In causal reasoning the presence of a strong predictor of an outcome interferes with causal judgments of a moderate co-occurring predictor. Causal competition effects have generally been demonstrated with a strong competing predictor that is followed by an outcome with a higher probability than a moderate target predictor, and that also signals as many or more of the total outcome occurrences than the moderate target predictor. Confounding these two distinct aspects of predictiveness has constrained the ability to examine their respective importance for the relative validity of predictors in causal competition. By examining the effects of one and two strong competing causes on judgments of a moderate cause, varying the proportion of total outcomes that the competing predictors are paired with while holding overall outcome frequency constant, this series of experiments begins to disentangle these aspects of predictiveness. It demonstrates competition effects with a strong predictor that predicts fewer outcomes than the moderate target predictor. In addition, causal competition was examined between positive predictors (those signaling the occurrence of the outcome), between negative predictors (those signaling the absence of the outcome) and between predictors of opposite polarity (positive and negative). Causal candidates of opposite polarity were found to enhance rather than reduce causal judgments of moderate positive and negative predictors, posing a challenge for some of the most influential theories of causal learning that explain competition effects as the discounting of the moderate predictor or a failure to learn its association with the outcome. Rather, these results are consistent with a contrast mechanism whereby causal judgments of moderate predictors are not necessarily reduced toward zero in the presence of stronger predictors, but are adjusted along the causal judgment scale in opposite direction from the strong predictors. When the competing predictors are of the same polarity causal judgments of moderate predictors appear to be reduced, but when they are of opposite polarity judgments are enhanced. The implications for various associative and statistical models of causal learning are discussed.

This dissertation considers the possibility of there being such a thing as ethical authority in the modern world, and seeks to give an account of its nature. It begins by expressing a critical stance toward the idea that authority is always dependent upon having a certain kind of theoretical expertise. It raises the suggestion that there are other forms of authoritativeness, based on tradition, the display of superior skill, or impressive discriminative/perceptual powers. The bases of these forms of authority are not primarily, or even necessarily, of an intellectual kind. The idea that ethical authority depends upon something more than intellectual foundations may be traced to Aristotle, who claimed that the practical wisdom of an ethical authority (phronimos) is a matter of being good at deliberation with regard to things that conduce to living well. The model of ethical authority provided here is not that of theoretical expertise but closer to that of practical skill and/or the possession of perceptual powers of a particular kind. Ethical authority in the Aristotelian tradition depends upon intellectual powers, but of the 'practical intellect' and not necessarily (it depends on the context) any advanced theoretical expertise. It then proceeds to argue that there is an important place for practical wisdom in modern ethical life. Many of us live today in modem pluralistic societies where diverse conceptions of goodness and ethical rationality compete. We may well find the idea of reasonable allegiance to local phronimoi, who grasp and can illuminate the value of particular practices and institutions to fellow participants of a shared life, pure anathema. Modern ethical philosophy reflects this stance, and is characterized by a certain faith in rule-centred or procedural ethical theories for guiding human conduct. The argument of the second chapter seeks to show that there is little warrant for rejecting the role of ethical authorities (phronimoi) in contemporary pluralistic societies in favour of ethical proceduralism. Thereafter, in the third, fourth and fifth chapters, it turns to exploring the nature of practical wisdom, in particular, whether or not it is best construed as grounded in a theory of right conduct, or as a form of 'ethical knowledge', or as aiming at an objective truth; and to the task of characterizing a credible conception of the insightful phronimos - or what it might be like if this model of ethical authority is to claim relevance for contemporary life within pluralistic ethical communities.

This thesis develops a 'response-dependent' account of the objectivity of ethical judgment. It uses the Kantian device of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the critical reflective test for convergence in judgment that is genuinely objectivity-sustaining. After a discussion of the challenges to ethical objectivism, it is argued that Wittgenstein's consideration of rule-following provides a compelling case for rejecting attempts to ground objectivity in a manner that is external to normative practices. This removes one potent source of hostility to ethical objectivity, but it does not establish the truth of this position. Within the constraints of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of objectivity, plausible accounts of ethical objectivity will be 'response-dependent'. The key issue facing such theories is whether they can provide a model of practical rationality that delivers suitably demanding, objectivity-sustaining standards of rational criticism. I examine two approaches to this issue. The first (suggested by John McDowell) takes Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations as implying a virtue-centred approach to ethical deliberation. On this view, virtuous agents' uncodifiable responses determine correct judgment. But the case for this theoretically modest model of objectivity has not been successfully made, and the approach has insufficient resources to yield genuine objectivity. Instead, appeal must be made to some more articulated account of practical rationality. The second, Kantian, model delivers this because the CI test provides a mechanism for objectivity-sustaining reflective criticism of agents' reasons for action, without importing any illicit codification of rationality. The CI can also be used for critical reflection on agents' appreciation of the ethical features of their situation. In this way the model can avoid the problem of empty formalism and offer a weak form of ethical cognitivism. This model also suggests a potential route to plausible approaches to some other problematic issues in ethical theory, such as akrasia and the categorical nature of moral reasons.

This thesis examined the knowledge and processes that adults use to reason about moral dilemmas. Two contrasting analyses of moral reasons, Kohlberg's justice orientation and Gilligan's response orientation, were reviewed and criticized. From this a Moral Reasoning Grammar which formally characterizes the semantics of the justice and response moral orientations was developed. Specifically, the Moral Reasoning Grammar distinguished reasoning based on principles and their defense from reasoning based on narrative and social-interactive knowledge. The Moral Reasoning Grammar was applied to subjects' protocols to determine the extent to which these two orientations characterized subjects' verbal responses to moral problems. Application of the Moral Reasoning Grammar resulted in good coverage of subjects' verbalizations which reliably differentiated knowledge and processes used by subjects resolving moral problems from either a justice or response orientation. The justice orientation characterized the four male subjects' protocols and the response orientation characterized the four female protocols. The small sample precludes any generalization of this finding. The Moral Reasoning Grammar and results were discussed in terms of further psychological research, an expanded and more comprehensive philosophical approach to moral reasoning, and the potential educational implications.

Thesis (M.A.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-72).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Western Seminary, Portland, OR, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 184-195).

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Psychology, 2003. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-73).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Bob Jones University, 1987. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 390-398).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Calvin Theological Seminary, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [94]-99).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1988. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-81).