Thesis--Munich, 1962. / Includes texts in Chinese and romanized Sanskrit. Includes bibliographical references (p. 225-232) and index.

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Thesis--Visva-Bharati. / Bibliography: p. 331-334.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

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No description available.

[pt] Esta dissertação investiga o uso de discursos apofáticos como ferramentas epistemológicas nas situações em que a linguagem parece alcançar seus limites, com ênfase especial no contexto místico-religioso. Como falar de Deus, compreender a natureza última da realidade ou conceber o que havia “antes” da origem do universo? Tanto místicos, religiosos e poetas quanto filósofos, físicos e cosmólogos lidam com questões como essas há bastante tempo. Ao longo da história, a linguagem catafática (afirmativa) pareceu a muitos destes não dar conta de respondê-las; e, percebendo-a como insuficiente, as grandes religiões, em especial, adotaram um tipo de discurso que veio a ser conhecido como discurso apofático, ou via negativa. A fim de examinar algumas técnicas de negação empregadas por místicos e contemplativos diante das dificuldades que encontram para falar sobre o inefável, esta dissertação contrasta as obras de duas figuras centrais em suas respectivas tradições religiosas: Teologia Mística, do cristão Dionísio Areopagita, e Fundamentos do Caminho do meio, do budista Nagarjuna - textos conhecidos por levarem a negação ao extremo. Por meio dessa comparação, e apoiando-se, principalmente, nos comentadores Denys Turner, Eric Perl e Giuseppe Ferraro, este estudo aponta e discute diferenças significativas entre as linguagens negativas empregadas nas duas obras. Discute por fim, de modo pontual, como esses discursos se relacionam com contrapartes e paralelos contemporâneos, como o pensamento filosófico de Jacques Derrida e as descobertas da física moderna no início do século XX. / [en] This dissertation seeks to investigate the use of apophatic discourses as epistemological tools in situations where language seems to reach its limits, with special emphasis on the mystical-religious context. How to talk about God, understand the ultimate nature of reality or conceive what was before the origin of the universe? Mystics, religious people and poets, as well as philosophers, physicists and cosmologists have been dealing with issues like these for a long time. Throughout history, catapathic (affirmative) language has seemed, to many of them, to be unable to answer these questions; and, perceiving it as insufficient, the great religions, in particular, adopted a type of discourse that came to be known as apophatic discourse, or via negativa. In order to examine some techniques of negation employed by mystics and contemplatives in the face of the difficulties they encounter in talking about the ineffable, this dissertation contrasts the works of two central figures in their respective religious traditions: Mystical Theology, by the Christian Dionysius, the Areopagite, and The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, by the Buddhist Nagarjuna - texts known for taking denial to the extreme. Through this comparison, and relying mainly on the commentators Denys Turner, Eric Perl and Giuseppe Ferraro, this study points out and discusses significant differences between the negative languages used in the two works. Finally, it discusses, briefly, how these discourses relate to contemporary counterparts and parallels, such as the philosophical thought of Jacques Derrida and the discoveries of modern physics in the early 20th century.

There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.

Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may share a common end with religion. Not all philosophies are, however, concerned with this end, nor, again are all religions involved with a quest for wisdom. There may be different techniques and tools employed in the accomplishment of wisdom, but this dissertation is concerned only with the study of the nature and use of reason. In the philosophy of Plato reason is employed in diverse fields including mathematics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis. Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or paramount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this paper and its contents will be examined. In the works of Plato, the use of reason in this sense is termed dialectic. The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course, derived from the Greek. It is equally clear that a radical change has occurred in the meanings of these terms from the original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day. The primary and original meanings of these terms have been nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as to the basic meanings and content of these terms. This problem is further complicated by the tacit agreement that whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than what preceded it. Hence there is today a general reluctance to examine basic origins and classic sources. Contrary to this belief is the concept that every real advance is a result of returning to the basic origins and sources and redefining problems from this perspective. This work will base itself on the latter concept. The final object will be to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy can be termed dialectical. It is a request to reconsider philosophy in the terms of dialectic. A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician - Plato. The Platonic concept of dialectic is to be utilized as a standard and basis of judging other systems that have been termed dialectical. Further, the work intends to reply to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as dialectic, has been superseded by religion since religion rather than philosophy can better insure the object of philosophy-- wisdom. Such a rejection of philosophy and dialectic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope. Thus, a rejection, to be considered, must demonstrate a knowledge of Plato and an understanding of the dialectic. A decline of philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would be justified. On the other hand, it is important to discern the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow from such a denial. Different systems of thought have been termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be examined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialectic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if it is possible to assign a cause. The deficiencies and inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialectic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be made by recourse to other traditions of thought. In the succeeding chapters, the analysis will include Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada, Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao Tzu. These authors have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a philosophy as noted in this thesis. There is no intention to review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards their use of dialectic in selected instances. The philosophers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of this dissertation. Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejection, analyze some private definitions of dialectic, and to correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic.