Au XVIIe siècle, commerce et guerre étant étroitement liés (Pocock), les auteurs de cette époque accordent une grande importance aux liens entre conflits et monnaie. Cette thèse met en évidence comment la conception de la monnaie, sous forme de métaux précieux, influence la manière d’envisager la question de l’enrichissement chez Colbert, Vauban et Locke. Elle montre également quelles sont les implications en matière de politiques économiques et de relations sociales. Ces auteurs développent ainsi une pensée pouvant être qualifiée«d’hétérodoxe», en opposition à l’orthodoxie d’Adam Smith qui critique vivement leur question d’une quantité de monnaie nécessaire au fonctionnement du système économique. Dans ce cadre, quatre questions sont traitées. La première consiste à mettre à jour les effets sociaux d’une économie monétaire : l’apparition d’un conflit entre propriétaires terriens et détenteurs de monnaie et la création du gouvernement civil. La seconde permet de souligner le lien entre les relations sociales et les politiques monétaires à mener – à savoir favoriser l’intérêt des marchands ou maintenir une stabilité sociale? La troisième question aborde alors le rôle du gouvernement et des leviers dont il dispose. Le gouvernement doit garantir une quantité de monnaie appropriée, maintenir une balance commerciale excédentaire et faire circuler la monnaie, via une stabilité monétaire ou encore une réforme fiscale. Enfin la dernière question permet d’appréhender le rôle du commerce international. Celui-ci, n’est qu’un moyen de faire circuler la richesse créée au niveau national, selon ces auteurs. Par ailleurs, seul le commerce international permet l’entrée de monnaie sous la forme de métaux précieux. / In the 17th century, trade and war are deeply related (Pocock). Thus, authors from thatperiod gave a great importance to the links between conflicts and money. This PhD aims at understanding how the idea of money, as a precious metal, influences Colbert’s, Vauban’s and Locke’s thinking about the question of the enrichment. It further studies the implications of this approach for economic policy and social relations. These authors can be considered as« heterodox » in opposition to the orthodoxy of Adam Smith who sharply criticized their investigation of an appropriate quantity of money needed to ensure the good functioning of an economic system. In this framework, four questions are analysed. The first one discusses the social effects of a monetary economy in the form of the appearance of a conflict between the landed men and the moneyed men, that ultimately leads to the establishment of a civil government. The second one underlines the link between social relations and the required monetary policies: shall measures favour merchants’ interest or shall they maintain social stability? This brings the reader to the third question, which is to define the role of the government and its means of action. The government must ensure that an appropriate quantity of money, maintain a trade surplus and make money circulate. This can be achieved through a monetary stability or by implementing fiscal reform. Finally, the last question revolves around the role of international trade. According to these authors, it is mainly a mean allowing wealth which is created inside the country, to circulate. Besides, international trade is the only way to have inflows of precious metal, thus increasing the quantity of money in the country.

[pt] Esta dissertação é composta por três capítulos que abordam questões relacionadas à política monetária. O Capítulo 1 avalia o problema de conduzir política monetária com ativos arriscados em um simples modelo neo-Wickselliano. Eu mostro que a potência da política monetária com relação a preços e inflação se reduz uma vez que ela só pode ser condicionalmente ativa na presença de risco subjacente ao ativo de política monetária. Além disso, prêmio de risco não compensado induz viés inflacionário, e há correlação positiva entre probabilidade de calote e inflação, do mesmo sinal que se costuma encontrar em dados empíricos. Esses resultados constituem um argumento novo em favor de uma política monetária mais vigilante em caso de crise fiscal ou política, o que ajuda a explicar o conservadorismo da política monetária em economias arriscadas. O capítulo 2 endogeniza risco no ativo de política monetária como risco fiscal e estuda sua transmissão. Eu desenvolvo um modelo novo-Keynesiano de dois agentes (TANK) com limites fiscais endógenos no qual o banco central opera através de títulos com risco de calote, e calibro para uma grande economia emergente, Brasil. Eu encontro que, ao ignorar o risco subjacente ao ativo de política monetária, o banco central reforça a coincidência desagradável de taxas mais altas de juros real, nominal e inflação na distribuição de equilíbrio do modelo, o que surge como o resultado de expectativas endógenas de recessões severas em caso de calote. Outrossim, acomodar risco de ativo de política induz correlação positiva entre risco de calote e inflação. Do ponto de vista de política, esses resultados lançam dúvidas quanto à correta avaliação da rigidez da política monetária em economias com risco de calote soberano, enquanto também lançam nova luz sobre a antiga discussão de por que a taxa básica de juros foi excepcionalmente alta no Brasil após o Plano Real. Finalmente, o Capítulo 3 responde à controvérsia recente sobre a presença, de fato, de um canal de transmissão de taxa de juros real nos modelos novo-Keynesianos, uma vez que adição de capital endógeno é consistente com a taxa real se movendo em qualquer direção após um choque monetário positivo. Eu mostro que esse problema de identificação pode ser contornado pela inclusão de outro ingrediente tão comum em modelos de tamanho médio quanto o próprio capital: suavização de taxa de juros. / [en] This dissertation presents three chapters addressing issues pertaining to monetary policy. Chapter 1 evaluates the problem of conducting monetary policy with risky assets in a simple neo-Wicksellian monetary model. I show that monetary policy s power w.r.t prices and inflation reduces as it can only be conditionally active in the presence of policy-asset risk. Moreover, uncompensated risk premium induces an inflationary bias, as well as default probability and inflation are positively correlated, the same sign of empirical correlations usually found. These results constitute a novel argument in favor of a more hawkish stance in case of a fiscal or political crisis, which helps to explain monetary policy conservatism in risky economies. Chapter 2 endogenizes policy-asset risk as a fiscal risk and studies its transmission. I lay out a two-agent New-Keynesian (TANK) model with endogenous fiscal limits in which the central bank operates through defaultable bonds, and then calibrate it to a large emerging economy, Brazil. I find that by ignoring policy-asset risk the central bank reinforces the unpleasant coincidence of higher inflation, real, and nominal interest rates in the equilibrium distribution of the model, what emerges as the result of endogenous expectations of a severe recession in case of default. Additionally, accommodating policy-asset risk induces positive correlation between default risk and inflation. From a policy perspective, these results raise serious concerns about the evaluation of monetary policy stance in default-risky economies, while shed new light on the long-standing discussion about why policy rates have been exceptionally high in Brazil after the Real Plan. Finally, Chapter 3 responds to a recent controversy on the actual presence of a real interest rate transmission channel in New-Keynesian models, as the addition of endogenous capital is consistent with real rates moving in any direction after a monetary shock. I show that this identification problem can be circumvented by the inclusion of another ingredient as prevalent as capital itself in middle-scale models: interest-rate smoothing.