Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / In this dissertation I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law. Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against injustices. Many traditional human rights theorists failed to reconcile the moral and legal aspects of human rights. That is why Jürgen Habermas, whose approach to human rights provides the guiding intuition of this dissertation, has been criticized for approaching human rights from a legal point of view, especially in Between Facts and Norms. Most of Habermas’s critics overlooked his goal in the project of reconstructing law. Habermas addresses the question of the legitimacy of modern law by finding good arguments for a law to be recognized as right and just. For him, modern law has two sources of legitimacy: human rights and popular sovereignty. He affirms their mutual presupposition in a system of rights within a constitutional democracy. In order to grasp Habermas’s moral considerations in his account of human rights, one has to go beyond Between Facts and Norms. That is why the relationship Habermas establishes between law and morality should constitute the starting point in understanding the moral dimension of human rights in his account of human rights. That relationship is clarified in the discussion on the interdependence between human rights and human dignity. Human dignity provides the ground from which human rights are interpreted and justified. Human dignity is the standpoint from which individuals can claim rights from one another on the basis of mutual respect. Because of human dignity, members of a political community can live as free and equal citizens. In order to achieve such a goal, there must be structures that facilitate social integration. Thus, the existence of a strong civil society that can stimulate discussion in the public sphere and promote a vigilant citizenry and respect for human rights becomes very important. The protection of human rights becomes a common and shared responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular state. The realization of such a regime requires solidarity and the politics of compassion. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

La responsabilité internationale est un ensemble de conséquences liées à laviolation des obligations internationales, soit le lien juridique par lequel un sujet de droitinternational est tenu, envers un ou plusieurs autres sujets, d’adopter un comportementdéterminé ou de s’en abstenir. S’il y a un comportement illicite, la Communautéinternationale peut intervenir, c’est ce que l’on dénomme souvent « droit d’ingérence ». Cedernier a évolué récemment vers une nouvelle terminologie introduite dans le rapport de laCIISE : « responsabilité de protéger ». C’est un concept selon lequel les Etats souverains ontl’obligation de protéger leurs propres populations contre des catastrophes de grande ampleur.Dans la dynamique du dépassement de l’antagonisme entre souveraineté et intervention, nousanalyserons le comportement de la Communauté internationale face à la « responsabilité deprotéger », le rôle qui lui incombe lorsque l’Etat faillit à ses obligations. Au-delà de cesauteurs, il reste encore à définir quels sont les bénéficiaires de cette protection, sa mise enœuvre et ses limites. Si la notion de « responsabilité de protéger » ne constitue pas seulementune nouvelle terminologie, garantit-t-elle un degré de protection plus élevé par rapport au« droit d’ingérence ». / International responsibility is a set of consequences connected to the violation ofinternational obligations, this being the legal ties which bind a subject of international law toadopt a defined way of behaving towards another or others or to abstain. If there is illicitconduct the International Community can intervene, which is often named “right ofintervention”. The latter hasrecently developeda new terminology introduced in the (ICISS)report: “responsibility to protect”. It is a concept according to which the sovereign states havethe obligation to protect their own populations against large-scale catastrophes.From theperspective of going beyond the opposition between sovereignty and intervention we willanalyse the behaviour of the International Community faced with the “responsibility toprotect”, its incumbent role when the state fails in its obligations.Aside from its creators itremains to be seen who will benefit from this protection, its implementation and its limits. Ifthe notion of the “responsibility to protect” not only constitutes new terminology, does itchange an issue already raised by the “right of intervention”: military deployment with aimswhich are not purely military?

Le pouvoir est omniprésent dans les interactions sociales. Il en va de même pour la politique internationale depuis la naissance des Relations internationales. Mais au sein de celle-ci, ce concept est contesté. Par exemple, le terme anglais power désigne deux phénomènes qui ne sont pas identiques et qui sont traduits par deux termes distingues en français : « la puissance » signifiant la capacité d’obtenir ce qu’on désire, et « le pouvoir » renvoyant au contrôle du comportement d’un acteur sur un autre. L’objectif de la thèse est double. Tout d’abord, cette recherche entend établir un lien étroit entre la façon de définir le pouvoir et les différents cadres théoriques (réalistes, libéraux, constructivistes) puisqu’il n’existe pas d’unique définition du concept. Ce premier aspect permettra de mieux comprendre la genèse mais aussi les tensions entre le concept et sa théorie-cadre lorsque le premier a tendance à circuler dans d’autres théories, comme ce dont témoigne les débats autour de la trilogie hard power, soft power, smart power de Joseph Nye. Le deuxième objectif vise à mieux comprendre le pouvoir des organisations intergouvernementales en adoptant un cadre constructiviste. La thèse s’appuie sur l’approche de Barnett et Duvall qui distingue quatre types de pouvoir (imposé, institutionnel, structurel et productif) en vue de saisir le pouvoir productif de la Francophonie dans la « fabrication » d’une nouvelle subjectivité de l’Etat : le « droit souverain » de promouvoir sa diversité culturelle et le « devoir souverain » concernant la responsabilité de protéger. La thèse montre également que le pouvoir institutionnel du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies s’exerce via la socialisation du Vietnam en son sein dans le cas de la responsabilité de protéger. / The power is a ubiquitous phenomenon in social relations, particularly in International Relations. It is, however, an “essentially contestable” concept in IR theories. For instance, the English term power refers to two different phenomena which can be translated into two distinct terms in French: “la puissance” which means the capacity to get what one wants, and “le pouvoir” which implies the control over other’s behavior. This thesis has two objectives. First, it aims to build close connection between the power conceptualization and its theoretical framework (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) as there is no unique definition of power. The liaison between power definition and its theoretical framework allows us to better apprehend not only its genesis but also the discrepancy that emerges whenever the concept tend to transcend its theoretical framework, as reflected in the debates relative to the trilogy hard power, soft power, smart power of Joseph Nye. Second, this thesis intends to better understand the power of international organizations under the constructivist theoretical framework. The study bases on the power taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall who classify the concept into four types: compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and productive power. Based on this classification, we can understand the productive power of Francophonie in terms of “producing” a new subjectivity of State in IR: the “sovereign right” of promoting its cultural diversity and the “sovereign duty” of fulfilling its responsibility to protect. The thesis demonstrates also the UNSC’s institutional power via the Vietnam socialization process leading to the endorsement of the R2P concept.

L'action humanitaire a connu un développement exponentiel au sein de la société internationale au cours de ces dernières années. Multiplication des résolutions humanitaires votées par les Nations unies, mise en place d'une justice pénale internationale chargée de réprimer les violations du droit international humanitaire, émergence de la responsabilité de protéger impliquant un recours à la force à des fins humanitaires, développement des organisations non gouvernementales en sont les manifestations majeures. Toutefois, la portée de ces évolutions récentes de l'action humanitaire tant sur le plan de la normativité que de l'opérationnalité est à relativiser. Si les insuffisances du droit de Genève ont pleinement justifié l'émergence d'un droit de New York, ce droit de nature essentiellement déclaratoire éprouve de réelles difficultés à palier les lacunes du droit de Genève. En outre, la mise en oeuvre contemporaine de l'action humanitaire, soulève de nombreux questionnements juridiques liés aux modalités et aux conditions de mise en oeuvre. La présente étude a pour objet d'analyser les évolutions et les limites du cadre juridique de l'action humanitaire afin de faire des propositions pour améliorer la condition juridique des victimes des catastrophes humanitaires. / Humanitarian action has seen such an exponential growth in international society in recent years that humanitarianism seems to be carrying increasing weight in international relations. Some of the main examples of this phenomenon are the increased number of humanitarian resolutions passed by the United Nations, the creation of an international court of justice to reprimand violations of international humanitarian law, the emergence of a sense of responsibility to ensure protection by means of force for humanitarian purposes, and the development of non-governmental organizations. However, the scope of these recent developments in humanitarianism, on both the normative and operational levels, needs to be put into perspective. Indeed, while the shortcomings of Geneva law fully justify the emergence of New York law, this essentially declaratory law faces real challenges in overcoming the short comings in Geneva law. Further more, humanitarian action as it has been carried out in recent years gives rise to a number of legal questions relating to the conditions under which such action is taken. This study aims at analyzing the developments and limits of the humanitarian action legal framework, in order to put forward proposals for improving the legal position of the victims of humanitarian disasters.

La sécurité humaine est un concept qui a été formellement dégagé du rapport sur le développement humain du PNUD de 1994. Présentée par ce dernier comme une alternative au développement humain, la sécurité humaine a été institutionnalisée davantage comme une réponse aux préoccupations contemporaines en termes de sécurité globale et de bien être des individus, et comme un levier de garantie de la paix internationale.Dans la dynamique de la sécurité humaine, il sera observé une mutation du système normatif international par le renforcement de la place des droits de l’Homme et du droit international humanitaire dans l’ordre juridique. Aussi, la nécessité de la sécurité humaine va entrainer une nouvelle conception de l’objet de la sécurité collective. À cet effet, les Nations unies joueront un rôle déterminant en ce qu’elles vont développer de nouvelles compétences (en termes de garantie de la paix) et de nouvelles activités relatives à la sécurité humaine. Cet élan, d’une part, dynamisera un grand nombre d’acteurs internationaux qui s’investiront en faveur de la sécurité et de la protection des individus et, d’autre part, suscitera l’établissement de nouveaux mécanismes de paix et de sécurité internationales / Human security is a concept that was officially drawn out in the UNDP’s 1994 report on human development. In this report the concept was introduced as an alternative to human development and then became institutionalised as a response to contemporary preoccupations related to security matters. Human security therefore relates to threats to individuals, which are not only different to those that jeopardise State security but relate to the physical security and well-being of individuals.International peace and security factors were subsequently revised from a conceptual perspective, shifting from a State security-based focus to a focus on the global security of individuals.In the dynamics of human security, the international order’s normative system is shifting, especially owing to the growing importance of human rights and international humanitarian law in the legal order. Similarly, ensuring human security will redefine the objectives and activities of collective security. In this respect, the United Nations plays a crucial role. The Organisation will develop new competences in terms of peacekeeping and will carry out new operations for the benefit of human security. This renewed effort will reinforce many international stakeholders who will develop competences and establish organisations to contribute significantly to the security and protection of individuals and larger to the international peace