeel.

The problem that this dissertation engages with is how the self achieves moral status or worth. I aim to show that recognition, beginning with Hegel’s dialectical treatment of recognition, is necessary to the modern conception of the value status of the individual, and therefore that the latter must be understood, first, as the value status of the self. That is to say, there is no normative standing of the individual without the self experiencing itself as a being of intrinsic worth. Second, this experience is fully dependent upon others’ acknowledgment of our intrinsic worth. In sum, recognition is constitutive of the value status of the self. To show this requires an exposition of the full significance of the Hegelian conception of recognition that includes a demonstration of the radical meaning of “dependence” in this concept. The basic premise of the dissertation is that there is a problem in how modern subjects have come to interpret their value in accordance with its codification in the reigning legal and political documents of our time, in which the value of the person is stated as a fact, an immediate possession of the self. The supposed validity of this premise is further evidenced in dominant philosophical conceptions of dignity that go back to Kant. The central problem is the commitment to the seemingly factual or given nature of the normative standing of the individual, whatever the vicissitudes in the fate of groups and individuals, which are viewed as secondary phenomena. In arguing against this premise, the dissertation is divided into two broad parts. First, because of the complexity of the ingredients of recognition in a Hegelian viewpoint—where the status of selfhood and the normative standing of the self are entwined, and where both are dependent upon experiences of recognition and misrecognition—the major part of the dissertation is a step-by-step elaboration of what is involved in the constitution of the modern value status of the individual through recognition. Second, this step-by-step elaboration will reveal the ethical meaning of recognition in Hegel. In this, we draw on recent work by J.M. Bernstein in Critical Theory, which emphasizes the ethics in Hegelian thought. The dissertation will then turn to a discussion of a phenomenon today that not only exemplifies the problem of recognition in the modern concept of intrinsic value but also fully reveals the depth and meaning of dependence in the constitution of the self’s value status. This will be a discussion of disability. Our argument is therefore that Hegel’s conception of recognition provides a critical perspective on the apparent assurances and securities of modern subjects by bringing into question and bringing to light: (1) our dependence on others in the “possession” of our individual value status; (2) the normative vulnerability that is central to the possibility of our normative standing; and (3) the need to ground philosophical ethics in experiences of vulnerability. The project will not only argue for these three theses in detailed elaborations of their conceptual components. It will also consider the phenomenon of disability as a contemporary exemplar that reveals their importance.

[pt] O Brasil possui uma vasta legislação que trata de direitos fundamentais, principalmente a partir da promulgação da Constituição Federal, em outubro de 1988. A Lei Maior, depois de um longo período de exceção, garantiu uma gama enorme de direitos individuais e coletivos, e isto foi da mais valiosa importância, pois possibilitou direitos e não favores. Mas esta normatização não alcança a efetividade que se espera de uma legislação. Existe um vazio, um profundo abismo entre esta normatização, fruto das lutas históricas e constantes da sociedade civil organizada e a sua efetividade. Tento pensar e apontar caminhos que podem ser as causas deste distanciamento, deste vazio que existe entre normatização e efetivação. Da mesma forma que Direitos Humanos são uma construção humana, assim esta conquista de sua efetivação também vai ser fruto de uma construção, forjada nas lutas do povo organizado e sedento de garantia de seus direitos. / [en] Brazil has a vast legislation that treats fundamental rights, principally from the promulgation of the Federal Constitution, in October 1988. After a long period of exception, the Constitution guaranteed a large number of individual and collective rights, and this fact was of great importance, because it allowed of rights and not favors. But these rules do not reach the effectiveness expected of a law. There is a vacuum, a deep abyss between these rules, the result of historical and constant struggles of the organized civil society, and their effectiveness. I try to think about and to point to the possible causes of this distance, of this emptiness that exists between the rules and their effectiveness. In the same way that human rights are a human construction, the achievement of their effectiveness will also be the result of a construction, forged in the struggles of the organized people in search of the guarantee of their rights.