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This thesis will investigate the feasibility of developing nationsâ ability to create a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry in the 21st century using China and India as case studies. I propose it is not possible for developing nations in the current context of the globalized arms race to build an advanced arms industry because of the high political and economic costs. Diverse competing interests force politicians to make decisions about distribution and usage of resources that will maintain their legitimacy. The hypothesis does not rule out that some domestic advancements may be made in certain sectors, such as nuclear bombs and missiles, because resources may be spent on narrowly defined goals instead of the development of the whole industry. Nor does it rule out that a developing nation cannot have a modern military with advanced weaponry, just that the weapons will not all be wholly domestic. They will obtain advanced weapons through joint development, purchasing, or licensing. Political and economic cost will explain the failure of a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry to fully develop, as well as illustrate the few successes within certain sectors of the industry.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-165). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

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Thesis--University of Washington. / Vita. Another copy has number: Thesis 27330. Bibliography: leaaves [227]-248.

A revision of the author's thesis, Kurukshetra University, 1976. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [249]-267) and index.

The lawful use of nuclear weapons in self-defence sits in a precarious and fraught position amongst lawyers, states and scholars, primarily due to their indiscriminate destructive nature. The use of nuclear weapons is the biggest threat to peace and security yet they exist under obscurity in International Law. The purpose of this paper is to examine at what point, and under what circumstances, a State is lawfully permitted to use nuclear weapons in self-defence. The right to self-defence is a basic normative right codified in the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). The inherent right to self-defence is the primary justification for the use of nuclear weapons according to the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion). Even so, nuclear weapons would still have to meet the threshold of self-defence and the cardinal principals of ‘imminence’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ which regulate the lawfulness of a state’s actions in self-defence. Since there has only been two situations where nuclear weapons have been used- in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945- it is necessary to examine three hypothetical situations in which nuclear weapons are used in self-defence to determine if, under any, exceptional circumstances such action could be lawful.

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This thesis explores China’s engagement with global nuclear order since 1949. In particular, China’s engagement refers to the process of creating, consolidating and maintaining nuclear order by assessing the methods it adopts, as well as the motivations behind its policy and the implications of its actions for global nuclear order. Overall, it is argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, even before nuclear order existed, China had an inadvertent hand in its creation, contributing to American and Soviet thinking about how best to build an order, as well as offering its own ideas based on socialist proliferation. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, China engaged in the process of consolidating nuclear order by developing alternative thinking on nuclear deterrence that challenged mainstream strategies such as mutual assured destruction; and by joining important institutions, for instance the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. In addition, during this period, China began to promote a new vision for nuclear order: that of a more representative order. China’s current engagement, at a time when global nuclear order is perceived by many to be under significant strain, is less clear: while China remains committed to key global nuclear institutions and a minimal nuclear strategy; Beijing is also wary of deeper commitments, in particular multilateral arms control processes that might unfairly constrain its nuclear force capabilities relative to other nuclear weapons states.