Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Resumo: A proliferação de armamentos nucleares representa um problema ainda não solucionado na agenda de segurança internacional, e está intimamente relacionada à proliferação de mísseis balísticos. A literatura sobre este tópico contém diferentes hipóteses sobre o que causa a proliferação, as quais podem ser distinguidas entre aquelas que se referem à demanda que os Estados têm por esses armamentos e aquelas que enfatizam o papel da oferta, ou seja, da facilidade de acesso à tecnologia sensível através da cooperação civil internacional. Nesta pesquisa, investigamos o papel de diferentes elementos sobre as decisões dos Estados de adquirirem, ou não, armamentos nucleares e mísseis balísticos, contrapondo as forças relacionadas à demanda e à oferta. Através de uma análise quantitativa, identificamos algumas correlações relevantes, com destaque para a importância da insegurança como uma força motriz da proliferação e a aparente irrelevância do acesso à tecnologia através de acordos de cooperação internacional. A partir de nossa análise estatística, selecionamos o caso da não-aquisição canadense como objeto para uma investigação mais detida, em que confirmamos a importância do contexto de segurança e o papel marginal do acesso à tecnologia, além de identificarmos uma influência de aspectos identitários sobre a decisão de não-aquisição. Diante disso, concluímos que os fatores relativos à demanda têm impacto muito superior sobre a proliferação do que fatores relacionados à oferta. / Abstract: Nuclear weapons proliferation represents a yet unsolved problem in the international security agenda, and it is intimately related to ballistic missile proliferation. Specialized literature on this topic contains different hypotheses about what causes proliferation, which can be distinguished between those that refer to states’ demand for these weapons, and those that emphasize the role of supply, represented by states’ access to sensitive technology through international civil cooperation. In this research, we investigate the role that different factors play in influencing states’ decision to acquire or relinquish nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and we contrapose forces related to demand and supply. Through a quantitative analysis, we identify some relevant correlations, among which the relevance of insecurity as a driving force of proliferation and the apparent irrelevance of access to technology through international cooperation are particularly noteworthy. From our statistical analysis, we select the case of Canadian non-acquisition to be the object of more detained investigation, through which we confirmed the importance of the security context and the marginal role of access to technology, besides identifying an influence of identity aspects on the non-acquisition policy. In light of this, we conclude that factors relating to demand have a far larger impact on proliferation than factors relating to supply. / Resumen: La proliferación de armamentos nucleares representa un problema que todavía no tiene solución en la agenda de seguridad internacional, y que está íntimamente relacionado a la proliferación de mísiles balísticos. La literatura acerca de este tópico contiene distintas hipótesis sobre lo que causa la proliferación, que pueden ser distinguidas entre las que se refieren a la demanda de los Estados por eses armamentos, y las que enfatizan el papel de la oferta, o sea, la facilidad de acceso a tecnología sensible a través de la cooperación civil internacional. En esta pesquisa, investigamos el papel de distintos elementos sobre la decisión de los Estados de adquirieren, o no, los armamentos nucleares y los mísiles balísticos, haciendo un contrapunto entre las fuerzas relacionadas a la demanda e a la oferta. A través de un análisis cuantitativo, identificamos algunas correlaciones relevantes, con destaque para la importancia de la inseguridad como una fuerza motriz de la proliferación y la aparente irrelevancia del acceso a tecnología por acuerdos de cooperación internacional. A partir de nuestro análisis estadístico, seleccionamos el caso de la no-adquisición canadiense como objeto para una investigación más detenida, en la cual confirmamos la importancia el contexto de seguridad y el papel marginal del acceso a la tecnología, además de identificamos una influencia de aspectos identitarios sobre la decisión de no-adquisición. Frente a eso, concluimos que los factores relativos a la ... (Resumen completo clicar acceso eletrônico abajo) / Doutor