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / In this dissertation I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law. Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against injustices. Many traditional human rights theorists failed to reconcile the moral and legal aspects of human rights. That is why Jürgen Habermas, whose approach to human rights provides the guiding intuition of this dissertation, has been criticized for approaching human rights from a legal point of view, especially in Between Facts and Norms. Most of Habermas’s critics overlooked his goal in the project of reconstructing law. Habermas addresses the question of the legitimacy of modern law by finding good arguments for a law to be recognized as right and just. For him, modern law has two sources of legitimacy: human rights and popular sovereignty. He affirms their mutual presupposition in a system of rights within a constitutional democracy. In order to grasp Habermas’s moral considerations in his account of human rights, one has to go beyond Between Facts and Norms. That is why the relationship Habermas establishes between law and morality should constitute the starting point in understanding the moral dimension of human rights in his account of human rights. That relationship is clarified in the discussion on the interdependence between human rights and human dignity. Human dignity provides the ground from which human rights are interpreted and justified. Human dignity is the standpoint from which individuals can claim rights from one another on the basis of mutual respect. Because of human dignity, members of a political community can live as free and equal citizens. In order to achieve such a goal, there must be structures that facilitate social integration. Thus, the existence of a strong civil society that can stimulate discussion in the public sphere and promote a vigilant citizenry and respect for human rights becomes very important. The protection of human rights becomes a common and shared responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular state. The realization of such a regime requires solidarity and the politics of compassion. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The research in the field of biotechnology is rapidly developing all over the world. Modern biotechnology offers unique opportunities, simultaneously as it gives rise to a number of ethical issues. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), PGD/HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) and germline gene therapy (GLGT) are controversial techniques. PGD gives a possibility to identify a genetic disease prior to the embryo’s implantation in the uterus. PGD/HLA involves selecting an embryo with genes coding for a specific tissue type, so that the child to be born can act as a donor to an existing sibling who requires a stem cell transplant. GLGT seeks to eliminate or change “bad” genes. The purpose of this study is to investigate student’s ethical attitude concerning PGD, PGD/HLA and GLGT. The empirical study was based on focus group discussions. Four group interviews were made, with 15 participants in all. The students are taking courses in biology or religion. The result from the interviews shows that the ethical issues are difficult to have a definite opinion in, because there are possibilities and risks involved in all these techniques, according to the students. A central part of the discussion was devoted to human dignity and the moral status of the embryo. They also see risks such as bioterrorism, designing the perfect humans, economic interests, medical risks, among many other risks. / Forskningen på det bioteknologiska området utvecklas snabbt över hela världen. Den moderna bioteknologin erbjuder unika möjligheter, samtidigt som den ger upphov till en rad frågor av etiskt slag. Preimplantatorisk genetisk diagnostik (PGD), PGD/HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) och zygotisk genterapi är kontroversiella tekniker. PGD ger en möjlighet att identifiera genetiska sjukdomar före embryots implantering i livmodern. Med hjälp av PGD/HLA väljs ett embryo ut vars gener kodar för en specifik vävnadstyp, vilket gör att barnet som föds kan fungera som donator till ett existerande syskon som är i behov av en stamcells transplantation. Med zygotisk genterapi kan man ta bort eller byta ut ”dåliga” gener. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka studenters etiska värderingar rörande PGD, PGD/HLA och zygotisk genterapi. Den empiriska studien baserades på fokusgrupp diskussioner. Fyra gruppintervjuer gjordes, med sammanlagt 15 deltagare. Studenterna studerar på programutbildningar i biologi eller religion. Resultatet från intervjuerna visar att de etiska frågeställningarna är svåra att ha en klar uppfattning om, eftersom det finns möjligheter och risker med alla dessa tekniker, enligt studenterna. En central del av diskussionen ägnades åt människovärdet och embryots moraliska status. De ser också risker som bioterrorism, designa perfekta människor, ekonomiska intressen, medicinska risker, bland många andra risker.

<p>The research in the field of biotechnology is rapidly developing all over the world. Modern biotechnology offers unique opportunities, simultaneously as it gives rise to a number of ethical issues. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), PGD/HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) and germline gene therapy (GLGT) are controversial techniques. PGD gives a possibility to identify a genetic disease prior to the embryo’s implantation in the uterus. PGD/HLA involves selecting an embryo with genes coding for a specific tissue type, so that the child to be born can act as a donor to an existing sibling who requires a stem cell transplant. GLGT seeks to eliminate or change “bad” genes.</p><p>The purpose of this study is to investigate student’s ethical attitude concerning PGD, PGD/HLA and GLGT.</p><p>The empirical study was based on focus group discussions. Four group interviews were made, with 15 participants in all. The students are taking courses in biology or religion.</p><p>The result from the interviews shows that the ethical issues are difficult to have a definite opinion in, because there are possibilities and risks involved in all these techniques, according to the students. A central part of the discussion was devoted to human dignity and the moral status of the embryo. They also see risks such as bioterrorism, designing the perfect humans, economic interests, medical risks, among many other risks.</p> / <p>Forskningen på det bioteknologiska området utvecklas snabbt över hela världen. Den moderna bioteknologin erbjuder unika möjligheter, samtidigt som den ger upphov till en rad frågor av etiskt slag. Preimplantatorisk genetisk diagnostik (PGD), PGD/HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) och zygotisk genterapi är kontroversiella tekniker. PGD ger en möjlighet att identifiera genetiska sjukdomar före embryots implantering i livmodern. Med hjälp av PGD/HLA väljs ett embryo ut vars gener kodar för en specifik vävnadstyp, vilket gör att barnet som föds kan fungera som donator till ett existerande syskon som är i behov av en stamcells transplantation. Med zygotisk genterapi kan man ta bort eller byta ut ”dåliga” gener.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka studenters etiska värderingar rörande PGD, PGD/HLA och zygotisk genterapi.</p><p>Den empiriska studien baserades på fokusgrupp diskussioner. Fyra gruppintervjuer gjordes, med sammanlagt 15 deltagare. Studenterna studerar på programutbildningar i biologi eller religion.</p><p>Resultatet från intervjuerna visar att de etiska frågeställningarna är svåra att ha en klar uppfattning om, eftersom det finns möjligheter och risker med alla dessa tekniker, enligt studenterna. En central del av diskussionen ägnades åt människovärdet och embryots moraliska status. De ser också risker som bioterrorism, designa perfekta människor, ekonomiska intressen, medicinska risker, bland många andra risker.</p>

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Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-03T19:00:11Z No. of bitstreams: 2 TEXTO FINAL.pdf: 941406 bytes, checksum: 7fa4b2e89b6c1f051c94eeb58042fbdd (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-03T19:00:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 TEXTO FINAL.pdf: 941406 bytes, checksum: 7fa4b2e89b6c1f051c94eeb58042fbdd (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-06 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) / This dissertation intends to analyze the attribution of the juridical category of “person” to the unborn child in the context of the juridical-philosophical formulation of meanings attributed to the term person, from the Roman tradition until the context of the crisis of legal security by codification in which the dignity is juridically chosen as a value of the human person. In Roman law, the concept of the person (persona) was not endowed from the abstract, how it was attributed by the Pandectistic of the 19th century, but embraced the human being concretely in his multiple dimensions, inclusively considering itself as such the unborn child, to which was guaranteed the rights in view of his birth. In regard of axiom conceptus pro iam nato habetur, based in the roman treatment given to the unborn, emerged two interpretations: one, more faithful to the Justinian tradition, which recognizes the concrete reality of the unborn child and equates him to the already born, and the other, abstract, sustained by the Pandectistic and based on the thoughts of Savigny, which considers the parity between the unborn and the born simply a mere fiction. This latter interpretation influenced the elaboration of many civil codes like the German and the Brazilian Code of 1916, both of which determined that the natural personhood can be attributed only when the child is born alive. The idea of personhood while a simple legal attribution withdraws itself from the philosophical tradition that considers the person in his ontological aspects, a fact that deserves to be recognized as primary in the juridical planning. The principle of human dignity, incorporated in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 as the foundation of the Republic, serves as an indication of an ‘ethical personalism’ which reflects itself in personal rights, providing elements to enlarge the semantic content of the juridical concept of person, recognizing the personal dignity of the unborn child, as done in the ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ (American Convention on Human Rights), to singularize the juridical personhood as a right and the unborn child as a person. Keywords: