Theories of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully account for the nuances of certain cases because proliferation is a complex process involving numerous variables, the importance of which can potentially shift across time. This seems especially true when applied to the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) where motivations have shifted in relevance numerous times in its proliferation history. In order to investigate this, this thesis reviews extant theories of nuclear proliferation and their ability to explain the case of the DPRK by critically examining its historical nuclear progress and nuclear weapons ambitions across time. The result is that indeed, proliferation theories are ill-equipped to completely account for the DPRK’s nuclear choices. The DPRK has ostensibly been motivated by numerous variables at different times, each having varying degrees of influence, inexplicable for mono-causal and often western and ethno-centric accounts of its proliferation motivations.

The recent developments in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe mark a watershed in attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and security. On the one side lie all the old beliefs and assumptions about nuclear defence and security that have been common parlance for the last forty years and more. On the other side lies a unique opportunity to develop a new relationship of increased mutual trust between East and West that could ultimately lead to substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenal. The object of this thesis is to establish how much information already exists about attitudes towards nuclear deterrence and the processes of attitude change. From there, to extend these boundaries of knowledge in the belief that if we are able to understand more exactly what people think about nuclear deterrence, why they hold these attitudes and how attitudes change then we will be in a better position to ease the transitional stage between one set of attitudes and another.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2004. / Submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 571-601). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on September 30, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-137).

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna ; Second Reader: Khan, Feroz H. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 15, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Pashtun Nationalism, Pashtunwali, Durand Line, Afghan Jihad, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, FATA, South Asian Conflicts, Indian Cold-Start Strategy, Kashmir Dispute, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, U.S. AFPAK Strategy, U.S. Troop Surge, Reconciliation with Taliban, Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Nuclear Weapons of Pakistan, Counterinsurgency Strategy of Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Operation Rah-e-Raast, Operation Rah-e-Nejat, Drone Attacks, Central Asian Republics (CARs), Oil and Gas, The New Great Game, Interests of Iran, India, China and Russia in Afghanistan, Gwadar Port. Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-115). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kapur, Paul S. ; Second Reader: Porch, Douglas. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Cold Start, principal-agent problem, compellence, civil-military relations, inter-service rivalry, escalation, deliberate and inadvertent, limited war, nuclear weapons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-108). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1998. / Vita. Abstract. Author's abstract: Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's "large technological systems" thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the "Super"--The most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period -- and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor. "LA-13577-T thesis, issued July 1999." Includes bibliographical references. Also available online via Internet.