Submitted by RAQUEL DE BESSA GONTIJO DE OLIVEIRA null (raquelbgontijo@gmail.com) on 2018-03-03T14:17:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese de doutorado - Raquel de Bessa Gontijo de Oliveira.pdf: 2199485 bytes, checksum: 7175c3b6adf14970ba69328f64b9f2e2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2018-03-05T17:45:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 oliveira_rbg_dr_mar.pdf: 2199485 bytes, checksum: 7175c3b6adf14970ba69328f64b9f2e2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-05T17:45:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 oliveira_rbg_dr_mar.pdf: 2199485 bytes, checksum: 7175c3b6adf14970ba69328f64b9f2e2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A proliferação de armamentos nucleares representa um problema ainda não solucionado na agenda de segurança internacional, e está intimamente relacionada à proliferação de mísseis balísticos. A literatura sobre este tópico contém diferentes hipóteses sobre o que causa a proliferação, as quais podem ser distinguidas entre aquelas que se referem à demanda que os Estados têm por esses armamentos e aquelas que enfatizam o papel da oferta, ou seja, da facilidade de acesso à tecnologia sensível através da cooperação civil internacional. Nesta pesquisa, investigamos o papel de diferentes elementos sobre as decisões dos Estados de adquirirem, ou não, armamentos nucleares e mísseis balísticos, contrapondo as forças relacionadas à demanda e à oferta. Através de uma análise quantitativa, identificamos algumas correlações relevantes, com destaque para a importância da insegurança como uma força motriz da proliferação e a aparente irrelevância do acesso à tecnologia através de acordos de cooperação internacional. A partir de nossa análise estatística, selecionamos o caso da não-aquisição canadense como objeto para uma investigação mais detida, em que confirmamos a importância do contexto de segurança e o papel marginal do acesso à tecnologia, além de identificarmos uma influência de aspectos identitários sobre a decisão de não-aquisição. Diante disso, concluímos que os fatores relativos à demanda têm impacto muito superior sobre a proliferação do que fatores relacionados à oferta. / Nuclear weapons proliferation represents a yet unsolved problem in the international security agenda, and it is intimately related to ballistic missile proliferation. Specialized literature on this topic contains different hypotheses about what causes proliferation, which can be distinguished between those that refer to states’ demand for these weapons, and those that emphasize the role of supply, represented by states’ access to sensitive technology through international civil cooperation. In this research, we investigate the role that different factors play in influencing states’ decision to acquire or relinquish nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and we contrapose forces related to demand and supply. Through a quantitative analysis, we identify some relevant correlations, among which the relevance of insecurity as a driving force of proliferation and the apparent irrelevance of access to technology through international cooperation are particularly noteworthy. From our statistical analysis, we select the case of Canadian non-acquisition to be the object of more detained investigation, through which we confirmed the importance of the security context and the marginal role of access to technology, besides identifying an influence of identity aspects on the non-acquisition policy. In light of this, we conclude that factors relating to demand have a far larger impact on proliferation than factors relating to supply. / La proliferación de armamentos nucleares representa un problema que todavía no tiene solución en la agenda de seguridad internacional, y que está íntimamente relacionado a la proliferación de mísiles balísticos. La literatura acerca de este tópico contiene distintas hipótesis sobre lo que causa la proliferación, que pueden ser distinguidas entre las que se refieren a la demanda de los Estados por eses armamentos, y las que enfatizan el papel de la oferta, o sea, la facilidad de acceso a tecnología sensible a través de la cooperación civil internacional. En esta pesquisa, investigamos el papel de distintos elementos sobre la decisión de los Estados de adquirieren, o no, los armamentos nucleares y los mísiles balísticos, haciendo un contrapunto entre las fuerzas relacionadas a la demanda e a la oferta. A través de un análisis cuantitativo, identificamos algunas correlaciones relevantes, con destaque para la importancia de la inseguridad como una fuerza motriz de la proliferación y la aparente irrelevancia del acceso a tecnología por acuerdos de cooperación internacional. A partir de nuestro análisis estadístico, seleccionamos el caso de la no-adquisición canadiense como objeto para una investigación más detenida, en la cual confirmamos la importancia el contexto de seguridad y el papel marginal del acceso a la tecnología, además de identificamos una influencia de aspectos identitarios sobre la decisión de no-adquisición. Frente a eso, concluimos que los factores relativos a la demanda tienen un impacto muy superior sobre la proliferación que los factores relativos a la oferta.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Jack M. Holl / Donald J. Mrozek / As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the threat of international communism. He championed the beneficent role played by nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war. Eisenhower's assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous. He desired to make nuclear weapons as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane. He also planned to exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also believed could contribute to national strength. However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the nuclear age as some scholars have argued. Rather, Eisenhower approached the question of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength. In this effort, Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation, Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the international community of the U.S.'s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national conscience. Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the twentieth century.

Magister Administrationis - MAdmin / This thesis attempts to assess the role Africa has played to further the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons disarmament. Particular focus is on the Pelindaba Treaty and whether it has been able to strengthen the call for disarmament based on the humanitarian approach. The findings of this research are that the Pelindaba treaty did contribute indirectly to the strengthening of the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons disarmament because the Treaty serves as an important contribution towards the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, which is the key objective of the humanitarian initiative of nuclear weapons disarmament. In addition, the Pelindaba Treaty has also contributed in strengthening the call for overall nuclear disarmament. This is the case as 53 states signed the treaty to rid the continent of nuclear weapons and any direct threats associated with those weapons. In so doing, it has contributed greatly to disarmament efforts. A nuclear weapons free zone across the continent is a powerful statement about the desire for a nuclear free world. It has provided African states with a foundation for engaging in the humanitarian initiative, as it led to some standardisation of statements/positions. Also, since the inception of the humanitarian approach to disarmament, African states have contributed greatly to the initiative. In terms of numbers, in the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use that have taken place between 2013 and 2014 (in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna), it was witnessed that the number of participating African states increased from 34 in the first meeting to 45 in the last meeting. This alone indicates the determination and commitment by these African states to the initiative. Conclusively, this research determined that the Pelindaba Treaty and efforts of African states in general have contributed towards strengthening the call for not only the humanitarian initiative to nuclear weapons disarmament but also to disarmament overall.

Main aim of this master's thesis is to answer the following research question: How to deal with nuclear Iran? Author explores this vast topic through lens of a neorealist paradigm in order to analyze the impact of Russia's and US influence over Israeli-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East. Discourse analysis has been chosen as a methodological blueprint to examine strategic dimension of Israeli-Iranian relations with a special emphasis on its nuclear dimension. In addition, a comparison of both possible military and peaceful solutions of Iranian nuclear program is stressed. Main empirical data used are infamous Israeli air-strikes on nuclear reactors of its neighbors; Osirak and Al-Kibar. Deterrence theory, especially its conventional realm, provides a basis for an assessment of strategic balance between State of Israel an Islamic Republic of Iran, in case Iran emerges as a nuclear power.

Background: Nuclear and conventional weapons industry workers are at risk for exposures to beryllium, asbestos, high explosives and barium, all of which are implicated in the pathogenesis of pneumoconiosis. Beryllium has also been shown to cause sensitization (BeS) carrying a risk of progression to Chronic Beryllium Lung Disease (CBD). Data are lacking on the epidemiology of beryllium related health effects in conventional munitions workers and limited studies have been published on the prevalence of BeS in workers with minimal exposure. Data on the prevalence of pneumoconiosis in nuclear weapons workers is also lacking. The main objectives of this study were to determine prevalence and risk factors for beryllium sensitization in former nuclear and conventional munitions workers and rates of and risk factors for pneumoconiosis in former nuclear weapons workers, both cohorts from the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP) in Burlington, IA. Methods: Former nuclear weapons workers were offered chest x-ray (CXR) and blood screening for sensitization with beryllium lymphocyte proliferation test (BeLPT) as part of the Department of Energy (DoE) Former Worker Medical Screening Program. Conventional munitions workers were offered BeLPT and clinical follow-up if sensitized, as part of a Department of Defense (DOD) funded study. Chest x-rays were reviewed by three readers according to the International Labour Organization's Classification system for Radiographs for Pneumoconioses (ILO system). Exposures under study were characterized qualitatively by the industrial hygiene team and based on former worker interviews and historical industrial hygiene records. Results: The prevalence of beryllium sensitization in nuclear and conventional munitions workers was found to be slightly higher than in other workforces and weapons worker populations at low risk for exposure. The prevalence of parenchymal disease was higher in these nuclear weapons workers than in other DoE studies, while the prevalence of coincident parenchymal and pleural and isolated pleural disease was lower than in other nuclear weapons populations. Workers who occasionally dressed the copper-beryllium alloy tools were found to have an increased risk of beryllium sensitization, compared to those in administrative or other jobs with insignificant potential for exposure on site. Exposure to beryllium, asbestos, high explosives or barium was not associated with lung disease in this population. Conclusions: The findings from this study have potential policy implications for DOE and DOD to extend or implement beryllium surveillance and lung disease screening for their workforces and better control use of the copper-beryllium alloy tools in their production processes.

No description available.

No description available.

The aim of this work is to determine the influence of nuclear weapons possession in 1) Russia's foreign policy in the Ukraine crisis, 2) relations between NATO and Russia. For this purpose the work monitors the development of NATO - Russia relations from the Budapest memorandum until present. The work also creates typology of russian signalling activities based on the theoretical basis of the nuclear deterrence conceptions and especially on the models of crisis signalling, which is closely linked to these conceptions. After monitoring these activities the work concludes that Russia is indeed using threats of nuclear weapons employment in the framework of it's attitude towards Ukraine crisis and also the intensity of signalling shows similar development as the relations with NATO.

No description available.