After the Cold War ended, the process of nuclear disarmament began to stagnate and in recent years there are signs of backsliding. Efforts to revive the disarmament regime over decades culminated with the drafting and ratification of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 and 2021 respectively, much to the dismay of nuclear weapons states. The U.S., Britain, and France have declared their dismissal of the treaty while subscribing to the disarmament regime as established by the Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970.  The Western nuclear powers typically channel their opposition through NATO, and this thesis will first look at NATO’s legal arguments and as the strategy of nuclear deterrence which is fundamental to their defensive strategy. I will then investigate NATO discourse as it pertains to nuclear weapon strategy as a constituent of its subjectivity and intentionality. In other words, what it is like to “be” NATO, and in so doing understand why it acts in opposition to a goal it already pursues.  This is relevant to IR in that it explores an alterative manner in which to understand social structures while adhering to research designs typically ascribes to the “lower” unit of analysis of individuals.

Yes / This briefing paper is the second in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.

This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of the modern nation state at the end of the Thirty Years Wars in 1648. Throughout these shifts, two issues have remained constant, although their relative weight has changed. First that a war can only be described as 'just' if it is being waged for legitimate reasons, jus ad bellum, and that is waged in a proportionate manner that seeks to separate combatants from non-combatants, jus in bello. Both these ideas were severely weakened in the period of warfare that followed on from the American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The new ideology of nationalism brought with it the idea of the nation at arms, the armed citizenry, and with this, a further blurring of the always weak distinction between soldiers and the wider population. By 1945, both the secular and Christian tradition lay in ruins, damaged by the total warfare in the twentieth century when anything and anyone who could contribute to the wider war effort became a target. Also, although not the most destructive weapon, this saw the advent of the nuclear bomb. In response, Christian thinkers sought to redefine the concepts of Just War for a nuclear age, with the potential for the use of weapons that could destroy all of humanity. Some saw this as the lesser evil, when faced with the victory of a totalitarian political system, and others argued that proportionality could be maintained if the size of weapons, or their targeting, was such as to minimise wider damage. On the other hand, many theologians argued that by definition they could never be discriminate or proportionate and that their use (or even the implied threat of their use) would always fail the precepts of Jus in Bello. In the modern Korean context, this debate is not abstract, but has real bearing on the practical steps being taken by all the main parties. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North (the DPRK) has meant that the desire for Korean re-unification has become entwined with how best to resolve the nuclear issue. At the moment, in the South amongst the Protestant communities (split between the CCK and the NCCK), this debate has become fixed on issues of practical politics. In effect, is it better to negotiate with the North over the nuclear weapons issue and hope that resolving this will then lead to reunification or is it better to aim to overthrow the DPRK (economically, politically or even militarily) and, this, by definition, would resolve the question of their possession of nuclear weapons. At the moment both the NCCK and the CCK have based their policies towards North Korea (the DPRK) on the basis of secular politics not the teachings of the Christian gospel. The NCCK is tending to overlook human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the threat of that regime‘s nuclear arsenal, in their emphasis on the need to overcome the political division of Korea. In turn, the CCK ignores much Christian teaching with its emphasis on seeking the collapse (perhaps by military means) of the DPRK as a precursor to unification. In this, both bodies seem to have forgotten that they are fundamentally Christian confessional bodies, and as such their public statements should be based on the Gospels, not on the practicalities of day to day politics. Neither approach is particularly grounded on either in the Christian message of the gospels or the Just War tradition. Thus this thesis does not just seek to explore and explain the current situation in Korea using the concepts of Just War, it also seeks to provide a basis on which the Protestant community can resolve their current impasse. This means the thesis is grounded on the Christian concept of political theology, in particular in so far as this approach 'offers alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution‘. In the case of the situation in Korea, this means there is no military solution to the problem of unification. Nor can a solution be found in ignoring the human rights abuses in the DPRK. The answer lies in stressing three aspects that remain fundamental to any Christian identity in Korea – of a unified Korean koinoina, that any resort to force must meet the conditions of the Christian Just War tradition, and that, as faith groups, any response must stem from the Gospels.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy

This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In the 2 years following the decision, several theories have emerged to explain why the Libyan regime renounced these dangerous weapons. The author uses current literature and relevant sources to analyze the three most probable external causal factors: sanctions and diplomacy, intelligence, and coercive diplomacy. He finds that sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence were significant in altering the Libyan cost-benefit analysis in favor of the West. These findings have political and theoretical implications. Lessons learned from the Libyan case will not be effective against Iran and North Korea due to differences between these countries' proliferation motivation levels and the Libyan case. However, the influence strategies that were effective against Libya are likely to be applicable in other situations. The author finds that more research is still needed to identify the conditions when different strategies are most likely to be effective.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political violence expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War. As a principal adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically driven objectives. A scenario whereby non-state actors would acquire a nuclear capability not only threatens the security of the United States, but would destabilize the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system. Despite U.S. expenditures of over $86 million to help nearly 30 countries worldwide in preventing the smuggling of weapons-useable radiological materials, over 20 known cases of such activity were reported between 1992 and 2001. Previous research has concentrated on a singularly defined threat: The Rogue State. Today's challenges are characterized by more defused, decentralized networks, to include transnational actors with the potential to proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade radiological material. This thesis examines the applicability of traditional Cold War strategies such as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy in the present context, to deny extremist groups and associated networks the means to buy, steal, or make nuclear and radiological weapons. This thesis proposes a multi-dimensional approach in support of mixed-strategies for winning the race against nuclear terror. The author contends that terrorist groups cannot acquire nuclear or radiological technology without the witting or unwitting support of state actors.

Iran and the United States have faced each other across a deep divide ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the events of the American Embassy Hostage crisis. The absence of diplomatic relations between the two nations has led to a lack of communication which has resulted in difficulties crafting successful policies to build bridges between the two governments. The specter of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons casts a further pall on the troubled relations. Case studies of historical examples of nuclear proliferation using multi-causality can shed light on what factors are motivating Iran to seek nuclear weapons. Once these factors are understood, the United States can craft rational policies to pursue its goals in the Middle East while accommodating the probable rise of nuclear industry in Iran.

This study treats the character of French nuclear policy since September 11, 2001; as such this work adds the most recent episode to a theme that, since the late-1950s, has concerned alliance statecraft faced with French â exceptionalismâ in trans-Atlantic relations. In the post-Cold War era, the changes in the strategic environment have led to a further evolution in French nuclear deterrent policy which forms the heart of this study. In 2001 and 2006, French President Chirac made policy speeches which specifically discussed nuclear strategy and clarified the shift in French thought and the justification for deterrence. In 2001, the most important element addressed dissuasion of regional powers and â rogueâ states with WMD that may attack France. The 2006 speech incorporated the threat of statesponsored terrorism into the nuclear dissuasion strategy. The thesis investigates past and present developments in French nuclear strategy, with chief emphasis on the period from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of the twenty-first century; it highlights the forces that have shaped French doctrine and analyzes the viability of the nuclear strategy as seen by a U.S. observer. A review of French Cold War doctrine provides the necessary backdrop for an evaluation of new elements in French nuclear strategy and should act as a guide to students of same in U.S. and NATO policy circles.

Magister Commercii - MCom / North Korea has against the numerous warnings of the international community, protocols and sanctions tested nuclear and missile devices. The purpose of this study is to explain how the political ideology of Juche informs North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. Using a qualitative analysis, this study analyzed the origin of Juche and its impact on North Korea’s foreign and nuclear policies through the years. The social values underlying Juche were found to be the foundation of North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions. Juche itself has evolved as a framework that informs North Korea’s international relations and the study traces this evolution through the different Kim presidencies.

Thesis advisor: James E. Cronin / This dissertation examines British nuclear policymaking during the late 1970s and early 1980s with a focus on its political implications. Highlighting the important link between nuclear politics and alliance coordination, the dissertation demonstrates that at a time of increased Alliance disunity (over Vietnam, détente, etc.) NATO policymakers achieved a broad consensus on theater nuclear policy that in effect stabilized the Alliance against the crises of the 1970s. The dissertation focuses especially on the U.K.’s role in this; British policymakers’ unique ability to mediate between the U.S. and continental Europe contributed enormously to the success of NATO in this period. Taking the British decision to update its strategic nuclear weapons and the coterminous debates in NATO over theater nuclear weapons, carried out against the backdrop of heightened public opposition and debate, it argues that nuclear politics played an integral role in structuring alliances and that this recalibration not only precipitated the end of the Cold War, but also ensured the Alliance’s post-Cold War viability. This research revises our understanding of the Cold War. This dissertation demonstrates that the Cold War, traditionally regarded as a bipolar conflict between superpowers, was often waged through alliances and that the policy preferences of lesser alliance partners mattered tremendously. The dissertation, furthermore, provides evidence for the way in which British policymakers retained an unexpected and disproportionate influence for the U.K. in world affairs—via their ability to successfully mediate within NATO