Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 1999. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 200 p. : ill. (some col.) Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 191-200).

Thesis (S.T.D.)--Catholic University of America. / Bibliography: p. 129-137.

Cette thèse a pour objectif d’analyser des effets du salaire minimum en Turquie où le salaire minimum est un instrument de politique sociale essentiel. Cette thèse s’articule autour de quatre chapitres : Le premier chapitre présente les institutions du salaire minimum et les principaux résultats obtenus dans la littérature concernant les divers effets du salaire minimum sur les différentes variables économiques et sociales dans les pays en développement. Le deuxième chapitre identifie empiriquement le profil des salariés payés au salaire minimum. Les résultats indiquent que la probabilité d’être rémunéré au salaire minimum est élevée parmi la population considérée comme « fragile ». Le troisième chapitre examine les effets du salaire minimum sur l’emploi dans le cadre de la demande et de l’offre du travail et montre que le salaire minimum n’a pas d’impact négatif sur l’emploi. Par ailleurs, une hausse du salaire minimum exerce un effet positif sur la probabilité de rester en emploi. Le dernier chapitre étudie l’évolution de la distribution des salaires au cours de la dernière décennie en Turquie. Les résultats indiquent que la hausse du salaire minimum en 2004 a contribué à réduire les inégalités salariales. / Minimum wage is an important tool of social policy. It consists of four chapters: The first chapter presents the institutions of the minimum wage and the main results in the literature concerning the effects of minimum wages on the various economic and social variables in developing countries. The second chapter identifies empirically the profile of workers paid at minimum wage. The results indicate that the probability of receiving the minimum wage is high among the groups considered "fragile". The third chapter examines the impact of the minimum wage on employment in the context of demand and supply of labor and shows that the minimum wage has no negative impact on employment. Besides, a minimum wage increase has a positive effect on the probability of remaining employed. The last chapter analyzes the evolution of the wage distribution over the last decade in Turkey. The results show that the minimum wage increase in 2004 contributed to reduce wage inequality in this country.

The U.S. apparel manufacturing industry includes many reputable firms, but is also believed to include many sweatshop operations. Sweatshop workers often work under sub-minimum wages, excessively long hours, and abusive management. Sweatshop establishments in the United States typically violate several U.S. labor laws. Two they commonly violate are the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the ban on hiring illegal immigrants under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The purpose of the present research was to estimate minimum penalties that would provide no monetary incentive for the average U.S. apparel manufacturing firm to violate the minimum wage and the ban on hiring illegal immigrants. The minimum per-violation penalties that were estimated to deter violation of the minimum wage are 8 to 28 times the current maximum penalty of $1,000 per violation, and those estimated to deter the hiring of illegal immigrants are 3 to 10 times the current maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation. The estimated penalties are associated with annual probabilities of prosecution ranging from 5% to 15%. The estimated penalties primarily depend on the difference between legal and illegal wage rates. A sensitivity analysis indicated that the estimated penalties are insensitive to the value of the own-price elasticity of production labor demand, which is one of the variables used to calculate the penalties. The results suggest that current federal penalties for violating the minimum wage or the ban on hiring illegal immigrants do not deter infraction of these laws by U.S. apparel manufacturers. / Master of Science

This dissertation is an empirical investigation into the distributive effects of overand under-education, defined as market outcomes such that some workers possess skills over or below those required at their jobs respectively. This type of market failure can arise in assignment and search equilibrium settings, as well as in the presence of asymmetric information regarding workers' performance on the job. The existence of permanent and sizable mismatch rates means that returns to education are depressed for over-educated workers and in ated for under-qualified workers. Thus, irreversible decisions to invest in human capital are made in a context of uncertainty regarding the exact outcomes that might arise. As in the Todaro model, where individuals decide whether to migrate to cities based on the expected values of the available alternatives, workers might decide it is worthwhile to keep investing in education even if the probability of finding appropriate employment is falling. The three chapters of the dissertation are entitled: Skill Mismatch and Earnings: A Panel analysis of the U.S. Labor Market," Earnings Inequality and Skill Mismatch in the U.S: 1973-2003," and Employment and Distribution Effects of Changes in the Minimum Wage." Skill Mismatch and Earnings: A Panel analysis of the U.S. Labor Market This chapter examines the effect on earnings induced by a mismatch between workers' skills and the skills actually required on the job. It uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1983-2002. The special re-interview methodology of the CPS is used to create a large panel, so that individual heterogeneity can be controlled for. Skill requirements are estimated by the median education level for each 3-digit occupation in the 1980 census occupational classification. The analysis, including the determination of skill requirements, is conducted for males and females separately. Cross-sectional analysis confirms the findings in the recent literature. Returns to required schooling are higher than the returns to attained education in standard earnings regressions. Also, for workers with similar educational attainment, over-education reduces earnings and under-education increases them. Contrary to what other studies have found, we conclude that these results are confirmed after controlling for individual fixed effects. The chapter also investigates which groups are more exposed to mismatch. I use standard probit analysis with over-education and under-education as the respective dependent variables. Women, service sector, and non-unionized workers appear to have higher probabilities of mismatch. Earnings Inequality and Skill Mismatch This chapter shows that skill mismatch is a significant source of inequality in real earnings in the U.S. and that a substantial fraction of the increase in wage dispersion during the period 1973-2002 was due to the increase in mismatch rates and mismatch premia. Standard human capital earnings regressions that do not decompose the education variable into required, surplus, and deficit years provide biased estimates of the relative importance of education in explaining earnings inequality. In 2000-2002 surplus and deficit qualifications taken together accounted for 4:3 and 4:6 percent of the variance in earnings, or around 15 percent of the total explained variance. The dramatic increase in over-education rates and premia accounts for around 11 and 32 percent of the increase in the coeffcient of variation of log earnings during the 30 years under analysis for males and females respectively. Residual inequality is slightly diminished when the estimating equation allows the prices of surplus, required and deficit qualifications to differ but the well-studied increasing trend of within-group inequality remains otherwise unchanged. Changes in the composition of the labor force are found to be important predictors of increasing residual inequality even when skill mismatch is taken into account. The Distributive Effects of the Minimum Wage: an Effciency Wage Model with Skill Mismatch (co-authored with Peter Skott) This chapter analyzes the effect of changes in the real value of the minimum wage on the wage distribution. Changes in the minimum wage and other labor market institutions affect workers in all groups and empirically appear to be good complement to standard supply and demand arguments in explaining overall inequality. We use an effciency wage model but allow for mismatch between jobs and workers. This framework yields predictions not only on the skill premium but also on the extent of inequality within groups. To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that high-skill workers can get two types of jobs (good and bad), whereas low-skill workers have only one type of employment opportunity (bad). As long as some matches of high-skill workers and bad jobs are sustained in equilibrium, changes in the exogenous variables will affect not only wages and employment rates but also the degree of mismatch. Thus, this paper shows that `over-education' can be generated endogenously in effciency wage models and that a fall in the real value of the minimum wage can (i) reduce total employment, (ii) lead to a simultaneous decline in both the relative employment and the relative wage of low-skill workers, and (iii) produce a rise in within-group as well as between-group inequality. Evidence from the US suggests that these theoretical results are empirically relevant.

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Este trabalho busca compreender como o governo do presidente Eurico Gaspar Dutra (vigorou de 31 de janeiro de 1946 a 31 de janeiro de 1951) fez uso dos instrumentos de política econômica acerca da renda e do salário mínimo, bem como seus reflexos nas questões do trabalho, do trabalhador e nos meios de representação deste. O governo do Presidente Eurico Gaspar Dutra é normalmente conhecido como o governo entre os governos de Getúlio Vargas e talvez, por isso, é pouco estudado pela academia, diferente de seu antecessor-sucessor. Busca-se neste trabalho contribuir para a pesquisa do governo Dutra que, apesar de considerado um interregno entre os governos de Getúlio Vargas, abandonou o varguismo e imprimiu uma política liberal e extremamente repressiva contra a classe trabalhadora, contribuindo para a perda de parte da renda do trabalhador brasileiro daquela época, com, talvez, reflexos em nossos dias. A política de arrocho salarial de Dutra foi um duro golpe contra os trabalhadores e em favor do capital. Os instrumentos de política econômica de Dutra são alvos de discussão no presente trabalho, com ênfase nas questões acerca do salário mínimo, situação do trabalhador e inflação. Questões estas praticamente atemporais na economia brasileira. / This paper seeks to understand how the government of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra (from January 31, 1946 to January 31, 1951) made use of the economic policy instruments on income and the minimum wage as well as its reflections on labor issues, of the worker and in the means of representing him. The government of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra is usually known as the government between the governments of Getúlio Vargas and, perhaps because of this, is little studied by the academy, different from its predecessor-successor The paper seeks to contribute to the research of the Dutra government which, although considered an interregnum between the governments of Getúlio Vargas, abandoned the \"varguismo\" and printed a liberal and extremely repressive policy against the working class, contributing to the loss of part of the income of the Brazilian worker of that time, with perhaps reflections in our day. Dutra\'s wage policy was a blow to the workers in favor of the capital. Dutra\'s economic policy instruments are the subject of discussion in this paper, with emphasis on issues such as the minimum wage, the worker\'s situation and inflation. These issues are practically timeless in the Brazilian economy.

Universidade Federal do Cearà / Este estudo analisa os efeitos da evoluÃÃo do salÃrio mÃnimo no Brasil sobre a distribuiÃÃo de renda entre categorias de trabalhadores, bem como o fluxo de trabalhadores, entre faixas de rendas demarcadas por um e dois salÃrios mÃnimos, em conseqÃÃncia do aumento do salÃrio mÃnimo verificado no perÃodo de 1995 a 2003. Os trabalhadores foram agrupados em diversas categorias de modo a melhorar a especificidade da anÃlise. Foram utilizados dados das PNADs (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por DomicÃlio) de 1995 e 2003, aplicando-se uma metodologia nÃo-paramÃtrica, com o uso do estimador de Kernel para estimaÃÃo das densidades dos rendimentos dos trabalhadores. Os resultados sÃo eminentemente visuais e qualitativos e mostram que algumas categorias tiveram aumentos significativos na proporÃÃo de trabalhadores com renda igual ou menor que um salÃrio mÃnimo. VÃrias categorias experimentaram um forte fluxo de trabalhadores com renda maior que dois salÃrios mÃnimos em direÃÃo a rendas entre um e dois salÃrios mÃnimos e rendas menores que um salÃrio mÃnimo, evidenciando uma piora na distribuiÃÃo da renda entre categorias de trabalhadores. / This study analyzes the effect of the minimum wage trend in Brazil on labor income the distribution, as well as the flow of workers, between bands of labor income demarcated by one and two minimum wages, in consequence of the increase in minimum wage verified in the period 1995 the 2003. Workers were grouped in different categories, in order to improve detailing in the analysis. The PNADs (National Research of Sample for Domicile) data for the 1995 - 2003 series were used, applying a not-parametric methodology, with the use of estimator Kernel, to estimate the densities of workersâ income. The results are visual and qualitative and show that some categories had significant changes in the ratio of workers with lesser or equal than a minimum wage and others experienced a strong flow of workers with bigger than two minimum wages in direction to incomes between one and two minimum wages and lesser incomes that a minimum wage.

Wong, Pui Hang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-61). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Characterizing Illegal Immigrants --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Job Displacement --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Minimum Wage Unemployment --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Basic Model --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Effect of Illegal Immigration --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- The Solow Model --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Decentralized Ramsey Model --- p.21 / Chapter 3 --- Frictional Unemployment --- p.26 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Basic Model --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Economy with Illegal Migrants --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2 --- Productivity Effect --- p.36 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Comparative Statics --- p.38 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Unemployment --- p.40 / Chapter 3.3 --- Exploitation Effect --- p.41 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- A Simulation Example --- p.47 / Chapter 3.4 --- Immigration Controls --- p.48 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Workplace Sanction --- p.49 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Deportation & Border Patrol --- p.53 / Chapter 4 --- Conclusion --- p.56