Thesis (MCom(Informatics))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-127).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Technische Hochschule Stuttgart, 1936. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 76-77).

Thesis (doctoral)--Københavns universitet, 1982. / Summary in German. Includes bibliographical references (p. 408-415).

Submitted by Cassiano Clemente Russo do Amaral (cassiano.russo155@gmail.com) on 2017-08-22T23:03:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação para repositório II.pdf: 1500022 bytes, checksum: 8668a1c5b10fb0c50afe27ff60bb0ba7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Monique Sasaki (sayumi_sasaki@hotmail.com) on 2017-08-23T18:28:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 amaral_ccr_me_mar.pdf: 1500022 bytes, checksum: 8668a1c5b10fb0c50afe27ff60bb0ba7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-23T18:28:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 amaral_ccr_me_mar.pdf: 1500022 bytes, checksum: 8668a1c5b10fb0c50afe27ff60bb0ba7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-07 / Neste trabalho, propomos uma leitura de interface entre Dostoiévski e Nietzsche à luz de temas como niilismo e cristianismo, tendo em vista uma possível relação entre os dois autores em um contexto de desmoronamento do solo metafísico expresso na formulação nietzschiana da morte de Deus, a qual, antes mesmo de Nietzsche, Dostoiévski já demostrava os sintomas desse acontecimento em seus livros, notadamente Memórias do Subsolo e Crime e Castigo, obras das quais é possível detectar a doença que contaminava a Europa e a Rússia do século XIX. Com estas palavras, nosso trabalho se situa numa zona limítrofe entre filosofia e literatura, com predominância do espírito dostoievskiano em suas páginas, sem menosprezar, contudo, a importância de Nietzsche para a discussão das páginas que se seguem. / In this work, we propose a reading of the interface between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche in the light of themes such as nihilism and Christianity, in view of a possible relationship between the two authors in a context of the collapse of the metaphysical soil expressed in the Nietzschean formulation of the death of God, which , Even before Nietzsche, Dostoevsky already demonstrated the symptoms of this event in his books, notably Memories from the Underground and Crime and Punishment, works of which it is possible to detect the disease that contaminated Europe and Russia of the nineteenth century. With these words, our work lies in a borderline between philosophy and literature, predominantly the Dostoevskian spirit in its pages, without neglecting, however, the importance of Nietzsche for the discussion of the pages that follow.

The last half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century, in the West, has been referred to as postmodern. Postmodernity represents a stage in a society after having passed through a nihilism, itself produced by the universal commodification inherent in late stage capitalism. Here we explore the progress of devaluation through Adorno’s negative dialects to ascertain the potential for truth and authenticity in the object. Informing Adorno’s negative dialectics, were Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Through their dialectics, Adorno postulated the effect of commodities, as objects, within the first part of the 20th century, and how the lack of potential for truth and freedom in these objects anticipated the nihilism of both the late capitalism period, into the postmodern period. This nihilism itself, was anticipated by Nietzsche. Further, this entire focus on and influence of commodities on the individual, from the early twentieth century to the present is referred to as the commodity structure and itself can be equated to Heidegger’s falling prey. Once the subject has had the valuation or meaning of their lives stripped via this universal commodification of the commodity structure, this paper will argue through the works of Heidegger and Nietzsche and the role of the aesthetic, only then can the subject in the postmodern period reclaim qua participation in one’s own becoming towards both truth and authenticity, as well as freedom.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

The study of history and philosophy reveals that there have been as many systems of morality as there have been distinct civilizations, and that doubts about morality are inevitable. From growing apathy towards political life to increasing cultural acceptance and toleration of what might be considered immorality in every aspect of society, in today’s modern world it is difficult not to notice these doubts creeping into our way of life. This vacuum of values and tendency towards a weariness and indifference towards life is what is generally called Nihilism. Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy illustrated perhaps the clearest expression of what he calls “the great danger to mankind . . . a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life, the tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness . . . nihilism” (3). The problem that Nietzsche sets up can be responded to in many ways, however one of the most common is the Hegelian solution that suggests we can imbue content into our values through our universal recognition and our social life. Despite the appeal of this approach, the problem of nihilism remains intact given the contradictions within Hegelian idealism that Nietzsche’s broader theories make apparent. The most promising resolution of the problem of nihilism in fact comes from Soren Kierkegaard, who is able to respond to Nietzsche’s challenges, as well as solve the issues inherent in the Hegelian solution. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the paradox of faith and on existence creates the basis for his conclusion. He ultimately claims that through a passionate embrace of the paradoxical infinite (faith), which constitutes the essential nature of his conception of inwardness, our values can indeed be real, meaningful, and can give our lives purpose: thereby saving humanity from the nefarious threat of nihilism.

In this thesis I examine the philosophical views of John Searle, Guy Debord, and Jean Baudrillard. These thinkers have radically different methodologies and theoretical alignments, but they are not entirely dissimilar. John Searle argues that there are two types of facts—those independent of human observation and those whose meaning depends on agreement. Guy Debord posits that modern society has replaced authentic social life with mere representation. The “spectacle” has replaced real interactions with others so that meaning itself is no longer authentic; it is treated as a commodity or currency. Jean Baudrillard argues that society has replaced reality with signs and symbols. Thus, human experience consists only of simulations, not reality itself. Each of these figures maintains that meaning is socially constructed. After examining the key assumptions of their respective theories, I demonstrate that their accounts are compatible and argue that their accounts are most cohesive when considered together.

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This thesis seeks to identify, explain, and differentiate the problems of existential doubt and the burden of choice in today’s world versus the previous epochs of human existence. It will attempt to discern the relevant differences in the types of existential doubt, illustrate how these differences came about, and analyze the strength of a potential solution to these problems. My aim is to critique Dreyfus and Kelly’s portrayal and solution to these problems in a way that can further promulgate discussion on an increasingly relevant topic in philosophy, mental health, and science. The conclusion will provide a novel understanding of contemporary nihilism that might be of use in combating this epidemic.