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The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors -- fusion (or hydrogen) devices -- are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's "large technological systems" thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the "Super" -- the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period -- and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor. / Ph. D.

This research is examines the nuclear arms race that dominated the 20th century, during which the United States manufactured and stockpiled a large number of strategic weapons. Using moral panic theory, the roles of the President of the United States and the media are examined in facilitating public interest in the manufacture of these weapons from 1955-1990. The project uses both time series and historical analyses to determine the extent to which the strategic nuclear weapons crisis was a moral panic created to insure public acceptance of such this massive defense sector expenditure. The time series analysis reveals that the President does have the ability to influence the public via the State of the Union Address, but that influence does not extend strongly to the media. However, what influence the President does have appears to be correlated to the use of substantive rhetoric, and the percentage of the speech dedicated to the issue. Finally, the historical analysis demonstrates that the moral panic moves through three phases. The first phase is characterized by grassroots concern over the technical gap represented by Sputnik 1's launch was utilized by interested actors to accomplish their goals. During the second phase, this concern transformed into an institutional technique utilized for deflecting institutional challenges when the moral panic moved into an interest group model. The final phase occurs during the rise of the "security state", when elites begin using the moral panic to achieve their own ends. / Ph. D.

This thesis is a history of American and British efforts to halt or retard the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. It assesses US and UK non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan from the Indian nuclear test of May 1974 to the decline of anti-proliferation activity in 1979 and 1980. A broadly chronological analysis of key government and media sources from American and British archives highlights the development of non-proliferation policy and the factors that influenced anti-proliferation activity. Scrutiny of British-and not just American-involvement in Pakistan's nuclear programme permits an assessment of the existence of a 'non-proliferation special relationship' between Washington and London. This study demonstrates that successive British governments played a significant role in creating, shaping, and at times adversely affecting, non-proliferation activity on the sub-continent. Additionally, this thesis demonstrates that the UK frequently deprioritised non-proliferation concerns in favour of economic considerations, creating tension between London and Washington. Thus, it is shown that there was a close working relationship between the US and UK governments, but the relationship was riven with fissures. Alongside this examination of British policy, this study also examines American policy and attitudes, demonstrating that infighting and conflicts between strategic priorities impaired the effectiveness of American non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, this study offers a detailed examination of the cultural underpinnings of UK-US non-proliferation policy directed against Pakistan. It demonstrates that-contrary to popular and long-lasting media representations-the paradigm of an 'Islamic bomb' played no part in the creation and application of non-proliferation policy. This thesis makes it clear that in UK-US efforts to halt or retard Pakistani nuclear attainment, issues of credibility and global standing were far more significant than religious factors. Overall, this study examines a key moment in non-proliferation history and offers new findings on the Anglo-American relationship and the role of cultural factors in shaping foreign policy.

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

A questão das armas nucleares continua a figurar como um ponto central das Relações Internacionais Os esforços e ações concretas para o desarmamento, a não-proliferação e o controle das armas nucleares continuam sendo temas que geram tensões recorrentes entre os Estados. No entanto, no Brasil, são poucas as análises de caráter acadêmico acerca destes temas e, no que tange ao posicionamento corrente e prospectivo do Estado brasileiro no Regime de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares, os estudos e análises são ainda mais escassos, ou incipientes. Tendo como objeto de estudo o Tratado sobre a Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP), o Regime dele decorrente e o processo de inserção do Estado brasileiro nesse Regime, a dissertação está estruturada em três eixos: o primeiro contempla o papel das armas nucleares na percepção de segurança dos Estados; o segundo abrange o TNP e o Regime dele decorrente; o terceiro analisa o processo de inserção do Estado brasileiro no Regime em pauta. Assim, em síntese, a pesquisa efetuada contemplou os motivos que levam os Estados à decisão de desenvolver armas nucleares; a gênese do TNP e a evolução da percepção do significado desse Tratado por parte dos Estados; bem como o processo e o grau de inserção do Brasil no Regime de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares. A pesquisa efetuada buscou colocar o presente objeto de estudo no debate mais amplo das Relações Internacionais, tomando como base as abordagens consagradas da disciplina na questão do gerenciamento da segurança dos Estados, isto é, as duas abordagens que constituem o mainstream da disciplina, a perspectiva teórica liberal (e suas variantes neoliberais) e o pensamento realista (e neo-realista). Dessa forma, as conclusões obtidas valeram-se de lentes teóricas distintas, porém necessárias para a compreensão das partes específicas de um conjunto complexo e das conexões causais entre essas partes. / The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue.